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INTRODUCTION
New reporting requirements and data collection efforts by over
four hundred law enforcement agencies across the country- including
entire states such as Maryland, Missouri, and Washington' - are
producing a continuous flow of new evidence on highway police
searches. For the most part, the data consistently show disproportion-
ate searches of African-American and Hispanic motorists in relation
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. I am deeply grateful to Gary Becker,
Tracey Meares, Martha Nussbaum, Nicola Persico, Richard Posner, Geoffrey Stone, Cass Sun-
stein, and David Weisbach for extensive comments and guidance on the manuscript, as well as to
Al Alschuler, Mary Anne Case, Adam Cox, Frank Easterbrook, Richard Epstein, Saul Levmore,
John Pfaff, and Eric Posner for comments and discussion of earlier drafts; to participants at
workshops at the University of Chicago, Harvard Law School, New York University, and Prince-
ton University; and to Ranjit Hakim, Timothy Karpoff, Jennifer Miller, and Ward Penfold for ex-
ceptional research assistance.
I See Clayton J. Mosher, Terance D. Miethe, and Dretha M. Phillips, The Mismeasure of
Crime 186 (Sage 2002) ("As of March 2001, more than 400 law enforcement agencies in the
United States were gathering information on the race/ethnicity of those stopped."). See also
Katheryn K. Russell, Racial Profiling: A Status Report of the Legal, Legislative, and Empirical
Literature, 3 Rutgers Race & L Rev 61, 68-71 (2001) (listing jurisdictions that have enacted data
collection mandates); Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 Colum Hum Rts L Rev
41, 81-83 (2001) (reviewing data collection efforts); Deborah Ramirez, Jack McDevitt, and Amy
Farrell, A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems: Promising Practices and
Lessons Learned (DOJ 2000), online at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffileslbja/184768.pdf (visited July
27, 2004) (describing the data collection systems in California, New Jersey, North Carolina, and
Great Britain). For the most recent data, legislation, and news, see the Northeastern University
Center on Racial Profiling website at http://www.racialprofiinganalysis.neu.edu (visited July 27,
2004). See also the website of the Institute on Race & Poverty at the University of Minnesota at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/irp/publications/racialprofling.html (visited July 27,2004).
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to their estimated representation on the road. Economists, civil liber-
ties advocates, legal and constitutional scholars, political scientists,
lawyers, and judges are poring over the new data and reaching, in
many cases, quite opposite conclusions about racial profiling.!
In one corner, economists are developing new models of racial
profiling to test whether the consistent findings of disproportionate
searches of minority motorists reflect efficiency of policing-that is,
"statistical discrimination" that results from maximizing the number
of successful searches of motorists for drug contraband-or raw racial
animus. To economists, the fact that police disproportionately search
minority motorists is not, in itself, proof of racism. What matters in-
stead is the rate of successful searches that discover drug contra-
band-frequently referred to as the "hit rate." When the hit rates are
the same across racial or ethnic lines, some economists argue, the po-
lice are not bigoted in their searches because they have no incentive
to search more or fewer motorists of any particular race. At equilib-
rium, the police have achieved a racial balance, though perhaps
one with a racial imbalance at its heart, that they are unwilling to
change on the basis of race-unless, of course, they have a taste for
discrimination.
Accordingly, when the data reveal equal hit rates as between dif-
ferent racial groups-such as in Maryland between African-American
2 The controversy over the definition of the term "racial profiling" has been rehearsed in
several leading articles on racial profiling. In this Article, "racial profiling" denotes the practice
of stopping and searching minority motorists at a rate in excess of their representation on the
road based on the assumption that they are more likely to be transporting drug contraband. The
term "racial profiling" is of recent vintage. See generally Jerome H. Skolnick and Abigail Cap-
lovitz, Guns, Drugs, and Profiling: Ways to Target Guns and Minimize Racial Profiling, 43 Ariz L
Rev 413 (2001), reprinted in Bernard E. Harcourt, ed, Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America
249 (NYU 2003) (discussing the history of the "racial profiling" expression). For discussions of
the controversy over the definition of racial profiling, see, for example, Russell, 3 Rutgers Race
& L Rev at 65-68 (cited in note 1); Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution,
2002 U Chi Legal F 163,168-73 & n 24; Samuel R. Gross and Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work:
Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 Mich L Rev 651, 738 & nn 278-82
(2002). For a careful definition of the term, see Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser, Racial
Profiling, 32 Phil & Pub Aff 131,135-38 (2004).
3 The leading studies include John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd, Racial Bias in
Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J Polit Econ 203 (2001); Rubdn Herndndez-
Murillo and John Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing?: Testing in Aggregated Data
(working paper Apr 18, 2003), online at http://www.econ.upenn.edu/-jknowlesfResearch/
HKRacProf_2003c.pdf (visited July 27, 2004); Nicola Persico, Racial Profiling, Fairness, and Ef-
fectiveness of Policing, 92 Am Econ Rev 1472 (2002); Vani K. Borooah, Racial Bias in Police
Stops and Searches: An Economic Analysis, 17 Eur J Polit Econ 17 (2001). For a fruitful discus-
sion of the difference between statistical discrimination and naked bigotry, compare Shanti P.
Chakravarty, Economic Analysis of Police Stops and Searches: A Critique, 18 Eur J Polit Econ
597 (2002), with Vani K. Borooah, Economic Analysis of Police Stops and Searches: A Reply, 18
Eur J Polit Econ 607 (2002).
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and white motorists4 -some economists conclude that the dispropor-
tionate searches of minority drivers do not reflect a taste for discrimi-
nation, but rather an attempt to maximize successful searches. When
the data reveal lower hit rates for minority motorists-such as in
Maryland between Hispanic and white motorists, or in Missouri be-
tween African-American and Hispanic motorists on the one hand and
white motorists on the other 6-some economists reason that bigotry
against minority motorists explains the disparity. And when the data
reveal higher hit rates for minority motorists-such as in Maryland
regarding large hauls of drugs'-economists conclude that reverse ra-
cism is at play-in other words, bigotry against white motorists.
In another corner, civil liberties advocates and some legal schol-
ars dispute the economists' assumptions and claims of policing effi-
ciency.8 Several commentators focus on the raw disparities in searches,
and argue that the disparities themselves produce large numbers of
innocent minority motorists subjected to negative police interaction
and state surveillance, which, they suggest, is unacceptable on its own
terms! Other commentators focus on indicators of actual offending
rates-such as drug consumption self-report surveys-and argue that
there is no evidence that minority motorists offend at higher rates
than whites.' From their perspective, the equal or lower hit rates do
not reflect policing efficiency, but rather constant rates of equal or
lower offending among minorities. And if there are non-elastic similar
rates of offending among minority motorists, the police should not use
race in the decision to stop and search motorists. Building on this em-
pirical foundation, they argue that it is "plainly unconstitutional" to
use race in the decision to search motorists." The police, they contend,
4 See Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 219 (cited in note 3).
5 Id.
6 See Hernbndez-Murillo and Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing? at 4-5 (cited in
note 3).
7 See Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 224-26.
8 The leading articles and books include David A. Harris, Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial
Profiling Cannot Work (New Press 2002); Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev 651 (cited in note
2); Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F 163 (cited in note 2); Samuel R. Gross and Debra Livingston,
Racial Profiling under Attack, 102 Colum L Rev 1413 (2002); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement
by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches without Cause, 3 U Pa J
Const L 296 (2001); Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on the Freeway, 3 Rutgers Race & L
Rev 117 (2001).
9 See, for example, Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 91-128 (cited in note 8).
10 See, for example, Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 230-31; Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich
L Rev at 670; Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const L at 308-12 (cited in note 8).
11 Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 744 (cited in note 2). See also Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J
Const L at 363-66 (cited in note 8); Maclin, 3 Rutgers Race & L Rev at 124 (cited in note 8).
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can no more use race to decide whom to search than a prosecutor can
use race to decide whom to charge with a capital crime."
In yet a third corner, judges and several constitutional commenta-
tors draw technical distinctions to resolve legal challenges to racial
profiling. First, judges distinguish between the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantee of equal treatment, and largely relegate the use of
race in policing to the latter. In the Fourth Amendment context,
judges and some commentators distinguish between using race exclu-
sively and as one factor among others, and tend to disregard claims
that fall in the latter category, which captures most of the cases. In the
equal protection context, judges and many commentators distinguish
between profiling without individualized suspicion and using an eye-
witness racial identification, and exclude the latter from Fourteenth
Amendment scrutiny. Finally, in the equal protection context as well,
judges distinguish between intentional discrimination established by
evidence of specific discriminatory acts and statistical evidence of dis-
parate treatment, and reject challenges that do not establish the for-
mer. The result is that practically all constitutional challenges to racial
profiling have either failed due to one or more of these technical legal
distinctions13 or have been settled out of court, primarily for injunctive
relief.1
4
The emerging debates are increasingly empirical, technical, en-
gaged, and heated-which are all positive developments. But they suf-
fer from one fatal flaw: no one has properly identified the conditions
12 See Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 740-41; Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 254-
55 (cited in note 2). See also Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const L at 322-29 (evaluating racial profiling in
light of the case law on selective prosecution).
13 See Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 727. There is one notorious exception, in
which a court permitted the requisite discriminatory intent to be inferred from statistical evi-
dence. State v Soto, 324 NJ Super 66, 734 A2d 350, 360 (1996). For commentary, see Gross and
Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 723-30; Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 53 (cited in note 8); Rudovsky, 3
U Pa J Const L at 351.
14 See Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 727-28; Garrett, 33 Colum Hum Rts L Rev at
75-81, 98-105 (cited in note 1) (discussing several decrees). This is not to suggest, though, that
the litigation has not had significant effects in raising awareness of the issue of racial profiling,
generating policy responses within police departments, and promoting agreements between po-
lice departments and anti-racial profiling organizations. An example of one such agreement en-
tered into as a result of voluntary mediation-between the St. Paul Police Department and the
St. Paul Chapter of the NAACP-is reproduced as an appendix to Lorie Fridell, et al, Racially
Biased Policing: A Principled Response (Police Executive Research Forum 2001). That report
also details six key policy responses-including police department accountability and supervi-
sion, education and training, and minority community outreach-that a number of police de-
partments are implementing. Id at ch 3-8. See also John J. Farmer, Jr. and Paul H. Zoubek, Final
Report of the State Police Review Team (New Jersey State Police Review Team 1999) (detailing a
list of recommendations for reforms relating to racial profiling).
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under which racial profiling, as a form of criminal profiling, can legiti-
mately and constitutionally be used in policing. This failure reflects in
part the fact that for many people after September 11, 2001, there is
no longer a clear-cut answer to the puzzle of race and policing. As Wil-
liam Stuntz suggests, expressing the views of many after September 11,
"solving the profiling problem is impossible.""
This, however, cannot be right. The use of race in policing is not
that different from the use of race in other policy contexts-whether
in higher education, employment, or even restitution for slavery -that
conditions cannot be stated for when race may be used in policing,
particularly when the government's interest in using race relates to a
traditional compelling interest such as the law enforcement goal of
combating crime. To the contrary, the specific conditions under which
race can legitimately and constitutionally be considered in policing
can be specified as follows: racial profiling for purposes of police
searches is a narrowly tailored policing technique that promotes the
traditional law enforcement interest in fighting crime if (1) racial pro-
filing reduces the amount of profiled crime while (2) maintaining or
increasing the efficient allocation of police resources, without (3) pro-
ducing a "ratchet effect" on the profiled population. A ratchet effect
occurs when racial profiling produces a supervised population dispro-
portionate to the distribution of offending by racial group.
The first condition-that racial profiling must minimize the pro-
filed crime-is the core of the government's law enforcement interest
in fighting crime. If racial profiling of minority motorists causes white
motorists to offend more, and this additional offending outweighs any
gains from the reduction of minority motorist offending, then racial
profiling is counterproductive. If, in contrast, racial profiling reduces
the profiled crime, then, as between different policing techniques, ra-
cial profiling is preferable only if it represents a more efficient alloca-
tion of resources (putting aside the issue of race for one moment).
15 William J. Stuntz, Local Policing after the Terror, 111 Yale L J 2137, 2163 (2002). Stuntz
places himself in the category of people who regard racial profiling as "occasionally tolerable";
however, Stuntz does not elaborate in detail when racial profiling is proper, other than to suggest
that "[i]t all depends on the balance, on the benefits to law enforcement from using race or eth-
nicity as a proxy and the harm to the group that must pay [the racial] tax." Id at 2179. Overall,
Stuntz writes that "racial and ethnic profiling is a fact of life that the legal system probably can-
not change." Id. As a result, rather than addressing the problem head on, Stuntz suggests we im-
plement changes in the regulation of police that will alleviate the problem-specifically, that we
allow group searches not based on individualized suspicion and regulate the manner of searches.
These reforms, Stuntz argues, will mitigate the problem of racial profiling. Id at 2163-76. See also
R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling. Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 Stan L Rev 571, 602
(2003) (suggesting abandonment of the racial profiling inquiry).
16 The concept of a "ratchet effect" is defined and explained in detail in Part II.B.2.
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Hence, the second condition. As opposed to random highway searches,
racial profiling would increase the efficiency of policing if, for exam-
ple, it produces higher overall rates of detection of drug contraband,
that is, higher hit rates overall. However, racial profiling is narrowly
tailored to these law enforcement goals only if the policing practices
do not create a ratchet effect on the profiled population; this is the
third condition. A policy of searching all members of a racial group-
or for that matter, incarcerating all members of a racial group-is
likely to satisfy the first requirement and significantly reduce the
amount of profiled crime, but would clearly produce a ratchet effect
on the members of the racial group. For the more effective and effi-
cient policing policy to be acceptable, it must not have disproportion-
ate collateral consequences on the profiled population. It must not
produce a racial imbalance in the supervised or carceral population
relative to the racial breakdown of offenders.
Under these three conditions, racial profiling would be an effec-
tive, efficient, and narrowly tailored law enforcement technique that
promotes the compelling government interest in combating crime,
here the highway transportation of illicit drugs. This is not to say that
it would have no costs. Like all other policies that use a category dis-
tinction-especially race-it would inflict costs on members of the
profiled group. More minority motorists -innocent and guilty-would
be subjected to intrusive, unpleasant, and possibly humiliating
searches on the side of the road. But all distinctions based on race-
including affirmative action programs -distribute costs based on race.
The fact that there are costs is not dispositive. What matters is whether
the race-based policy is narrowly tailored to minimize costs. Nor does
the satisfaction of the three constitutional conditions establish that the
benefits of drug interdiction outweigh these substantial costs. We can
debate at length the pros and cons of the war on drugs. But, policy de-
bates aside, if the three conditions are met, racial profiling of police
searches should survive constitutional scrutiny.
There may well be other non-law enforcement interests that war-
rant using race in policing as well. For instance, having a carceral
population that reflects more accurately the demographic distribution
of the offending population or the general population may constitute
a compelling interest. If so, it may be necessary to profile white motor-
ists to balance the demographics of the prison population. It may be
necessary to employ affirmative action in policing. Again, this would
have costs-increased searches of innocent white motorists-and, as a
policy matter, those costs may be equally troubling; however, as a con-
stitutional matter, if the reverse racial profiling is narrowly tailored to
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the compelling interest in reducing minority representation in prison,
then the policy would also survive judicial scrutiny. Alternatively,
combating crimes committed against historically disadvantaged popu-
lations, such as African-Americans or Hispanics, may be a compelling
interest. If so, here too it may be necessary to be race conscious in po-
licing. But with regard to the specific compelling interest in fighting
crime-in this case, interdicting the highway transportation of drug
contraband-race can properly be used in policing only if the three
narrow conditions specified above are satisfied.
Properly defining these conditions greatly clarifies the racial pro-
filing debate. As a preliminary matter, it becomes clear that the new
economic models and the debates over "policing efficiency" are
maximizing the wrong thing: instead of maximizing the success rate of
searches, the police should seek, first and foremost, to maximize the
reduction in the profiled crime and associated policing costs-in other
words, to minimize the social costs associated with the profiled crime
and profiling technique. As a result, the new economic models track
the wrong statistic: rather than focusing on hit rates, the models should
focus on the overall amount of profiled crime and costs to society of
the searches. Moreover, the models need to address the additional
question of whether racial profiling produces a ratchet effect on the
profiled population.
A second major implication is that the new data do not contain
enough information to address these questions-neither the narrow
question of whether racial profiling maximizes the success rate of
searches, nor the larger questions of whether it reduces the amount of
the profiled crime or causes a ratchet effect. The three narrow condi-
tions that would make racial profiling acceptable will be satisfied only
under very specific circumstances of comparative elasticity of offend-
ing to policing and of comparative offending as between the two racial
groups. The new data, however, lack this information. The data contain
only two of at least four necessary quantities of interest. The data in-
clude, first, the number and proportion of drivers searched by race
and, second, the success rate of searches by race. (There is also more
detailed information about types and amounts of drugs seized, loca-
tion, type of searches, etc., which can produce more refined but not
fundamentally different analyses.) The data, however, are entirely si-
lent regarding the comparative elasticity of offending to policing and
the comparative natural offending rates by racial group. They also lack
information on the selective use of other search criteria by race. With-
out this information, the data can say little empirically about the nar-
row efficiency of racial profiling or about the impact of racial profiling
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on the profiled crime and the profiled population. For example, equal
official hit rates may mask higher real offending rates for minority
motorists if the police rely less on other search criteria for minor-
ity motorists, or they could mask lower real offending rates for minor-
ity motorists if the police use additional sub-search processes for mi-
nority motorists, both of which would be consistent with bigotry. The
official hit rates, it turns out, are extremely difficult to interpret.
When we correct for these deficiencies and make reasonably con-
servative assumptions from other available evidence, it becomes clear
that racial profiling probably does not satisfy all three conditions. Mi-
nority motorists, in all likelihood, have slightly lower elasticity of of-
fending to policing than white motorists because of reduced employ-
ment opportunities, and have slightly higher offending rates when
drug trafficking is included. Under these conditions, racial profiling on
the highways may well increase the amount of profiled crime and
costs associated with police searches, resulting in numerically more
white motorists offending because of a perceived sense of immunity.
In addition, racial profiling on the highways is likely to have a ratchet
effect on the profiled population, resulting in a greater disproportion
of minority arrests or negative contacts with the police over and above
the higher offending rate. This increase in negative police contacts will
aggravate the disproportional representation of minorities in the cor-
rectional population, more unevenly distribute criminal records, su-
pervision, and post-punitive collateral consequences, and significantly
boost the public perception that minorities are drug users, traffickers,
and couriers.
The central problems with racial profiling on the highways, then,
are the likely ratchet effect on the profiled population and, possibly,
an adverse long-term effect on the profiled crime and costs of police
searches. These are not really problems about racial profiling, but
problems about racial profiling.7 Or to put it another way, these are
problems that might infect any profiling scheme, whether based on
race, or gender, or wealth, or class, or physical demeanor. Although
practically everyone in the criminal justice field endorses criminal pro-
filing as a law enforcement technique outside the racial profiling con-
17 In this sense, my thesis in this Article goes directly against that of Frederick Schauer in
his most recent book, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (Harvard 2003). Schauer argues that
"the problems with racial profiling ... are not problems of profiling, with race being merely an
example. Rather,... the problem is about race and not about profiling." Id at 197-98. The pur-
pose of this Article is to demonstrate the exact opposite: the problem is about profiling, not
about race. The problem has to do with comparative elasticities and offending rates, and may
plague any criminal profiling scheme, not just racial profiling.
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text, the fact is that criminal profiling advances the larger interest of
crime reduction only under very specific circumstances.
The ratchet effect is also a problem with criminal profiling more
generally. What the ratchet effect does is violate a core principle of
punishment theory, namely that anyone who is committing the same
crime should face the same likelihood of being caught, and that race,
gender, social status, class, wealth, or other irrelevant categories simply
should not matter in that equation. When profiling works-when it
targets a higher offending population-it likely produces a ratchet ef-
fect that violates this fundamental idea. It distributes the costs of the
penal system along troubling lines-race, gender, class, status, wealth,
and the like. It runs against a basic ideal of our criminal justice sys-
tem: that all similarly situated persons be treated alike. The best way
to achieve that goal is to avoid criminal profiling entirely and to police
color-blind, or gender-blind, or class-blind: rather than profile the
wealthy for tax evasion, select at random; rather than profile on race
for automobile searches, select color-blind.
Naturally, race is what makes racial profiling on the highways so
controversial and, at least at the level of public rhetoric, so con-
demned. But it is important to rethink racial profiling through the lens
of criminal profiling-to reduce race to the role that it purportedly
plays in racial profiling, namely a predictive factor; to treat race no dif-
ferently than we would gender, class, age, or any other profile that
works; to take the focus away from race and place it on criminal pro-
filing more generally.
Rethinking racial profiling through the lens of criminal profiling
sheds light on and raises important questions about the larger issue of
criminal profiling. The fact is that criminal profiling tends to accentu-
ate the prejudices and biases that are built into the penal code. This is,
naturally, all for the good when we come out on the winning side or
when we punish the worst offenders. But it is problematic in the gray
area of the criminal law, in the mass of cases that engulf the criminal
justice system-the drug users, the quality-of-life offenders, the tax
cheats. There, matters are less clear. The prejudices and biases of the
penal law in those cases are more questionable. In the mass of crimi-
nal cases, criminal profiling may have adverse effects by aggravating
18 There may well be certain profiles that distribute the costs along lines about which we
are somewhat indifferent. So, for instance, we might not care about the distributional conse-
quences of profiling along the lines of out-of-state tags or rental cars if these are, in fact, profiles
that work (though it is often easy to find associations between these seemingly innocent traits
and traits that do bother us). But most of the profiles that we care about and debate involve
those more sensitive traits, such as race, gender, physical attributes, wealth, class, etc.
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the correlations between status and crime. What criminal profiling
does, in effect, is to leverage any structural tilt and exploit any associa-
tions between crimes and identifiable or profilable traits. It magnifies
these correlations into carceral distortions. Racial profiling on the
highways is a good example of this, but it is by no means the only ex-
ample. The same would hold true for other forms of profiling, whether
profiling the wealthy for tax evasion or single mothers for welfare
fraud.
This Article is an attempt at ground clearing. It seeks to clarify
the empirical controversies surrounding racial profiling and thereby
shed light on the policy and constitutional law debates. The organiza-
tion of the Article is as follows. Part I reviews and evaluates the recent
economics literature on racial profiling, and argues that the new eco-
nomic models focus attention on the wrong question and track the
wrong statistic. Part II reviews and assesses the civil liberties scholar-
ship on racial profiling, and contends that its response unwittingly
embraces the logic of the economic models and perpetuates the prob-
lematic focus on hit rates. Part III reviews and assesses the constitu-
tional framework that judges have constructed to resolve legal chal-
lenges to racial profiling and, based on the prior empirical analysis, of-
fers an alternative approach. Part IV sets forth the type of empirical
evidence that would be necessary to venture more informed specula-
tion regarding the effects of racial profiling on the highways. Based on
reasonably conservative assumptions from other available evidence,
Part IV concludes that racial profiling on the roads likely does not
meet the three narrow conditions that would satisfy the basic policy
threshold or constitutional review. I conclude by raising critical ques-
tions about the larger issue of criminal profiling.
I. THE ECONOMICS LITERATURE
Drawing on Gary Becker's work on tastes for discrimination,19
several economists are developing econometric models of racial pro-
filing in an effort to distinguish between efficiency and racial animus
in policing. The economic models rest on a few core assumptions. The
first is that police officers seek to maximize the success rate of auto-
mobile searches given the cost of searching cars. The second is that the
motorists who might be transporting drug contraband seek to maxi-
mize the payoff of carrying contraband; facing a negative payoff, they
will not carry drugs. The third is that racist police officers experience a
lower cost for searching minority motorists than for searching white
19 Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Harvard 1996).
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motorists. The fourth is that minority motorists offend at higher rates
than white motorists.
Given these assumptions, the models predict that police officers
will target minority motorists for police searches to maximize their
search hit rates. Searching minority motorists disproportionately, how-
ever, will reduce the rate of minority offending: as the search rate of
minority motorists increases, the payoff of transporting drugs among
minority motorists decreases, and fewer minority motorists will carry
drug contraband. Police officers will continue to search minority mo-
torists disproportionately until the point of equilibrium where minor-
ity and white motorists offend at the same level.
At that point, it will be possible to distinguish between the effi-
cient nonracist police officer and the racist officer who has a taste for
discrimination. The efficient, nonracist police officer will no longer
care about race and will try to maintain the distribution of searches so
as to maintain equal search success rates. In fact, maintaining that
equilibrium will reflect the fact that the police officer is efficient
rather than racist. Maintaining that particular equilibrium will maxi-
mize the likelihood that the next search will be successful: if the police,
on the one hand, were to search proportionally more minority motor-
ists, they would be dipping into a pool of motorists with a hit rate be-
low the hit rate they could achieve by searching an additional white
motorist; on the other hand, if the police were to search proportionally
more white motorists, given elasticity here too, the hit rate of white
motorists would fall below that of similarly situated minority motor-
ists, thus reducing overall efficiency.
Given a relatively fixed level of law enforcement resources, there
is only one equilibrium point that will maximize hit rates if the police
officer is not racist-the point at which the hit rates are the same
across racial lines. At that equilibrium, the police officer is engaged in
maximally efficient searches. In contrast, the racist police officer will
continue to target more minority motorists because his cost of search-
ing minority motorists is lower. In other words, at the efficiency equi-
librium, he will still be able to maximize his utility (search success rate
minus cost) by searching more minority motorists. Depending on how
great a taste for discrimination this racist police officer possesses, he
will find his own point of equilibrium at some distribution where the
hit rate of minority motorists is below the hit rate of white motorists.
The hit rate of searches, then, indicates whether the police officer is
purely efficient or bigoted. John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra
Todd, some of the leading economists working on racial profiling,
explain:
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The key implication of the model is that if a police officer has the
same cost of searching two subgroups of the population and if
these two subgroups are searched at equilibrium, then the returns
from searching will be equal across the subgroups. For example,
suppose that searching one subgroup of motorists yielded a
higher return. Then police would always search these motorists,
who would in turn react by carrying contraband less often, until
the returns to searching are equalized across groups. If the re-
turns to searching are equal across all subgroups distinguishable
by police, they must also be equal across aggregations of these
subgroups, which is what we can distinguish in the data. Thus
equality of the returns to searching can be tested without know-
ing all the characteristics observed by the police.0
This economic model of racial profiling can be represented in a
graph, making some basic assumptions about offending and elasticity
that will be discussed in greater detail in Part I.B below.2 Graph 1
shows the relationship between the internal rate of searches con-
ducted within each racial group to the offending rate of the different
racial groups. At Time 1, the police are engaged in color-blind policing:
assuming a certain level of searches, the police are searching both
groups at the same internal search rate of 10 percent. If minority mo-
torists represented 20 percent of the total motorists on the road, then
the police would be searching 20 percent minority motorists and 80
percent white motorists. Given that distribution of searches by race,
minority motorists are offending at a higher rate than white motor-
ists-6 percent versus 4.5 percent-resulting in higher hit rates for
minority motorist searches. This reflects the assumption that minority
motorists are offending at a higher rate than white motorists.
Given the higher marginal hit rate for minority motorists, the po-
lice begin to search minority motorists far more than their share of the
motorist population: as the proportion of searches targeting minority
motorists increases, the offending rate of minority motorists decreases.
The police continue to search marginally more minority motorists un-
til Time 2 when the offending rates for white and minority motorists
are the same-5 percent. Now the police are using race in the decision
to search: the police are searching 20 percent of the minority motorists
on the road and 7.5 percent of the white motorists on the road, result-
ing in a hypothetical total distribution of searches of, say, 60 percent
20 Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 206 (cited in note 3).
21 I take full responsibility for this graphical representation. The economists developing the
models of racial profiling have not attempted to translate their equations into graphs.
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minority and 40 percent white motorists. At that distribution of
searches, the offending rates are similar-and, one can infer, so are the
hit rates. At that distribution, the efficient police officer has no reason
to change the racial distribution of searches: the officer has no incen-
tive to search more minority motorists than the 60/40 total distribu-
tion, which produces these different internal group search rates.
If the police officer is, in fact, searching more minority motorists
and getting to Time 3, where the offending rate of minority motorists
is lower than that of white motorists-4.8 percent versus 6 percent-
then the officer must be racially bigoted. The only reason that the offi-
cer would search more minority motorists than at the Time 2 equilib-
rium-that is, would search, say, 70 percent minority motorists and 30
percent white motorists, instead of the Time 2 distribution of 60 per-
cent minority and 40 white motorists-would be if the officer had a
taste for discrimination resulting in higher utility even though fewer
minority motorists were offending.
The three hypothetical distributions of searches-20/80, 60/40,
and 70/30- correspond to three different sets of internal group rates
of searches within the different racial groups. These three scenarios
also correspond to the three equilibrium points for the color-blind, ef-
ficient, and racist police officer. The three scenarios are represented in
Graph 1."
22 This graph reflects many simplifying assumptions about the comparative elasticities
among different racial groups, the comparative offending rates between racial groups, the selec-
tiveness with which race is used in the searching process, and several other complicating matters.
See Parts I.B and II.B.
12872004]
The University of Chicago Law Review
GRAPH 1
An Economic Model of Racial Profiling
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X-Axis: Internal Group Rate of Searches
(Percent of Searches Conducted within Racial Group)
The basic assumptions reflected in the graph include, first, elastic-
ity among both citizen motorists and police officers. Motorists,
whether minority or white, are assumed to reduce their drug traffick-
ing on the road when the police increase the proportion of searches
conducted on members of their racial group. As Rub6n Herndndez-
Murillo and John Knowles explain: "The key assumption in the analy-
sis is that while motorists differ in their propensity to carry contra-
band, those who face a high probability of being searched will tend to
reduce their probability of carrying contraband in the vehicle." This is
23 Hemndez-Murillo and Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing? at 3 (cited in note
3). See also Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 212 (cited in note 3) ("Our model as-
sumes that motorists respond to the probability of being searched.").
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the assumption of elasticity of offending to policing-more technically,
of transporting drug contraband to police searches. In this Article, I
will refer to this as "the elasticity of offending to policing" or some-
times by the shorthand "elasticity." Police officers as well are assumed
to respond to the likelihood of successful searches, targeting their
searches at populations with higher hit rates.
Another key assumption reflected in the graph is that African-
Americans have a higher rate of transporting drug contraband, all
other things equal. If it takes such disproportionate searches of Afri-
can-Americans and whites (for example, 63 percent versus 29 percent
in Maryland) to achieve comparable success rates for searches (34
percent versus 32 percent respectively in Maryland), ' this assumes
that African-Americans would offend at a much higher rate than
whites if they were being stopped in proportion to their representa-
tion on the road. As Knowles, Persico, and Todd explain: "Our model
implies that at equilibrium, both races should have the same probabil-
ity of carrying drugs, but one race may be searched more often than
another. In fact, searching some groups more often than others may
be necessary to sustain equality in the proportions guilty across
groups."'
A final key assumption reflected in the graph has to do with the
way in which racism manifests itself-namely, through the lower cost
to racist police officers of searching minority motorists. It is in this
sense that the crux of the economic models is derived from Gary
Becker's work on discrimination, specifically on the central insight
that "tastes for discrimination lead to lower profits for the discrimina-
tors.'26 By assuming that all police officers seek to maximize the search
success rate minus the cost of searching, and that racism enters the
picture by means of the cost of conducting a search, the economic
models are able to factor out of the analysis all the other traits that
lead police officers to search motorists-such as age, tinted windows,
bumper stickers, car model, etc. As discussed below in Part I.B, this is
both a strength and weakness of the economic models.
24 Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 218 (Table 1), 222 (Table 2) (cited in
note 3).
25 Id at 227. See also Borooah, 17 Eur J Polit Econ at 35 (cited in note 3) ("If the likelihood
of being stopped was the same for blacks and whites, then the likelihood of being arrested after a
stop would be substantially higher for blacks.").
26 Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 208. See generally Becker, Accounting
for Tastes at 140-42 (cited in note 19) (noting that "when minority members are a sizable fraction
of the total [population], discrimination by members of the majority injures them as well [as the
minority members]").
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One additional point. When the economists investigate data re-
vealing disproportionate searches of minority motorists, their models
do not attempt to explain away the disproportionality by holding con-
stant other search criteria. Instead, they essentially assume that the
imbalance is intentional and attempt to test the data to explain
whether the inequality is due to statistical discrimination or racial big-
otry. In this sense, the economists' approach differs significantly from
the more traditional multiple-regression approach of political scien-
tists-represented, for example, by the work of Mitchell Pickerill,
Clayton Mosher, Michael Gaffney, and Nicholas Lovrich. These politi-
cal scientists focus their research on identifying the other possible
traits that may account for police searches to determine whether the
contribution of race vanishes when other nonracial factors are held
constant.7
In most cases, the economists' approach seems more realistic
given that the rates of disproportionality are consistent and often high.
In Maryland, for instance, between January 1995 and January 1999,
63 percent of those stopped and searched by the state police along In-
terstate 1-95 were African-American, and 29 percent were white.
Other similar statistics have been rehearsed in leading law review ar-
ticles and books. In Volusia County, Florida, on a stretch of 1-95 in the
mid- to late-1980s, 70 percent of those stopped were minority motor-
ists and 80 percent of the cars searched belonged to minority motor-
ists, even though minorities represented only 5 percent of motorists.29
In Illinois in the early 1990s, under "Operation Valkyrie," the state po-
lice searches were comprised of approximately 30 percent Hispanic
drivers even though Hispanics represented only about 8 percent of the
state population. In litigation in New Jersey, the state court credited
defense experts' findings that suggested absolute disparities of 32.7
percent (46.2 percent of stops were of African-Americans, 13.5 per-
cent of drivers were African-American) and 22.1 percent (35.6 percent
stops of African-Americans, 13.5 percent African-American drivers)
27 See J. Mitchell Pickerill, et al, Search and Seizure, Racial Profiling and Traffic Stops on
Washington State Highways 15-26 (unpublished paper prepared for annual meeting of the Law
& Society Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, June 5-8,2003) (on file with author).
28 Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 218 (Table 1) (cited in note 3).
29 See Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 62-64 (cited in note 8). See also Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J
Const L at 300 (cited in note 8); Russell, 3 Rutgers Race & L Rev at 73 (cited in note 1).
30 See generally Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const L at 300-01; Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 64-66
(cited in note 8). See also Chavez v Illinois State Police, 251 F3d 612, 634-48 (7th Cir 2001) (re-
viewing the empirical evidence of racial profiling and rejecting the equal protection claim).
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based on stops at different intervals of the New Jersey Turnpike." In
other policing contexts, the racial disproportionalities are often also
32
very high. Given these data, the economic models focus attention on
the right issue-not whether the disproportionality can be explained
away, but rather whether it reflects racial prejudice. Let's turn now to
the specific contributions.
A. The Economic Models of Racial Profiling
1. Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001).
In Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence,
John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd develop a model of po-
lice officer and citizen motorist behavior to test whether recent em-
pirical data concerning police searches of vehicles on Interstate 95 in
Maryland reflect efficient policing-what they refer to as "statistical
discrimination" -or racial animus. Their model of citizen and police
behavior uses the rationality assumptions discussed above; the ulti-
mate determination whether the police are racially prejudiced, then,
31 See State v Soto, 324 NJ Super 66,734 A2d 350,353 (1996). See generally Harris, Profiles
in Injustice at 53-60 (cited in note 8): Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const L at 299-300 (cited in note 8);
Russell, 3 Rutgers Race & L Rev at 74-75 (cited in note 1). Civil liberties advocates also refer to
Philadelphia, where the ACLU analyzed police stops of motorists and pedestrians in several dis-
tricts in the late 1990s and found significant disparities. See generally Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const
L at 301; Russell, 3 Rutgers Race & L Rev at 73-74. "For a one-week period in July, 1999, for car
and pedestrian stops made in predominantly white police districts, the ratio of African-
Americans who were stopped was up to ten times higher than one would expect from population
data." Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const L at 301. Data from the Richmond, Virginia, Police Department
from 2000 reveals that the percentage of automobile stops that resulted in a search was most
likely determined by location in a predominately African-American neighborhood. See Matthew
Petrocelli, Alex R. Piquero, and Michael R. Smith, Conflict Theory and Racial Profiling: An Em-
pirical Analysis of Police Traffic Stop Data, 31 J Crim Just 1, 7 (2003). Data from San Diego for
the year 2001 reveal that "[o]n average, Black/African American drivers had about a 60%
greater chance of being stopped during the year than white drivers; the comparable figure for
Hispanic drivers was about 37% greater than for white drivers." Gary Cordner, Brian Williams,
and Alfredo Velasco, Vehicle Stops in San Diego: 2001 2 (San Diego Police Department Nov
2002), online at http://www.sannet.gov/police/pdf/stoprpt.pdf (visited Aug 19, 2004). Data from
the San Jose Police Department for 2001 reveal that Hispanic and African-American motorists
are stopped at a higher rate than their demographic representation. See San Jose, California, Po-
lice Department, Vehicle Stop Demographic Study 6 (2002), online at http://www.sjpd.org/
imageslVehicleStops2001.pdf (visited Aug 23, 2004); Racial Profiling: Limited Data Available on
Motorist Stops 1 (GAO Mar 2000), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00041.pdf (visited
Aug 19, 2004) (reviewing five early racial profiling studies and finding that, although the studies
contain methodological limitations, "the cumulative results of the analyses indicate that in rela-
tion to the populations to which they were compared, African American motorists in particular,
and minority motorists in general, were proportionately more likely than whites to be stopped
on the roadways studied").
32 See, for example, Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken
Windows Policing 173-75 (Harvard 2001) (discussing New York City stop-and-frisks).
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turns on whether the hit rates are lower for minority motorists. "[I]f
police are prejudiced," Knowles, Persico, and Todd explain, "the equi-
librium returns to searching members of the group that is discrimi-
nated against will be below average."33
Knowles, Persico, and Todd apply their model to the Maryland
data, finding that the police in Maryland disproportionately target Af-
rican-Americans for searches of their vehicles.' Between January 1995
and January 1999, 63 percent of the persons stopped and searched by
the state police along 1-95 were African-American and 29 percent
were white (of a total 1,590 observations). The assumed proportion
of African-American drivers on the road was roughly 18 percent.6 In
contrast, both groups have nearly equivalent offending rates based on
those searches. With regard to African-Americans, 34 percent of the
searches turn up some evidence of drug carrying; with regard to
whites, 32 percent of the searches turn up some evidence of drugs.
Based on data concerning the raw number of drug seizures,
Knowles, Persico, and Todd conclude that there is no evidence that the
police officers are displaying a taste for discrimination. They write that
"[a]lthough African-American motorists are much more likely to be
searched by police, the proportion of guilty motorists among whites
and African Americans whose cars are searched is nearly identical
(0.32 vs. 0.34)- a result that is consistent with the hypothesis of no ra-
cial prejudice.3'' In contrast, they do find racial prejudice against His-
panics because the success rate of searches is far lower-ll percent. 9
In other words, far more Hispanics are being stopped than would be
necessary to get them to offend less (assuming they had higher natural
offending rates).
Based on data concerning drug seizures of amounts that exceed
the felony threshold,' however, Knowles, Persico, and Todd find racial
discrimination but discover that the prejudice works against whites.
Their results here are that African-Americans are significantly more
33 Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 208 (cited in note 3).
34 A number of other studies also explore the Maryland data. See Gross and Barnes, 101
Mich L Rev at 662-95 (cited in note 2); John Lamberth, Report of John Lamberth on Racial
Disparities in Police Searches along the 1-95 Corridor (1996), online at http://archive.aclu.org/
court/lamberth.html (visited Aug 19,2004).
35 Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 218.
36 Id at 204.
37 Id at 222.
38 Idat219.
39 Id at 222 ("The lower guilty rate for Hispanics is suggestive of prejudice against this
group.").
40 Id at 225-26.
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likely to be found guilty than white motorists-13 percent versus 3
percent. The authors conclude:
In our data, vehicles of African-American motorists are searched
much more frequently than those of white motorists. However,
the probability that a searched driver is found carrying any
amount of contraband is very similar across races. Thus we can-
not reject the hypothesis that the disparity in the probability of
being searched is due purely to statistical discrimination and not
to racial prejudice. When we look at the probability that a
searched driver is carrying contraband in excess of a high thresh-
old, this probability is higher for African Americans. Under our
model, this would imply a bias against white motorists."
2. Herndndez-Murillo and Knowles (2003).
In Racial Profiling or Racist Policing?: Testing in Aggregated Data,
Rub6n Hermindez-Murillo and John Knowles apply the Knowles, Per-
sico, and Todd model to aggregated Missouri data and find that the
data are consistent with racial prejudice rather than statistical dis-
crimination. The data set from Missouri consists of aggregated data by
race and police force from an annual report published by the State of
Missouri, the "2001 Annual Report on Missouri Traffic Stops," man-
dated by the recently revised Traffic Regulation Laws.2
The core data reveal the following: the proportion of each group
stopped in Missouri is 31.5, 43.1, and 31.7 percent respectively for
whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics. The proportion of stops
that lead to a search is 6.5, 11.4, and 12.9 percent respectively for
whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics. The hit rate for drugs is
19.7, 12.3, and 9.8 percent respectively.43 Based on this aggregated data,
Hermindez-Murillo and Knowles "reject statistical discrimination as
an explanation of the higher search rates of African-Americans and
Hispanic motorists in Missouri,"" because searches of minority motor-
ists "are less likely to be successful, with significantly lower probability
of turning up drugs or other contraband."'" They calculate that 18 per-
cent of the excess search rate of African-Americans would be elimi-
41 Id at 206-07.
42 Hernindez-Murillo and Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing? at 4 & n 4 (cited in
note 3).
43 Id at 31 (Table 1).
44 Id at 4.
45 Id at 5.
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nated "if search rates were set so as to equalize success rates across
racial groups."4'
Because the data are aggregated and not individual observations,
the authors are not able, strictly speaking, to hold other relevant vari-
ables-such as type of search-constant. The State of Missouri in fact
argues in the report that the lower hit rates for African-Americans
and Hispanics may stem from higher rates of arrest and mandatory
search, 7 but Hernindez-Murillo and Knowles use sophisticated (non-
parametric) statistical methods in an effort to take account of this
variable (given that they have the relative arrests/searches rate), and
contend that this factor does not account for the racial differentials.
They conclude: "We found strong evidence in support of racial bias
against African-American motorists, even when controlling for sex
and age."4'
3. Borooah (2001).
In Racial Bias in Police Stops and Searches: An Economic Analy-
sis, Vani Borooah develops a similar model of police behavior in-
tended to distinguish between bigotry and efficiency, which he calls
"business necessity," and applies it to data from the British Home Of-
fice on stops and searches of citizens in ten police areas in England.
He finds wide disparities in the proportion of the racial groups
searched, but far lower disparities in the rates of success, and con-
cludes that the only discrimination is "on grounds of business neces-
sity. 49 Borooah deduces that the racial disparities in stops are "un-
tainted by racism" and have contributed positively to the efficiency of
policing.'
Borooah's enthusiasm rests, in part, on his belief that "statistical
discrimination [business necessity], untainted by bigotry, is optimal
from a policing perspective because it maximizes the number of ar-
rests consequent upon a given number of persons stopped.""' But he
realizes that there is a tradeoff between efficiency and the appearance
of fairness with regard to the stops, and that the ultimate decision is a
normative one. Borooah is agnostic about questions of fairness. He
recognizes that societies may prefer to equalize the likelihood of be-
ing stopped and searched, or may want to equalize the rate of success
46 Id.
47 Id at 4-5.
48 Id at 26.
49 Borooah, 17 Eur J Polit Econ at 35 (cited in note 3).
50 Id at 36.
51 Id at 19.
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of searches. As he suggests: "The conflict between the two types of
equality arises because they represent different perspectives to the
welfare aspects of police stops."'2
B. A Critique of the Economic Models of Racial Profiling
The problem with the economic models of racial profiling is that
they do not properly specify what counts as "success" for purposes of
a highway drug interdiction program. The models assume that a non-
racist police officer seeks to maximize the rate of successful searches
that discover drug contraband. That, however, is simply the wrong ob-jective. The proper goal for the police is to minimize the social cost of
crime-in this case, to minimize the transportation of drug contraband
on the highways and the social cost of policing. And the fact is, under
certain identifiable conditions, minimizing the social costs of crime is
at odds with maximizing search success rates. Under certain condi-
tions, statistical discrimination leads to higher overall social costs asso-
ciated with the profiled crime and the costs of searches. Under these
conditions, racial profiling on the highways is socially counterproduc-
tive and should be avoided. The use of racial profiling under these cir-
cumstances would amount to a racist practice -whether intentionally
or not-because it would disproportionately target minority motorists
while increasing the overall costs to society: it would use a race classi-
fication without promoting a law enforcement interest.
1. Rethinking success.
The economic models focus the definition of policing efficiency
exclusively on maximizing search success rates. Knowles, Persico, and
Todd, for instance, draw the line between efficiency and racial bigotry
in the following terms: "Police may use race as a criterion in traffic
stops because they are trying to maximize successful searches and race
52 Id at 27. Shanti Chakravarty, in a critique of Borooah, takes Borooah to task for failing
to recognize that bigotry and business necessity may be commingled. Chakravarty argues that
the data may be contaminated because, if both groups have the same likelihood of offending, the
bigotry in the selection of persons to stop and search is not wiped away by the similarity of the
offending rates. See Chakravarty, 18 Eur J Polit Econ at 605 (cited in note 3). In reply, Borooah
calls this a "fairly obvious" point. The "whole point of my paper," he argues, is that under condi-
tions of elasticity, the similar success rates show nonprejudice. Borooah, 18 Eur J Polit Econ at
607 (cited in note 3). The data suggest that "Blacks have a greater mean probability of offending
than Whites." Id. Because the rates of success are the same, the data show no bigotry. As a result,
the argument against racial profiling, Borooah explains, does not go to the effectiveness of polic-
ing, but to the costs of stopping more blacks. It is about "the consequences of policing in terms of
harassing the innocent and, as a corollary, in terms of the broader message that is issued to the
Black community at large." Id at 608.
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helps predict criminality or because they prefer stopping one racial
group over another."53 The only other factor that the authors take into
account-other than the success rate of searches-is "the cost of
searching motorists" in terms of police time, effort, and taste for dis-
crimination.A
What is absent from the models is the effect of racial profiling on
the absolute number of motorists transporting illicit drugs.5 The long-
term consequences on the amount of the profiled crime are simply not
factored into the economic models. This is problematic because the
two objectives -maximizing search success rates and minimizing
crime-may conflict under certain conditions. If the police shift their
allocation of resources away from white motorists and toward minor-
ity motorists, the offending rate among minority motorists may well
decrease, but simultaneously the offending rate among white motor-
ists may increase. The problem is, of course, that there are more white
motorists. Depending on the relationship between the comparative
elasticity of offending to policing as between white and minority mo-
torists and the comparative offending rates, the total increase in white
motorist offending in absolute numbers may outweigh the total de-
crease in absolute numbers of minority offending.
Assuming fixed law enforcement resources, racial profiling will
reduce total crime only if the ratio of the minority to white motorist
population is greater than the differential of the change in offending
by race. Whether this condition is satisfied or not, however, will de-
pend entirely on comparative elasticities and offending rates. Let me
be more precise. In terms of notation, let r E {M, W) denote the race
53 Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 205 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
54 Id at 205-06 ("Our model assumes that the police maximize the number of successful
searches, net of the cost of searching motorists.").
55 Many other commentators who discuss policing efficiency make the same error and
draw on a similarly narrow definition of success. John Derbyshire, for instance, also focuses nar-
rowly on the police officer trying to maximize his arrests: "A policeman who concentrates a dis-
proportionate amount of his limited time and resources on young black men is going to uncover
far more crimes-and therefore be far more successful in his career-than one who biases his at-
tention to, say, middle-aged Asian women." John Derbyshire, In Defense of Racial Profiling, 53
Natl Rev 38, 39 (Feb 19, 2001) (emphasis added). See also George Will, Exposing the "Myth" of
Racial Profiling, Wash Post A19 (Apr 19, 2001) (attributing the disproportion in stops of minor-
ity motorists to effective policing, and noting the "truism" that "minority groups dominate...
[drug] trafficking"); Jackson Toby, Racial Profiling Doesn't Prove Cops Are Racist, Wall St J A22
(Mar 11, 1999) (arguing that "if drug traffickers are disproportionately black or Hispanic, the po-
lice don't need to be racist to stop many minority motorists; they simply have to be efficient in
targeting potential drug traffickers"). See generally Gene Callahan and William Anderson, The
Roots of Racial Profiling: Why Are Police Targeting Minorities for Traffic Stops?, Reason 37
(Aug-Sept 2001) (noting, in the context of discussing commentators' diverse reactions to racial
profiling, that "[i]f police have a goal of maximizing drug arrests, they may indeed find that they
can achieve this most easily by focusing on minorities").
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of the motorists, either minority or white. Let Pop, denote the repre-
sentation of each racial group in the total population. Let 0, denote
the offending rate of each racial group. Let AO, denote the absolute
value of the change in the offending rate of the racial group from
Time 1 to Time 2.
Racial profiling will be beneficial from a long-term crime fighting
perspective only if total crime at Time 1 (pre-racial profiling) is
greater than total crime at Time 2 (with racial profiling). This happens
if:
POPMOM + Popw0w > [POPM(OM -AOM)]+[Pow(Ow +AOw)] (1)
We can rewrite this equation as follows:
POPM AO W
PoPw AOM
From equation (2), racial profiling will decrease overall crime
only if the ratio of the minority to white motorist population-"the
population differential" -is greater than the ratio of the absolute
value of the change in white motorist offending to the absolute value
of the change in minority motorist offending-"the differential of the
change in offending by race."
If we assume that minority motorists represent approximately 20
percent of the motorists on the road-in Maryland, for example, re-
search reveals that African-American motorists represent 17 to 18
percent of the motorists-we can substitute estimated values for the
population differential. What this suggests is that racial profiling is ef-
fective as a long-term crime fighting strategy only if:
0.25 > (3)
AOM
In other words, for racial profiling to work, it has to be the case
that the change in the offending rate of minority motorists is more
than four times greater than the change in the overall offending rate of
white motorists. If the minority representation is smaller than 20 per-
cent, the required differential in the change of offending must be even
greater. By the same token, if the minority representation is larger,
then the required differential in the change in offending need not be
as large. To put some numbers on this, if the minority population
represents 12 percent of the total population, then the change in the
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minority offending rate must be at least 7.4 times greater than the
change in the offending rate of white motorists. If the minority popu-
lation represents 28 percent of the total population, then the change in
the minority offending rate has to be at least 2.6 times greater. The
smaller the minority population, the larger the required differential on
change of offending rates.
Whether this ratio is satisfied depends on the relative elasticity of
offending to policing and the relative offending rates of the two racial
groups. If minority motorists have the same elasticity of offending to
policing as white motorists, then racial profiling will work if the of-
fending rate of minority motorists is greater than the offending rate of
white motorists at Time 1 (under conditions of no racial profiling). As
I demonstrate in the more technical Appendix, the reason is that, by
definition, if the elasticity is the same as between racial groups and
there are resource constraints, the change in offending of the two ra-
cial groups will reflect the population differential. By definition, if
elasticity is the same, then the following will also be true:
AOw _ Ow (4)
AOM 40m
If we substitute this into equation (3), then racial profiling will
reduce crime only if the offending rate of minority motorists (OM) is
greater than the offending rate of white motorists (Ow) under condi-
tions of no racial profiling. The same is true if minority motorists have
higher elasticity of offending to policing than white motorists.
But if minority motorists have lower elasticity than white motor-
ists, then racial profiling will decrease the profiled crime only if the of-
fending rate differential at Time 1 is greater than the difference in
elasticity. Let E, denote the elasticity of each racial group. If EM is less
than Ew, we can denote the relationship in the following way:
xEM = Ew where x > 1 (5)
If we assume that minority motorists have lower elasticity by a
factor of x, then, by definition and substituting into equation (3), racial
profiling will decrease the profiled crime only if the following condi-
tion holds true:
0 M > xOw
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In other words, if minority motorists have lower elasticity than
white motorists, racial profiling will decrease the amount of profiled
crime only if minority motorist offending is greater than white motor-
ist offending times the elasticity differential. If, for example, white mo-
torist elasticity is two times greater than minority motorist elasticity,
then racial profiling will reduce crime only if minority motorist of-
fending is more than two times greater than white motorist offending.
As a result, the key statistics for purposes of determining the ef-
fect of racial profiling on the profiled crime are the elasticity and of-
fending differentials. If minority motorists have lower elasticity, racial
profiling may well increase overall profiled crime. The problem with
the narrow definition of efficiency- maximizing search success
rates-is that it may effectively mask racial prejudice. If a police offi-
cer or police department engages in disproportionate searches of mi-
nority motorists in order to maximize the success rate of searches and
pays no attention to the consequences on long-term trends in the
transportation of drug contraband-or if we as modelers and policy-
makers focus on narrow efficiency-then the police may endorse a
scheme of racial profiling that may in fact promote more crime in the
long term. The police may promote, whether intentionally or unwit-
tingly, a policy that discriminates on the basis of race and increases
overall crime. That would not be efficient. To the contrary, it would in
effect be racially prejudiced.
What is most troubling is that there are good reasons to suspect
that minority and white motorists may have different elasticities of of-
fending to policing and that the elasticity of minority motorists may be
less than that of white motorists. Elasticity is going to depend in large
part on the existence of legitimate work alternatives, as well as on dif-
ferent cultural scripts and community norms. Economist Nicola Per-
sico suggests that, as a theoretical matter, the elasticity for African-
Americans may be less than for whites because they may have fewerjob opportunities and therefore fewer alternatives to crime. As Persico
explains, "the amount of criminal activity-and hence also the elastic-
ity of crime to policing-depends on the distribution of legal earning
opportunities."' This may affect the transportation of illicit drugs for
personal use as well as the substitutability of drug couriers.
A couple of additional observations. First, the analysis has as-
sumed fixed law enforcement resources. This is, after all, the most real-
istic, reasonable, and conservative assumption, since the police budget
is fixed by political processes that have little to do with hit rates or ef-
56 Persico, 92 Am Econ Rev at 1474 (cited in note 3).
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fects on profiled crime. Nevertheless, even if we relax the assumption
of resource constraint, the same analysis would apply to the allocation
of the additional police resources. Under conditions of lower elasticity,
maximizing search success rates may possibly increase overall crime.
Second, it is important to emphasize that the problem with the
economic models of racial profiling is not that the economists over-
value efficiency." The problem is that they do not define efficiency
properly in the policing and criminal justice context. A proper model
of police behavior would assume that police departments and police
officers seek first and foremost to minimize the number of persons
carrying drug contraband on the highway. If searches are the most ef-
fective way to promote this objective-more effective, for instance,
than advertisements or public announcements-then, and only then,
should the police seek to allocate resources to maximize search suc-
cess rates minus the cost of searching cars.
This discussion has been somewhat technical and abstract, but the
point can be made more directly with one simple hypothetical. Let us
assume a city with a population of one million residents, of which 20
percent (200,000) are minorities and the other 80 percent (800,000)
are majorities. Let's assume that the police search 1 percent of the
population each year, effectively conducting 10,000 stop-and-searches
per year, and that, in Year 1, the police stop and search randomly-
they are color-blind. In order to make the profiling in Year 2 nonspu-
rious, let's also decide that minorities offend at a higher rate, say 8
percent, versus majorities who offend at a rate of 6 percent. Under
these assumptions, the searches will prove successful in the case of 8
percent of the 2,000 minority searches (or 160 minority searches) and
6 percent of 8,000 majority searches (or 480 majority searches). As for
the total criminal population in the city, it would consist of 16,000 mi-
norities (8 percent of the total 200,000 minority population) and
48,000 majorities (6 percent of the total 800,000 majority popula-
tion) - or a total of 64,000 offenders overall. We can reflect these sim-
ple assumptions and results in Table 1:
57 Most of the economists recognize fully that the goal of narrow efficiency may be offset
by other social ends. "Statistical discrimination, even if not due to prejudice, may be considered
unfair because innocent drivers experience different probabilities of being searched depending
on their race." Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 228 (cited in note 3). Borooah also
recognizes that statistical discrimination "may be reprehensible to society" and that "society may
prefer its police to implement a 'colour-blind' policy." Borooah, 17 Eur J Polit Econ at 19 (cited
in note 3).
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TABLE 1
Total Minority Majority
City population 1,000,000 200,000 (20%) 800,000 (80%)
Police searches 10,000 2,000 (20%) 8,000 (80%)
Searches as % of
relevant population
Offending rate 6.4% 8% 6%
Successful searches 640 160 (8% of 2,000) 480 (6% of 8,000)
Number of offenders 64,000 16,000 (8% of 200,000) 48,000 (6% of 800,000)
Now, let us assume in Year 2 that the police decide to profile mi-
norities for searches since they have a higher offending rate. The in-
creased searches of minorities will decrease their offending patterns
since they will find offending more costly, and therefore less attractive.
On the flip side, majorities will offend more now that they are being
searched less. Let's assume, then, that the police decide to search twice
as many minorities, and that the police have the same amount of re-
sources and so can only search 1 percent of the population. In Year 2,
the police search 4,000 minorities and 6,000 majorities. Moreover, the
police profile to this point because it is the most efficient point from a
search perspective-the point, according to the economic model of ra-
cial profiling, where the offending rates are the same as between mi-
norities and majorities. Let's decide that the two groups have different
elasticities of offending to policing: minority offending goes down to 7
percent and majority offending goes up to 7 percent. Table 2 shows the
effect on successful searches and on total crime, using the same com-
putation on the new values for Year 2:
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TABLE 2
Total Minority Majority
City population 1,000,000 200,000 (20%) 800,000 (80%)
Police searches 10,000 4,000 (40%) 6,000 (60%)
Searches as % of 1% 2% 0.75%
relevant population
Offending rate 7% 7% 7%
Successful searches 700 280 (7% of 4,000) 420 (7% of 6,000)
Number of offenders 70,000 14,000 (7% of 200,000) 56,000 (7% of 800,000)
Clearly, the use of racial profiling has increased the efficiency of
the police searches. The same number of police searches has produced
a higher number of successful searches -searches that have discov-
ered contraband. And in fact, this is the optimally efficient allocation
of resources from the perspective of successful searches because it is
the point where the hit rates are the same.
However, the racial profiling has also increased the overall
amount of crime in the city. Whereas before there were 64,000 offend-
ers in the city, now there are 70,000 offenders. Why? Because the elas-
ticity of minorities is less than that of majorities. The shift in policing
has reduced the offending of minorities, but increased the offending of
majorities-and there are more majorities in the city. In other words,
the increased efficiency of racial profiling has also increased overall
crime in the city.
What makes this so troubling in the real world is that we have no
data on how the elasticities compare as between the two groups. As-
suming lower elasticity for minorities, racial profiling may very well
increase overall crime. In fact, it will increase crime in our hypotheti-
cal so long as the hit rates equalize above 6.4 percent, which was the
average offending rate for the total population in Year 1. The relative
elasticities and offending rates are visually represented in Graph 2.
Note that, as long as the equal hit rate exceeds 6.4 percent, profiling in
Year 2 will be more efficient in terms of successful searches but coun-
terproductive in terms of total crime in society.
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GRAPH 2
Offending Rates at Different Levels of Internal Search Rates
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(Percent of Searches Conducted within Racial Group)
2. An alternative model.
In order to model police behavior properly, we must focus not on
maximizing search success rates, but on minimizing the costs associ-
ated with the profiled crime, including the social costs of the crime it-
self and of the policing technique.* Here, we need not assume fixed
police budgetary resources, because the analysis would be the same
with or without resource constraints. First, we must minimize the costs
to society defined in terms of the profiled crime. For purposes of nota-
tion, let D denote the social loss associated with one instance of the
profiled crime, namely the transportation of illicit drugs on the high-
58 Special thanks to Gary Becker for helping me think through this model.
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way. 9 Let I denote the rate at which motorists are being searched. o r
(defined earlier as the internal rate of offending for each group) is a
function of I and so will be noted accordingly. In more technical
terms, then, the cost to society associated with the profiled crime can
be captured by the following expression:
D [OM(IM)PoPM + Ow(Iw)Popw] (7)
Second, we need to minimize the social costs associated with
searching motor vehicles for contraband. For purposes of notation, let
Q denote the cost associated with one instance of a police search." In
more technical terms, the cost to society associated with the searches
of automobiles can be captured by the following expression:
Q [IMPOPM + IwPoPw] (8)
To minimize the total costs to society, we would need to take the
derivative of the total cost function, denoted as C, which would be a
function of I and would contain both equations (7) and (8). The total
cost function can be expressed as follows:
CM(IM) + Cw(IW) =
D [OM(IM)PoPM + Ow(Iw)PoPw] + Q [IMPopM + IwPoPw] (9)
Using partial differentiation to resolve separately for the two ra-
cial groups, if we were to minimize the social costs, it would produce
the following:
Cr(Ir) = D [O:(Ir)Popr] + Q POP, (10)
If we solve for the case where cost is zero, and rewrite the equa-
tion, we would obtain the following:
Q
D O;(lr) (11)
D
59 It is assumed here that the social cost is the same for all incidents, regardless of the type
of drugs, the quantity, or the race of the carrier. This is, naturally, a simplifying assumption given
that the transportation of drugs for personal use or for drug trafficking have very different costs
for society as a whole.
60 Here too it is assumed that the social cost is the same for all searches, regardless of the
type of car, the kind of search, or the race of the motorist.
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Since we are assuming that Q and D are the same for white and
minority motorists-that is, we are assuming nonracist police offi-
cers-minimizing total social costs produces the following first-order
condition:
OM(IM) = Ow(Iw) (12)
Since 0', (/) is the slope of 0, at point I, or [AO, / A/,], we can
rewrite this first-order condition as follows:
AOM _ AO w  (13)
AIM AIw
We can rewrite this as follows, multiplying both sides by 1:
AOM IM 0 M AO W  Iw O w (14)
AIM OM IM AIw Ow Iw
Given the definition of elasticity and using Er to denote elasticity,
the first-order condition can be expressed as follows:
EM OM = E w  Ow (15)IM Iw
This first-order condition must be satisfied to minimize the total
social costs associated with the illicit transportation of drug contra-
band on the highways. Whether the condition is satisfied will depend
on the comparative elasticities, natural offending rates, and search
rates. It is possible to construct a three-by-three table to identify the
conditions under which the police should search different racial
groups at different rates. Table 3 summarizes the nine findings:
TABLE 3
Minimizing Total Social Costs
EM = Ew EM < EM E > E,
IM W M < I, IM > IWOM = Ow (No Racial Profiling) (Profile Whites) (Profile Minorities)
I. > IW Im < Iw [O,/O1 I, > 1,OM > Ow (Profile Minorities) (Not Clear) (Profile Minorities)
Im - < 1, > IW[OM/OWI
0. < Ow (Profile Whites) (Profile Whites) (Not Clear)
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The two shaded cells represent situations where racial profiling
may increase total social costs. In the case where minority motorists
have lower elasticities of offending to policing and higher natural of-
fending rates, and similarly where minority motorists have higher elas-
ticities but lower natural offending rates, racial profiling may increase
overall social costs depending on the relationship between the relative
offending and search rates. Note that this result does not even take
61into account the ratchet effect discussed in Part II.B.
The foregoing underscores the myopia of an efficiency analysis
that looks solely for equal hit rates and elides elasticities and offend-
ing differentials. As the model makes clear, minimizing the costs to so-
ciety will entail a distribution of searches between white and minority
motorists that will depend on the relative elasticities of offending to
policing and on the relative natural offending rates. In other words, the
equilibrium point is not defined by the equality of hit rates, but instead
depends on comparative elasticities and the relationship between of-
fending and search rates. As a result, the focus of the analysis should
turn on the size and characteristics of the group of persons at the mar-
gins who are most likely to be influenced one way or the other to
carry illicit drugs on the highway for personal or commercial purposes.
In this sense, the analysis will call not only for modeling skills and bet-
ter data on overall elasticities and offending rates, but also for socio-
logical and ethnographic studies of the groups of individuals who are
most likely to respond to shifts in the allocation of policing resources.
The economic modelers may respond that they are merely trying
to distinguish between the racist and the success-maximizing line po-
lice officer. And, to be sure, some police officers may measure success
by the narrow metric of successful searches. This response, though,
does not square with basic assumptions of rationality or police behav-
ior. The broader notion of efficacy-associated with the long-term ef-
fects on the profiled crime -makes far more sense from the perspec-
tive of police officers and police departments. The bottom line for po-
licing is crime rates, not hit rates. In fact, if the police focus exclusively
on narrow efficiency, the economic models are irrelevant to the con-
temporary criminological and policing debates. A finding that the po-
lice conduct themselves in a narrowly efficient manner may point to a
principal-agent problem in policing. But it does not resolve the key
question of racial profiling, namely whether it is racist. If targeting mi-
61 By way of illustration, in Maryland if minority motorist elasticity is lower, then social
costs are minimized only if the search rate of minority motorists is less than .34/.32 or 1.0625
times the search rate of white motorists. Given that approximately 63 percent of searches are of
minority motorists, this condition likely does not obtain. See note 24 and accompanying text.
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nority motorists increases long-term offending on the highways or the
overall costs to society, then it is in effect racially prejudiced. It may be
inadvertent and mistaken, but it is effectively racist because it uses a
racial category without any benefit to society.
3. The problem of selectivity.
Even setting this aside and adopting the narrow-and incorrect-
definition of efficiency, there is a second problem with the economic
models of racial profiling: the models do not properly address issues
surrounding the selectiveness with which the police use race and other
search criteria for purposes of searching and sub-searching members
of different racial groups. As a result, the models place too much faith
in their interpretation of hit rates-or, to say this slightly differently,
the official hit rates do not necessarily mean what the economists
claim.
There is good reason to believe that a police officer who is racist
is going to use race differently in the decision to search a minority mo-
torist than in the decision to search a white motorist. A racist police
officer might decide, for instance, to search all available motorists
when it comes to African-American motorists on the one hand, but
only young drivers driving late-model cars with tinted windows and
counterculture bumper stickers when it comes to white motorists. In
other words, the racist police officer may use other search criteria
more or less selectively depending on whether the motorist is white or
minority. If the police are more or less selective when it comes to mi-
nority motorists, then the equal official hit rates would mask different
actual offending and hit rates among minority drivers. If so, the fact
that there are equal official hit rates would not signal narrowly effi-
cient policing.
a) Selecting on race. The fact is that the police do not profile
on race alone. They also profile on car models, vehicle attributes,
rental cars, stickers, location, direction, motorist appearance, age, etc.,2
The police use these various attributes-as well as, possibly, race-to
narrow down the pool of likely suspects. We know that they are doing
this successfully. The pool of motorists who are being searched are
62 Knowles, Persico, and Todd list these characteristics from a training manual of the Illi-
nois State Police: "tinted windows, cell phones, leased vehicles, religious paraphernalia used to
divert suspicion, and attorney business cards." Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at
204 n 2 (cited in note 3).
63 See Stephan Michelson, Driving While Black: A Skeptical Note, 44 Jurimet J 161, 178
(2004) (stating that police use other factors, such as the condition of the car and whether the
lights are operable, in determining which cars to stop).
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carrying at high rates, far in excess of the population as a whole. In
Maryland, for instance, about 34 percent of African-American and 32
percent of white motorists searched are carrying drugs. M That is far
higher than rates of personal drug use among surveyed adults, 6 and
far higher than success rates at nondiscretionary roadblocks (about
4.7 percent in Indianapolis in 199866). It is also higher than success
rates in Missouri (12.3 percent for African-Americans and 19.7 per-
cent for white motorists). 7 By not stopping elderly motorists on their
way to church or synagogue, the police can and are successfully nar-
rowing down the pool of suspects. We see here that criminal profiling
probably "works": it can increase the success rates of searches.
What we do not know, however, is whether and to what extent
the police are engaging in racial discrimination in the treatment of
race as a selection criterion, and to what extent, if any, that is helping to
make the profiling work. We do not know whether the police use
more factors to identify white suspects than African-American or
Hispanic suspects. If the police are in fact searching any available mi-
nority motorist and being more selective for white motorists, then the
official hit rates compare apples and oranges. They compare all minor-
ity motorists on the one hand and a class of high risk white motorists
on the other. If this is true, then the actual offending rate for all Afri-
can-American motorists is probably higher than for all white motor-
ists, despite the equal official hit rates. The equal hit rates would be
deceptive: they would not signal narrowly efficient policing, but would
instead mask a form of racism-selectively differential use of other
search criteria-that would escape detection. To make matters worse,
we do not know the direction of bias that would necessarily result if
the police were using more characteristics for white motorists than for
minority motorists. It would depend entirely on how predictive the
other characteristics are and how they offset each other. Some charac-
teristics may actually retard the success rate. For instance, the fact that
an automobile is swerving may be a very strong predictor of DUI, but
64 Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 222 (Table 2) (cited in note 3) (listing the
proportion of vehicles searched found to be carrying drugs, broken down by race).
65 See Part IV.B.1(a).
66 See City of Indianapolis v Edmond, 531 US 32,35 (2000) (noting that 55 drug-related ar-
rests were made during a total of 1,161 stops). The Indianapolis roadblock in 1998 involved ran-
dom stops without police discretion whether to stop or search. The selected car would be
stopped, the driver would be asked to produce a license and registration, and a dog would sniff
the outside of the car. A search was to be conducted upon consent or based on a specified
amount of particularized suspicion.
67 See Hernndez-Murillo and Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing? at 31 (Table 1)
(cited in note 3).
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a very poor predictor of-or perhaps inversely related to-being a
large-haul drug courier.
More technically, the economic models focus exclusively on the
overall hit rates by race.6 That is, in part, their strength, because we
lack reliable data on other selection criteria. But it also presents a
problem: it makes the hit rates unreliable as a test for racism because
it does not account for other characteristics when comparing hit rates.
The Knowles, Persico, and Todd model does include a variable for
all the other characteristics that would lead the police to search a sus-
pect. The variable "c" denotes all other traits that raise police suspi-
cion, and "r" represents race.6 Their model, however, does not hold c
constant. To the contrary, their model integrates c out of the final
equation.
They begin, correctly, by asserting that the nonracist, efficient po-
lice officer will be indifferent with regard to the race of the next mo-
torist searched when, for all c, guilt probabilities are equal across all
races. They express this in an equation reproduced below as equation
(16).' For purposes of notation, G denotes that the search of the mo-
torist comes up with drugs, A denotes minority motorists, W denotes
white motorists, t denotes the marginal cost of searching a motorist,
P*(GIc, A) denotes the equilibrium probability that a minority motor-
ist (A) of type c is guilty (G), and c, as we know, denotes all other
traits that raise police suspicion.
Their equation posits that, for all c, at the equilibrium, it must be
the case that:
P*(GIcA) = t = P*(GIc,W) (16)
In other words, at equilibrium-the point at which the nonracist police
officer will be indifferent about race-the hit rate will be the same for
minority and white motorists holding c constant, or, to put it slightly
differently, taking into account c and solving the equation for all c. This
is correct given that the nonracist police officer by definition does not
have a different cost t for searching motorists of different races."
68 See Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 205-06 (cited in note 3) (contending
that a "key advantage" of their model is its ability to cope with limited data, for the "equality of
the returns to searching can be tested without knowing all the characteristics observed by the po-
lice").
69 Id at 209.
70 Id at 211 (equation (4)).
71 Recall that racial prejudice is defined as a taste for discrimination reflected in the fact
that the cost of searching a minority motorist (tA) is different from the cost of searching a white
motorist (tW).
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In the next step of their model, Knowles, Persico, and Todd inte-
grate out c. Based on equation (16) above, they come up with the fol-
lowing test for racial prejudice -reproduced below as equation (17)."
In this equation, D represents "data on the frequency of guilt by race
conditional on being searched": 3
D(W) = t = D(A) (17)
The problem is that "the frequency of guilt by race conditional
on being searched" is not different conceptually from the terms
P*(GIc, A) or P*(GIc, W) from equation (16) above. The latter terms
were defined as, at equilibrium, "the probability that a motorist of
type c, [A or W] carries contraband."7 In other words, the two equa-
tions are functionally equivalent. The only difference is that the c term
was extracted from the second equation (17). The test for prejudice,
then, is whether the frequency of guilt by race conditional on being
searched is the same or different-whether the hit rates are the same
or different-regardless of c. Knowles, Persico, and Todd have effec-
tively eliminated any consideration of other characteristics c from
their test.
But extracting c makes a difference. Hit rates may be the same ig-
noring c even though guilt probabilities may be different if c is held
constant. This is possible where police officers are racist, use other
search criteria less selectively for minority motorists, and are not en-
tirely concerned about maximizing overall hit rates. In this sense,
equation (16) is the right test for prejudice, but equation (17) is miss-
ing the key variable of other characteristics c. It could be, for instance,
that if we hold constant the characteristic that the automobile is
swerving-or any other characteristic, such as late-model car or
bumper sticker -the hit rates that seemed equal diverge. And there is
no necessary bias as to the direction of the difference. This problem of
selectivity distorts the interpretation of the hit rates.75
The economic modelers might respond that the assumption of ef-
ficiency solves all the problems: if the police are actually being less se-
lective with minority motorists and achieving the same hit rates, then
72 Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 212 (equation (5)) (cited in note 3).
73 Id.
74 Id at210.
75 This problem is mirrored by the model's failure to hold c constant for purposes of the
definition of statistical discrimination. Knowles, Persico, and Todd explain: "An alternative defi-
nition of statistical discrimination would require that.., blacks are searched at different rates
than whites with the same observable characteristics c. This definition is more stringent than [our]
definition 2 .... For our purposes, it is more convenient to use [our] definition 2." Id.
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they would have to know that minorities are actually offending at dif-
ferent rates than what is reflected in the parity of hit rates, and, if they
are being perfectly efficient, they will seize the marginal difference by
searching more or fewer minority motorists. This is Gary Becker's bril-
liant insight-to operationalize racism through the taste for discrimi-
nation- and it may work remarkably well as a way to capture uncon-
scious racism. But this explanation may not work as well if we relax
slightly the assumption of rationality and assume instead that the bla-
tantly racist police officer operates on a more simple heuristic, some-
thing like: "I'll search any minority motorist that I stop for speeding,
and search any white 'druggie' motorist that I stop for speeding. By
white 'druggie' motorist, I mean young white male with a fancy car
and drug stickers or other drug indicia." If this heuristic is how the
racist police officer operates, then the economic models cannot distin-
guish between the racist and the narrowly efficient police officer on
the basis of hit rates, because the hit rates do not have the meaning at-
tributed to them by the economic models.
In essence, the economic modelers' response assumes away the
most interesting question- namely, how racism expresses itself. It
places efficiency as a leading objective for all police officers. Yet there
is no good reason to assume that the blatantly racist police officer is
also maximally efficient in her racism. Racism and narrow efficiency
may be mutually exclusive. In fact, the police officer possibly could
search more minority motorists and improve the overall hit rates-
which is what the officer would do if she were perfectly efficient and
knew that the other characteristics were accurate predictors across
race. Yet the racist police officer may continue to select differentially
on other search criteria out of racism. This is, possibly, the paradox of
inefficient racism. Her racism may be masked to us by the equal hit
rates, which mask to her the fact that she could search more minorities.
In any event, this form of racism would distort the interpretation of hit
rates.
b) Sub-search processes. The police may also be engaging in
more careful and deliberate sub-searches of stopped motorists de-
pending on their race76- and this too may skew the interpretation of
hit rates. The police may, because of a reduced "cost of thoroughness,"
call canine units more often or engage in more intrusive visual inspec-
tion, closer scrutiny of documents, or more heavy-handed interroga-
tion with disfavored categories of motorists. These sub-search tech-
76 See Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 682-84 (cited in note 2) (discussing differen-
tial sub-searches).
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niques may also affect hit rates in a statistically invisible way. And
they are not accounted for in the economic models of racial profiling.
As Knowles, Persico, and Todd write:
[O]ur model abstracts from the issue of the thoroughness of
searches. Suppose that it were the case that police search Afri-
can-American motorists more thoroughly than whites, because of
a lower "cost of thoroughness." As a result, searches of African
Americans would not necessarily be more successful, because of
the equilibrium reaction of motorists. In fact, we may expect
searches of African Americans to be less successful since in equi-
librium police equate the (lower) cost of searching thoroughly to
the expected benefit from searching. Testing a model that takes
into account thoroughness requires data on effort spent search-
ing. In the absence of such data, we leave this question for future
research."
The differential application of sub-search processes, however, may
also distort the interpretation of hit rates.
It is important to note, in both these contexts, the difficulty of
identifying what counts as "racist." From one perspective, using more
selection criteria (not just race, but also out-of-state tags, fancy rims,
etc.) and applying more sub-search techniques (canine sniffing, heavy-
handed interrogation, closer visual inspections, etc.) to one set of mo-
torists is more fair toward that set of motorists, because it decreases
the number of innocent motorists in that group who are subjected to
full-scale searches. If we are more careful in this manner with white
motorists, fewer white motorists will be unnecessarily searched; mi-
nority motorists, as a whole, will be subjected to comparatively more
futile searches. From another perspective, though, the sub-search
techniques themselves are often intrusive, invasive, and, for innocent
motorists, may well feel like full-blown searches. On this view, the sub-
search techniques count as searches, and their disproportionate appli-
cation appears racist against the beneficiary-against the group sub-
ject to the practices. Moreover, the use of additional selection criteria
and sub-search techniques creates a perception that the beneficiary
group is more crime prone.
An important normative question then is whether to label a po-
lice officer who stops all African-American motorists because of their
race alone, but who stops only white motorists with out-of-town tags
and late-model cars and subjects these white motorists to a canine
77 Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 109 J Polit Econ at 215 (cited in note 3).
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sniff, as racist against African-American motorists (because he is less
careful and causing more unsuccessful searches of innocent minority
motorists) or as racist against white motorists (because he is subject-
ing white motorists to intrusive canine searches and jacking up their
collective hit rate, thus painting them as drug dealers). For purposes of
clarity, in the ensuing discussion I will label such a police officer as
"bigoted against minorities (or whites)."
The bottom line is that, when the hit rates are 34 percent for Afri-
can-American motorists and 32 percent for white motorists along
Maryland 1-95, we do not know if the police have searched African-
American motorists simply based on their race and white motorists
because of five other suspicious traits. If that is the case, clearly, the
African-American motorists actually have far higher average hit rates
than the average white motorist. Alternatively, this might be offset by
differential sub-search techniques, which would increase the hit rate.
Lower or equal official hit rates would mask much higher real offend-
ing rates.
The only way to address this issue is to get the relevant data-
offending or hit rates-holding c constant and holding constant sub-
search processes. That would be difficult, but not impossible. It would
require asking the police officer to report all grounds of suspicion and
to report all sub-search processes administered. It would then be pos-
sible to hold c constant in the offending and hit rates. Political scien-
tists at Washington State University-Mitchell Pickerill, Clayton
Mosher, Michael Gaffney, and Nicholas Lovrich-are attempting to
do this, but for slightly different purposes. Their research, which in-
volves a more traditional multiple-regression approach, seeks to iden-
tify all factors that may contribute to searches in order to determine
whether any of those factors neutralize the role of race."' In their re-
78 Their data consist of every stop made by a Washington State Patrol officer from March
2002 through October 2002, which amounts to 677,514 cases. Pickerill, et al, Search and Seizure at
17 (cited in note 27). Of those, 23,393 (or 3.5 percent) resulted in searches. Their findings are pre-
liminary, but they also find that race plays an important role in the incidence of searches by the
Washington State Police. "Even when we control for other factors that influence whether or not
searches are conducted after motorists are contacted by the WSP, we find that race still has an
impact on the likelihood of a search." Id at 26. Specifically, Native Americans are searched at
much higher rates than whites, African-Americans and Hispanics are searched at moderately
higher rates than whites, and Asians are searched at slightly lower rates than whites. Whereas 3
percent of white motorists who were stopped were searched, the search rates were 15 percent,
7.6 percent, 6.7 percent, and 2.5 percent respectively for Native Americans, African-Americans,
Hispanics, and Asians. Id at 21. Although Pickerill, et al, do not develop an economic model of
racial profiling focused on hit rates, they do nevertheless report the hit rates from the data. They
find that, overall, white motorists are the most likely to be found with contraband. The disparities
are greater with regard to discretionary searches-not surprisingly. Adding both types of
searches, it turns out that the hit rates are 24.8 percent for whites, 18.9 percent for African-
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search, they find that some of these other factors affect the racial dis-
parities. The strongest predictor of a search is the seriousness of the
violation associated with the stop. The influence of race is mitigated by
other variables, including the age of the driver, geographical location,
time of day, and the seriousness of the violation triggering the traffic
stop. Most important, they find that the disparities in searches do not
vary much between searches that are nondiscretionary (which they
define as searches incident to arrest, "impound searches," and "war-
rant searches") and those that are discretionary (which they define as
canine searches, consent searches, and pat-down searches)."9 Their pri-
mary purpose is to test whether the consistently disproportionate
searches of minority motorists are an artifact of some other nonracial
factor-in other words, whether the race correlations would vanish if
some other variable were held constant."' Nevertheless, it would even-
tually be possible to use their data to examine hit rates holding c
constant.
In the final analysis, the economic models of racial profiling are
inadequate. The models, in essence, maximize the wrong thing: instead
of maximizing hit rates, the models should maximize the crime-
fighting punch of the searches. The models incorrectly assume that it is
efficient and nonracist for the police to maximize the success rate of
searches. Moreover, even assuming the models' soundness, they fail to
account for differential selection criteria or sub-search techniques that
distort the data the models purport to interpret.
Americans, 21.4 percent for Native Americans, 16.7 for Hispanics, and 12.2 percent for Asians. Id
at 34 (Table 4).
79 Id at 18. Pickerill, et a], infer from this that "this is one indicator that while there may be
racial disparities in search rates, those disparities do not appear to be the result of intentional
discrimination by the officers" Id.
80 As they explain:
While virtually every extant study of such data indicates that racial profiling may be occur-
ring, it is important to stress that these studies do not provide proof that biased policing ex-
ists. Without appropriate "denominator" data keyed to specific racial and ethnic popula-
tions, and without the addition of appropriate contextual information concerning traffic
stops to multivariate analyses, it is not possible to distinguish biased policing from entirely
appropriate, but demographically disproportionate, enforcement outcomes with respect to
racial and ethnic characteristics.
Id at 11. See also Michelson, 44 Jurimet J at 166-70 (cited in note 63) (suggesting that the exist-
ing studies do not prove discriminatory impact because they fail to account for the proportions
of drivers excessively speeding and do not measure the extent to which police officers can dis-
cern motorists' race). But see Soto, 734 A2d at 354-57 (recounting plaintiffs' experts addressing
these and other concerns).
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II. THE CIVIL LIBERTIES LITERATURE
Civil liberties advocates and legal scholars are also scrutinizing
the same new data. For the most part, these scholars point to evidence
of similar drug consumption across racial groups and assert that the
equal or lower hit rates reflect nothing more than equal or lower
offending rates. They conclude from this that the disproportionate
searches of minority motorists are racially discriminatory and do not
reflect policing efficiency. In effect, these scholars refer to the same
empirical evidence, rely on the same key statistic (hit rates), assume
similar offending and no elasticity, and claim racial discrimination. As
it should be clear from Part I, however, the focus on hit rates is mis-
placed. Let's start, though, by exploring the specific contributions.
A. The Civil Liberties Model of Racial Profiling
1. Harris (2002).
In Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work, David
Harris reviews extensively the data on police searches and argues
against racial profiling on several grounds. His primary argument,
though, is that it simply does not work because the hit rate for minor-
ity motorists is equal to or less than that for white motorists." Harris
argues that the new data "offer an irrefutable statistical argument
against the practice." Harris writes:
Despite the widespread belief that racial profiling, reprehensible
though it may be, is an effective and efficient way of catching
criminals-a "rational" approach to law enforcement-newly col-
lected information about "hit rates" gives the lie to this assump-
tion: the numbers just don't add up. Data emerging from studies
done over the last few years demonstrate conclusively that hit
rates-the rates at which police actually find contraband on peo-
ple they stop-run contrary to long-held "commonsense" beliefs
about the effectiveness of racial profiling. The rate at which offi-
cers uncover contraband in stops and searches is not higher for
81 Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 13 (cited in note 8). Harris correctly points out that racial
profiling is a form of criminal profiling, that its supporters believe that it is an efficient and ra-
tional law enforcement technique because of offending differentials, and that it flourishes where
the police use high-discretion methods. "If racial profiling is what directs police suspicion at mi-
norities, it is high-discretion police tactics that put these suspicions into action, turning profiles
into police investigations," Harris explains. Id at 11. "These high-discretion methods allow police
to detain, question, and search people who have exhibited no concrete evidence of wrongdoing."
Id at 11-12.
82 Id at 13.
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blacks than for whites, as most people believe. Contrary to what
the "rational" law enforcement justification for racial profiling
would predict, the hit rate for drugs and weapons in police
searches of African Americans is the same as or lower than the rate
for whites. Comparing Latinos and whites yields even more sur-
prising results. Police catch criminals among Latinos at far lower
rates than among whites. These results hold true in studies done
in New York, Maryland, New Jersey, and other places.-
Harris also emphasizes that the benefits in terms of drug interdic-
tion are negligible. He points to the fact that, "while it is true that
automobile stops sometimes result in large seizures of drugs,... [t]he
quantities discovered seldom exceed enough for personal use and of-
ten amount to even less-so-called trace amounts that can be detected
but not used."' From this, Harris concludes that racial profiling
"simply does not work as a law enforcement tactic."8' It does not help
identify likely drug suspects and it does not result in significant drug
interdiction."
Sympathetic critics of David Harris have pointed out that his ar-
gument misses a step. As Samuel Gross and Katherine Barnes write,
"hit rates alone are insufficient to distinguish discrimination from
evenhanded treatment of groups with different behavior patterns.' 'n In
all fairness to Harris, though, Harris does infer from the data that the
basic assumption of higher minority offending is mistaken. He writes,
for instance:
All of this exposes the rational law enforcement argument as, at
best, the product of a set of mistaken assumptions. If blacks and
Latinos who are stopped as a result of racial profiling are no
more likely or are even less likely to be in possession of drugs or
other contraband than whites, it simply doesn't make sense to en-
force the law in this way."'
83 Id. See also id at 79-84 (discussing hit rates for highway and street searches); David A.
Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of Data Collection, 66
L & Contemp Probs 71,81-82 (Summer 2003).
84 Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 13-14 (cited in note 8). See also id at 84-87 (discussing the
incorrect perception of successful interdiction efforts and the infrequency of large drug seizures).
85 Id at 14.
86 Id.
87 Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 690 (cited in note 2). See also Alschuler, 2002 U
Chi Legal F at 215 n 216 (cited in note 2) (concluding that Harris's "data say nothing at all about
the empirical success or failure of racial profiling").
88 Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 14 (emphasis added).
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It should be clear from the notion of a mistaken assumption that Har-
ris is in effect inferring from the evidence that minority motorists do
have equal or lower offending rates. In this respect, Harris's argument
is not very different than the position advocated by Gross and Barnes,
which I discuss in detail below. Harris's argument, in sum, is that ra-
cial profiling fails as a law enforcement tactic for lack of an offending
differential.
2. Rudovsky (2001).
David Rudovsky, in Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Seren-
dipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches without Cause, argues
against racial profiling on three grounds. First, he reviews evidence re-
garding the relative offending rates in the context of both use and sale
of illicit drugs, and concludes that no evidence supports the claim of
differential offending." Second, he challenges the elasticity assump-
tion: "[A]s a statistical matter, the [economic models] assume[] that
the extremely small number of searches (compared to the motoring
population and to the number of motorists actually stopped) was suf-
ficient to deter African-American drivers from transporting drugs
(there are no data to show the rate of transportation pre-racial profil-
ing)."9 Third, anticipating later more sustained critiques, Rudovsky
challenges the validity of the underlying data: "The study also assumes
that the police are accurately reporting searches where nothing is re-
covered even though there is evidence to suggest the contrary."'
Rudovsky challenges, in effect, the key assumptions of the eco-
nomic models-the assumptions regarding offending and elasticity
and the reliability of the data. The reliability of the data is, of course,
central to drawing any inferences; and the assumptions of offending
and elasticity are central to the economic models. Without them, the
models simply cannot distinguish between efficiency and prejudice
based on hit rates.
89 Gross and Barnes conclude that, based on available drug usage survey data, the offend-
ing rates are probably similar and therefore that the search differentials do reflect racial animus.
See Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 690-95 (cited in note 2). Similarly, Alschuler notes that
"[little evidence suggests that blacks and Latinos commit drug crimes at higher rates than
whites, and whether racial profiling has even a rational basis is disputed." Alschuler, 2002 U Chi
Legal F at 215 (cited in note 2).
90 Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const L at 317 (cited in note 8) ("The substantial racial disparities
that have been documented in stop, frisk, and search practices cannot be fully explained or ra-
tionalized by crime patterns, police deployment, or policing tactics.").
91 Id at 312.
92 Id.
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3. Gross and Barnes (2002).
In their article, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction
on the Highway, Samuel Gross and Katherine Barnes reexamine the
data from Maryland previously analyzed by Knowles, Persico, and
Todd. The differences in their conclusions are stark.
Gross and Barnes's data cover stops and searches conducted by
the Maryland State Police on Interstate Highway 95 from 1995
through mid-2000-a total of 8,027 searches, broken down by location,
direction of travel, types of searches, quantities and types of drugs dis-
covered, among other variables (though the data omit the number of
persons stopped but not searched).93 Approximately 40 percent of mo-
torists searched by the Maryland State Police were African-American
and 4.4 percent were Hispanic.4 On the specific corridor of 1-95 that
has been singled out in the racial profiling litigation, 60 percent of the
persons searched were African-American and 6 percent were His-
panic." By contrast, African-American motorists represent about 17
percent of drivers and 17.5 percent of traffic violators."
With regard to a narrower corridor of 1-95 from the Baltimore
city limit to the Delaware border, more specific data cover stops and
searches between May 1997 and April 2000. African-Americans repre-
sented 27.8 percent of the motorists stopped and 51.3 percent of the
motorists searched. Hispanics represented 1.3 percent of the motorists
stopped and 6 percent of the motorists searched.9 In effect, African-
American drivers "were almost twice as likely to be stopped as white
drivers; and more than five times as likely to be searched."'"
The hit rates were as follows: across the entire state, 37.4, 30.6,
and 11.9 percent respectively for whites, African-Americans, and His-
panics; on the 1-95 corridor, 40.3, 37.8,, and 15.8 percent respectively
for whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics.9 Gross and Barnes
break down the data by drug, location, type of search (consent search
versus probable cause, with ground given for request, such as Grateful
Dead stickers or nervousness). They find, for example, that "[c]ocaine
and crack were found most often in cars with black drivers; heroin and
'other' drugs in cars driven by whites."' '
93 Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 664 (cited in note 2).
94 Id at 663 (Table 1).
95 Id.
96 Id at 664 (Table 2).
97 Id at 665 (Table 3).
98 Id at 666.
99 Id at 668 (Table 6).
100 Id at 669.
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Gross and Barnes begin by casting doubt on the validity and reli-
ability of the data. They argue that because the data were collected by
the state police under court order, the data are therefore likely to be
tainted and misleading."' They write:
The Maryland State Police did not volunteer to keep these records;
that requirement was forced upon them. They knew that the in-
formation they collected would be used to judge and to criticize
them, and they had every incentive to improve the picture. In
other states, officers in similar circumstances have been caught
falsifying information. We don't know if that happened in Mary-
land, but even if it did, that sort of fabrication is not the main
problem. The easy, safe way to bias records is simply to skip some
cases altogether.... There is substantial evidence that this has hap-
pened with the MSP data set, but we do not know to what extent.
'C
Despite concerns about the data, Gross and Barnes reach two
conclusions. The first is that the Maryland State Police do engage in
racial profiling: the disparities in stops and searches are unlikely to be
the product of randomness. 3 They speculate that the police's motiva-
tion to engage in this type of racial profiling is that they are trying to
intercept large quantities of drugs. "[R]acial profiling," they suggest,
"seems to increase the probability of finding large hauls of drugs," be-
cause "[a]mong black and Hispanic drivers .... a larger minority of
the searches uncovered substantial quantities of illegal drugs.""'
101 Id at 659 (noting that the "data are not only limited but probably distorted as well").
102 Id. The evidence of underreporting consists primarily of documents produced in discov-
ery in the litigation against the Maryland State Police, showing that a regional commander or-
dered his officers to file reports on dozens of searches where the paperwork was missing but
contraband had been found, as well as evidence of minority motorists who had been searched
but who did not appear in the Maryland State Police database. See id at 680. There is similar an-
ecdotal evidence from other jurisdictions. See id at 678-82 (discussing a variety of misreporting
tactics allegedly employed by New Jersey and Illinois state troopers).
103 Id at 660.
104 Id. See also id at 703. Another explanation that has been offered is that the police are in-
terested in seizing drug moneys through asset forfeitures:
Collectively, local police departments received $490 million worth of cash, goods, and prop-
erty from drug asset forfeiture programs during fiscal 1997. Sheriffs' departments had total
receipts of $158 million.
The possibility of rich pickings through asset forfeiture, combined with the higher propen-
sity for black motorists to carry drugs, provides police departments with a tremendous in-
centive to engage in racial profiling. It is hardly surprising, then, that police take the bait,
even at the cost of racial bias accusations and investigations
Callahan and Anderson, The Roots of Racial Profiling, Reason at 42-43 (cited in note 55).
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Their second conclusion is that the disproportionate searches re-
flect racial prejudice, not mere statistical discrimination."' Gross and
Barnes reach this conclusion because drug use survey data provide
every reason to believe that blacks and whites offend at the same rate:
According to the 1999 National Household Survey on Drug
Abuse, 6.6% of white Americans 12 years of age or older report
that they have used an illicit drug in the previous month, com-
pared to 7.7% of blacks and 6.8% of Hispanics. There are no
comparable data on drug dealers, but customers swamp sellers in
any consumer market, including the market for illegal drugs.'
°6
While this says nothing about dealing, trafficking, and distribution, it is
relevant because, as they point out, "the great majority of the drug of-
fenders arrested by the MSP were users rather than dealers."' '
"Statewide, 84% of those found with drugs were carrying only trace or
personal-use amounts, and 68% were found with trace or personal-use
quantities of marijuana only.""'
Gross and Barnes thus reason that the hit-rate maximization
model cannot explain racial profiling because it wrongly assumes "that
blacks possess drugs on the highway far more often than whites, which
is hard to square with what we know about drug use by race.""' Gross
and Barnes do not, however, address the question of elasticities. They
suggest that the assumption of elasticity is "debatable,""' but do not
discuss how the assumption of elasticity would affect their argument,
what evidence there is for elasticity, or whether they need to contest
the assumption for purposes of their argument. Gross and Barnes also
argue that the hit-rate maximization model is simply implausible:
Why would the MSP want to maximize the number of drug busts,
however small, rather than the number of dealers they arrest or
the quantities of drugs they seize? And if they did want that, why
wouldn't they shift more heavily from consent searches (with a
22% hit rate) to probable-cause searches (with a 53% hit rate)?"'
So how did the Maryland State Police get to similar hit rates even
though they were pulling over so many more minority motorists? Ac-
105 Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 687 (cited in note 2).
106 Id at 691 (internal citation omitted).
107 Id.
108 Id at 697.
109 Id at 692.
110 Id at 692 n 143 (stating that Knowles, Persico. and Todd's assumption that "motorists who
might carry drugs are deterred by the race-specific probability of being searched" is "debatable").
111 Idat692.
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cording to Gross and Barnes, by using more sub-search techniques.
Having a dog sniff the outside of a car does not qualify as a search.
Asking for consent and detaining someone while a canine unit arrives
also does not qualify as a search. 2 Other techniques include interroga-
tion and comparisons to drug-courier profiles."3 These are the type of
sub-searches that can be administered in a racially discriminatory
manner and yet may soften the impact of the purported race differ-
ences in searches."'
Ultimately, what accounts for the racial profiling, Gross and Bar-
nes speculate, is that blacks were more likely to be in possession of
large hauls of drugs."5 In addition, the authors find that the police dis-
criminate against Hispanics by all accounts. Hispanics had much lower
hit rates, reflecting a taste for discrimination."6
In sum, Gross and Barnes focus our attention on the fact that so
many of the successful searches merely reveal personal or trace
amounts of drugs. By combining this observation with the evidence
that drug use is relatively similar across races, Gross and Barnes raise
serious questions about racial profiling on the highway. These are, in
effect, the central arguments that have made racial profiling on the
highway such an "easy case," as Gross suggests in other writings with
Debra Livingston." This "easy case" argument emphasizes the high
costs"8 and the questionable benefits of racial profiling.
112 Id at 683-84.
113 Id at 685.
114 Id at 694 (explaining that the disparate use of sub-search techniques allows police to
limit searches to cars comparatively likely to contain contraband, thus boosting the hit rate).
115 Id at 703 (noting that "84% of the big dealers arrested on 1-95 north of Baltimore were black").
116 Id at 693.
117 Gross and Livingston, 102 Colum L Rev at 1431 (cited in note 8) ("The probability of
guilt for any individual who is stopped is low; few are carrying any drugs at all, and only a tiny
proportion are drug traffickers.").
118 These include, first and foremost, the costs imposed on innocent African-American mo-
torists. Alschuler, among others, places this cost-"the extent to which a racial classification bur-
dens the innocent members of one race more than the innocent members of another"-at the
top of his list. Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 264 (cited in note 2). See also Harris, Profiles in
Injustice at 94 (cited in note 8) (observing that racial profiling has a "profound impact on inno-
cent people"). Another cost is the harm to the relationship between the African-American
community and the police. As Harris writes,
profiling, which treats all citizens of particular racial and ethnic groups as potential crimi-
nals, can do nothing but alienate these same citizens from their police. It breaks down the
trust that must be at the heart of any true partnership, and it threatens to defeat community
policing's best efforts to fight crime and disorder.
Id at 12. Another cost involves the reputational harm to the profiled group-what Alschuler re-
fers to as "the social meaning of the racial classification employed by the police." Alschuler, 2002
U Chi Legal F at 265. And, of course, there is the cost to society as a whole-to the legitimacy of
the criminal justice system and the legal system more generally. Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 117.
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B. A Critique of the Civil Liberties Literature
While making important contributions, civil liberties scholars
nevertheless make several critical errors. First, they take at face value
the narrow definition of efficiency proposed by the economists and
fail to challenge how that definition of efficiency relates to the larger
goal of fighting crime. Second, while Gross and Barnes are sensitive to
sub-search processes, they seem to ignore the larger issue of the selec-
tive use of other search criteria in the decision to search. Third, they
fail to focus on the possible ratchet effect that would disqualify racial
profiling as a narrowly tailored policing strategy.
As a result, and somewhat ironically, civil liberties advocates em-
brace too willingly the logic of the economic models of racial profiling.
To be sure, they reject the two key assumptions-higher offending of
minority motorists and elasticity of offending to policing-but they
endorse the theory. And more importantly-and most problemati-
cally-they maintain the focus on hit rates. The lower hit rates for
Hispanic motorists, they argue, proves that there is racial discrimina-
tion against Hispanics. The equal hit rates for African-American mo-
torists, they argue, corroborates the fact that drug consumption is
equal among races and therefore establishes racial discrimination."
The civil libertarians have, in effect, bought into the economic models
of crime but have flipped the assumptions.
1. The difficulty of interpreting hit rates.
The problem is, of course, that hit rates are simply the wrong sta-
tistic. But even putting that aside, hit rates are far more difficult to in-
terpret than these authors suggest given that we know little about the
selectiveness with which other search criteria are used or, for that mat-
ter, about elasticities and offending rates. The new data from across
the country do not contain any evidence concerning these key quanti-
ties of interest, without which it is practically impossible to interpret
the hit rates reliably. So even if we were interested only in narrow effi-
ciency, the fact of lower, equal, or higher hit rates tells us very little. In
each case, there are multiple possible interpretations.
Three two-by-three matrices help elucidate the different possible
interpretations of hit rates from the emerging data. All of the matrices
assume disproportionate searches of minority motorists.' ° Each matrix
addresses a different relationship between hit rates-equal, lower, or
119 See, for example, Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 693 (cited in note 2).
120 As a result, the three matrices lack symmetry. Symmetry would require creating the
three matrices for disproportionate searches of white motorists.
1322 [71:1275
Rethinking Racial Profiling
higher for minority motorists-given different basic assumptions
about elasticity and offending. The six different assumptions (elas-
tic/inelastic and lower/equal/higher offending) can be visualized in the
following graphs:
GRAPH 3
(a) Minority Higher Offending and Elastic
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The following three matrices set forth the simplest and most
likely explanation for the given hit rates, and then infer whether the
interpretation is consistent with racism or narrow efficiency.'1 The first
matrix involves disproportionate searches of minority motorists whose
hit rates equal those of white motorists. There are six possible scenar-
ios:
TABLE 4
Equal Hit Rates
If offending is
elastic to policing ...
... the minority real offending
rate may have decreased be-
cause of the disproportionate
searches, which is reflected in the
similar hit rates.
Here (Graph 3(a)) it is narrowly
efficient to police minorities at
higher rates, because it reduces
their offending and creates an
equilibrium. There is no racial
bigotry.
If offending is
inelastic to policing...
... the police perhaps are being
more discriminate in their
searches of whites (applying
more successful profiling factors
and sub-search techniques), in-
creasing the overall white hit
rates.
Here (Graph 3(b)) the police are
acting in a bigoted manner
against minorities, because of the
more careful searches of whites,
and against whites from a
narrow efficiency perspective,
because they should not be
searched at all since minorities
have constant higher offending
rates.
121 Given that all of the matrices assume disproportionate searches of minority motorists, it
is possible to argue in each cell that the disproportionality reflects racial prejudice simply be-
cause it considers race in the administration of criminal justice to the detriment of minority mo-
torists. Some commentators argue that any recourse to race in these circumstances-regardless
of relative offending or elasticities-is morally and politically offensive. This is an argument for
color-blind policing practice. Randall Kennedy, for instance, argues against racial profiling on the
grounds that race should not be taken into consideration in discretionary preventative policing.
See Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, New Republic 30 (Sept 13, 1999). Kennedy assumes ar-
guendo that African-Americans have higher natural offending rates, and that racial profiling is
not only efficient policing but reduces the amount of crime. Despite this, Kennedy opposes racial
profiling: "[tlndividuals should be judged by public authority on the basis of their own conduct
and not on the basis-not even partly on the basis-of racial generalization. Race-dependent po-
licing retards the development and spread of such thinking; indeed, it encourages the opposite
tendency." Id at 34. See also Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 12 (cited in note 8) ("It is clearly un-
conscionable to treat an individual as a criminal suspect simply because a small number of indi-
viduals from the same racial or ethnic group are criminals.").This argument is purely deontologi-
cal. I distinguish it from the more specific argument that condemns disproportionately searching
minority motorists where they are not offending at higher rates-where there is no efficiency ar-
gument. This specific argument I will include in the matrices. Because the more absolutist argu-
ment applies to every cell, however, I will put a place holder here and omit it from the matrices.
... and minority
motorists have
higher natural
offending rates
than white mo-
torists ...
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T r
... and minority
motorists have
the same natural
offending rates
as white motor-
ists...
I. +
... either the police are being
more discriminate in their
searches of minorities (applying
more successful profiling factors
or sub-search techniques), result-
ing in more successful minority
searches, or less discriminate in
their searches of whites, resulting
in lower success rates for whites,
or both.
Here (Graph 3(e)) the police are
acting in a bigoted manner
against whites (or minorities);
but at the same time, the police
are acting in a bigoted way
against minorities because, given
the lower offending rates, there
is no efficiency reason to search
minorities disproportionately.
... the equal hit rates may reflect
equal real offending rates.
Here (Graph 3(d)) there is no
narrow efficiency reason to
search minorities disproportion-
ately, and therefore the police
are acting in a bigoted manner
against minorities when they
stop them disproportionately.
... either the police are being
more discriminate in their
searches of minorities (applying
more successful profiling factors
or sub-search techniques), result-
ing in more successful minority
searches, or less discriminate in
their searches of whites, resulting
in lower success rates for whites,
or both.
Here (Graph 3(f)) the police are
acting in a bigoted manner
against whites (or minorities);
but at the same time, the police
are acting in a bigoted way
against minorities because, given
the lower offending rates, there
is no efficiency reason to search
minorities disproportionately.
The second matrix corresponds to disproportionate searches of
minority motorists whose hit rates are lower than those of white mo-
torists. Again there are six possible interpretations:
... either the police are being
more discriminate in their
searches of minorities (applying
more successful profiling factors
or sub-search techniques), result-
ing in more successful minority
searches, or less discriminate in
their searches of whites, resulting
in lower success rates for whites,
or both.
Here (Graph 3(c)) the police are
acting in a bigoted manner
against whites (or minorities) by
not being as careful in the search
selection process; but at the
same time, the police are acting
in a bigoted way against minori-
ties because, given the equal of-
fending rates, there is no narrow
efficiency reason to search mi-
norities disproportionately.
... and minority
motorists have
lower natural
offending rates
than white mo-
torists ...
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TABLE 5
Lower Hit Rates among Minorities
If offending is
elastic to policing ...
... minority real offending may
have decreased too much be-
cause of the disproportionate
searches, which is reflected in the
lower hit rates.
Here (Graph 3(a)) the police
have exceeded the equilibrium
and are now engaging in bigotry
against minorities.
If offending is
inelastic to policing ...
... the police perhaps are being
much more discriminate in their
searches of whites, resulting in
more successful searches of
whites.
Here (Graph 3(b)) the police are
demonstrating bigotry against
minorities (or whites) because of
the more careful searches of
whites, combined with bigotry
against whites from a narrow ef-
ficiency perspective because
they should not be searched at
all, since the minorities have
constant higher offending rates.
... and minority ... the lower hit rates for minori- ... either the police are being
motorists have ties may reflect the reduced real more discriminate in their
the same natural offending rates of minorities searches of whites or less dis-
offending rates caused by the elasticity. criminate in their searches of
as white motor- Here (Graph 3(c)) there is no minorities, or both.
ists ... narrow efficiency reason to po- Here (Graph 3(d)) there is no
lice minorities disproportion- narrow efficiency reason to
ately, and therefore the police search more minorities, and the
are exhibiting bigotry against police are also demonstrating
minorities, bigotry against minorities (or
whites).
... and minority ... the lower minority hit rate ... the lower minority hit rate
motorists have may reflect the lower minority may reflect the lower minority
lower natural offending rate and the reduced offending rate.
offending rates real offending from elasticity. Here (Graph 3(f)) there is no
than white mo- Here (Graph 3(e)) there is no narrow efficiency reason to
torists... narrow efficiency reason to po- search minorities disproportion-
lice minorities disproportion- ately, and therefore the police
ately, and therefore the police are exhibiting bigotry against
are exhibiting bigotry against minorities.
minorities.
Finally, the third matrix corresponds to disproportionate searches
of minority motorists whose hit rates are higher than those of white
motorists. Again there are six different possible scenarios:
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... and minority
motorists have
higher natural
offending rates
than white mo-
torists ...
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TABLE 6
Higher Hit Rates among Minorities
If offending is If offending is
elastic to policing... inelastic to policing...
... and minority ... minority real offending rates ... the higher minority hit rates
motorists have perhaps have not fallen enough may reflect the higher offending
higher natural to reach the equilibrium and so among minorities.
offending rates the police could efficiently
than white mo- search more minorities. Here (Graph 3(b)) it is narrowly
torists ... efficient to search only minori-Here (Graph 3(a)), while it is ef- ties because they are offending
ficient to search more minorities, at constant higher rates. In fact,
the disproportionality is insuffi- it is bigoted against whites from
cient to reduce minority offend- a narrow efficiency perspective
ing to the same level as white of- not to search only minorities.
fending, which is bigoted against
whites.
... and minority ... either the police are being ... either the police are being
motorists have much more discriminate in their more careful in their searches of
the same natural searches of minorities, or much minorities, or less careful in their
offending rates less discriminate in their searches of whites, or both.
as white motor- searches of whites, or both.ists...H re (Graph 3(d)) there is no
ists... Here (Graph 3(c)) the police are efficiency reason for the dispro-
acting in a bigoted manner portionate searches, so the police
against whites (or minorities); are acting in a bigoted manner
but at the same time, the police against minorities; but at the
are acting in a bigoted way same time, the police are also
against minorities because, given bigoted against whites (or mi-
the equal offending rates, there norities) in the selection and
is no efficiency reason to search sub-searching process.
minorities disproportionately.
... and minority ... either the police are being ... either the police are being
motorists have much more discriminate in their much more discriminate in their
lower natural searches of minorities, or much searches of minorities, or much
offending rates less discriminate in their less discriminate in their
than white mo- searches of whites, or both. searches of whites, or both.
torists ... Here (Graph 3(e)) the police are Here (Graph 3(f)) the police are
acting in a bigoted manner acting in a bigoted manner
against whites (or minorities); against whites (or minorities) by
but at the same time, the police being so much less careful about
are acting in a bigoted way which whites they search; but at
against minorities because, given the same time, the police are act-
the lower offending rates of mi- ing in a bigoted way against mi-
norities, there is no efficiency norities because, given the lower
reason to search minorities dis- offending rates, there is no effi-
proportionately. ciency reason to search minori-
ties disproportionately.
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Clearly, we need to know more about selectivity, elasticity, and of-
fending before we can use the new data to test whether the police are
being narrowly efficient or racist. No solid interpretive rules can be in-
ferred from these matrices, as a summary demonstrates:
SUMMARY OF TABLE 4
Equal Hit Rates
Elastic Inelastic
Higher minority Bigoted against minorities
offending Narrowly efficient (or whites) and against whites
Bigoted against whites
Same offending (or minorities) and against Bigoted against minorities
minorities
Lower minority Bigoted against whites Bigoted against whites(or minorities) and against (or minorities) and against
offending minorities minorities
SUMMARY OF TABLE 5
Lower Minority Hit Rates
Elastic Inelastic
Higher minority Bigoted against minorities
offending Bigoted against minorities (or whites) and against whites
Bigoted against minorities
Same offending Bigoted against minorities (or whites)
Lower minority Bigoted against minorities Bigoted against minorities
offending I I
SUMMARY OF TABLE 6
Higher Minority Hit Rates
Elastic Inelastic
Higher offending Bigoted against whites Bigoted against whites
Bigoted against whites Bigoted against minorities and
Same offending (or minorities) and against against whites (or minorities)
minorities
Lower inority Bigoted against whites Bigoted against whites
offerino (or minorities) and against (or minorities) and against
offending minorities minorities
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Given that the data include no information about offending or
elasticity, and given the uncertainty regarding how the police are com-
paratively treating race and other search criteria as a factor in selec-
tion and in sub-search processes, it is extremely difficult to interpret
the data on hit rates. Equal hit rates could mean narrow efficiency, but
they could also signal racial discrimination.
2. The ratchet effect.
The civil liberties scholars also fail to focus on the likely ratchet
effect associated with racial profiling. A ratchet effect occurs when
profiling produces a supervised population that is disproportionate to
the distribution of offending by racial group. To give an example: if
minority motorists represent 20 percent of motorists on the road, but
30 percent of the offenders (persons carrying drug contraband on the
highway), then minority motorists are offending at a higher propor-
tion than their representation in the general motorist population. If
the police achieve equal hit rates by deploying 60 percent of their
searches on minority motorists, then minority motorists will represent
60 percent of the population with negative police contacts resulting, in
all likelihood, in some form of correctional relationship, whether
a ticket, fine, arrest, probation revocation, supervision, or incarcera-
tion. The difference between minority motorists representing 30 per-
cent of the offenders and 60 percent of the correctional population
represents a ratchet that has significant negative effects on the minor-
ity population.'
The ratchet effect disproportionately distributes criminal records
and criminal justice contacts, with numerous secondary implications.
Disproportionate criminal supervision and incarceration reduces work
opportunities, breaks down families and communities, and disrupts
education. It contributes to the exaggerated general perception in the
public imagination and among police officers of "black criminality"
that, as Dorothy Roberts suggests, has significant collateral conse-
quences for African-American communities.'2 This, in turn, further
undermines the ability of African-Americans to obtain employment
or pursue educational opportunities. It has a delegitimizing effect on
122 This discussion of the ratchet effect does not even take into account the potential addi-
tional harm of increased false convictions. For a fruitful discussion of the possible increased dan-
ger of convicting the innocent minority motorist, see Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Self-Fulfilling
Impressions of Criminality: Unintentional Race Profiling 5-16 (unpublished paper 2003), online
at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstract id=462900 (visited July 27,2004).
123 See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of
Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J Crim L & Criminol 775,801-18 (1999).
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the criminal justice system that may encourage disaffected youths to
commit crime. It may also corrode community-police relations, ham-
pering law enforcement efforts as minority community members be-
come less willing to report crime, to testify, and to convict. And, to
make matters worse, a feedback mechanism aggravates these tenden-
cies. Given the paucity of reliable information on natural offending
rates, the police may rely on their own prior arrest and supervision
statistics in deciding how to allocate resources."' This, in turn, acceler-
ates the imbalance in the prison population and the growing correla-
tion between race and criminality.
Whether a ratchet effect will manifest turns on subtle variations
in elasticity and offending. To grasp these effects, it makes sense to be-
gin by graphing a basic model of racial profiling. Let us assume, first,
that the elasticity of offending to policing is measured in terms of the
distribution of total searches conducted by race. So on the x-axis, in-
stead of having the internal group search rate (the rate of searches
within each racial group), the graph plots the total distribution of
searches as between white and minority motorists. Second, let us as-
sume that elasticity is relatively constant and is the same for both ra-
cial groups. Third, let us assume that minority offending is consistently
higher than white offending. Based on these assumptions, a simple
model of racial profiling is represented by Graph 4.
124 See Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, Interim Report of the State Police
Review Team Regarding Allegations of Racial Profiling 68 (Apr 1999), online at
http://www.state.nj.uslps/intm-419.pdf (visited Aug 19, 2004) ("To a large extent, these statistics
have been used to grease the wheels of a vicious cycle-a self-fulfilling prophecy where law en-
forcement agencies rely on arrest data that they themselves generated as a result of the discre-
tionary allocation of resources and targeted drug enforcement efforts.").
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GRAPH 4
Basic Assumptions
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X-Axis: Distribution of Searches
(Percent of Searches Conducted by Racial Group)
As the graph shows, if the police engage in race-neutral policing
and take a random sample of the total motorist population (assume a
distribution of 20 percent minority and 80 percent white motorists),
then the police will search approximately 20 percent minority and 80
percent white motorists. The police searches will reflect offending
rates of approximately 7.5 percent for minority and 3 percent for
white motorists (Time 1). If the police engage in racial profiling in a
narrowly efficient manner, they will search additional minority motor-
ists until the hit rates converge. Based on this graph, they will need to
search 60 percent minority and 40 percent white motorists, achieving
equal hit rates related to equal offending rates of approximately 4.5
percent.
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This simple model reflects the likelihood of a significant ratchet
effect. Even if minority motorists commit more offenses than their
representation in the general population-which they do under these
assumptions-but far less than 50 percent of the offenses-which is
likely since they constitute only 20 percent of the population-the po-
lice would nevertheless need to search minority drivers more than 50
percent of the time to equalize hit rates. The search differential will
exceed the offending differential. This difference is precisely a ratchet
effect that magnifies minority representation in the supervised popu-
lation far in excess of their proportion of the offending population,
much less the population as a whole.
The only way to avoid a ratchet effect on this simplified model is
if white offending is less elastic than minority offending and the of-
fending curves intersect at some point less than 50 percent. This is pos-
sible, but it assumes that minority offending is not higher than white
offending at every point on the scale-which represents a nontrivial
assumption for anyone who is assuming generally higher offending
among minority motorists. The model based on these assumptions is
represented in Graph 5:
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GRAPH 5
Assumptions Necessary to Avoid a Ratchet Effect
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(Percent of Searches Conducted by Racial Group)
On these narrow assumptions, it would be possible for the offend-
ing differential to be reflected perfectly by the policing differential. It
would be possible, for instance, for minority motorists, who represent
20 percent of the population, to represent 40 percent of offenders un-
der conditions of random sampling, and for the police to search 40
percent minority motorists to equalize hit rates. If that were the case,
there would be no ratchet effect: 40 percent of the offending popula-
tion would be minority motorists, and 40 percent of the population
with negative police contacts (arrests or other negative contact) would
also be minority motorists. The police would have increased the over-
all efficiency of the searches and the total number of successful
r
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searches, yet they would not have created a ratchet effect on the car-
ceral population.
It is important to note, though, that it would not be possible to
achieve similar hit rates on this model without a ratchet effect if the
point of intersection were at a point greater than 50 percent, as dem-
onstrated in Graph 6. If the point of intersection is to the right of the
50 percent mark, then there is simply no way for the police to equalize
hit rates.
GRAPH 6
Different Elasticity and Offending, But No Equal Hit Rates
10-
9-
-0
-
0"1
0
Time 2
I I I I I I I I I I
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
X-Axis: Distribution of Searches
(Percent of Searches Conducted by Racial Group)
The bottom line is that a ratchet effect is likely under the more
common assumptions concerning offending and elasticity. In the
model presented here, a ratchet is avoided only if there is lower elas-
ticity for white motorists and the point of intersection is at less than 50
4 4
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percent. But these assumptions are unrealistic: if minority motorists
offend at higher rates than white motorists, there is no apparent rea-
son why that would be the case less than 50 percent of the time.
Moreover, although elasticity as between racial groups may differ,
there is little reason to believe that white motorists would have lower
elasticity."'
In the final analysis, the civil liberties advocates err in embracing
too fully the logic of the economic models of racial profiling. The
proper question to ask, at the empirical level, is not whether racial
profiling maximizes the success rate of searches, but whether it re-
duces the profiled crime-namely the illicit transportation of drug
contraband on the highways-without creating a ratchet.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LITERATURE
Whether racial profiling reduces the profiled crime without creat-
ing a ratchet is also the key question for purposes of constitutional
analysis since it ties most directly into the traditional law enforcement
interest in combating crime. Unfortunately, the courts and many
commentators fail to address the question directly. Instead, they de-
ploy a set of four technical legal distinctions that insulate them from
the hard question of race in policing. None of the four distinctions,
however, is tenable.
A. The Constitutional Model of Racial Profiling
1. The Fourth versus the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's decision in Whren v United States'2 set the
stage for the first two legal distinctions. In Whren, the police used a
minor traffic violation as a pretext to stop and investigate two motor-
ists in a car for drugs. The police suspected the two young African-
American men, who were sitting in a Pathfinder with temporary li-
cense plates, because they were stopped for a longer than usual
amount of time-more than twenty seconds-at a stop sign in a high-
drug area and the driver was apparently looking down into the lap of
his companion. The two men challenged the pretextual stop as unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment, and argued that allowing such
practices would enable the police to stop motorists based on an im-
permissible factor-race."' The Supreme Court rejected their argu-
125 See Part IVA.
126 517 US 806 (1996).
127 Id at 808-09.
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ment. The Fourth Amendment, the Court declared, does not concern
itself with the subjective intentions of police officers, including their
possible reliance on race, so long as they had reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to justify the seizure-in this case, the traffic violation.
Race claims should be addressed to the Equal Protection Clause, not
the Fourth Amendment, the Court concluded'
The Court's ruling in Whren sent two signals. First, Fourth
Amendment analysis differs in kind from equal protection analysis,
and claims of racial bias should be addressed to the latter, not the
former. Second, and more indirectly, in the Fourth Amendment con-
text race can legitimately be considered as a factor in the determina-
tion to stop an individual so long as the police independently have
reasonable suspicion. This doctrinal framework of bifurcated Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment analysis has guided lawyers and lower
courts; most legal discussions of racial profiling address each claim
separately.
Most constitutional scholars have criticized this practice and ar-
gued that notions of equal protection should inform our interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment. 9 Their conclusion is right, but not always
for the right reason. The principal reason to reject separate Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment analyses is that each begins with a similar
factual question: whether race predicts criminality. Although the doc-
trinal analyses obviously differ-reasonable suspicion on one hand,
narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest on the
other-they both trigger a threshold factual determination of whether
race is a valid predictor of the profiled crime. If there is a strong corre-
lation between race and the profiled crime, then race may raise legiti-
mate suspicion and may also represent a means to satisfy the govern-
ment's interest in combating crime. The analyses then turn on the de-
gree of predictive power as compared to other factors that would sat-
isfy the constitutional tests, as well as, for purposes of the equal pro-
tection analysis, whether the police technique is narrowly tailored to
128 Id at 813 ("We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective
enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for ob-
jecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment.").
129 See, for example, Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const L at 348 (cited in note 8) (arguing that "arti-
ficial doctrinal lines that the Supreme Court has drawn around the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments" create "disquiet[ing]" results); Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 193 & n 121
(cited in note 2) (characterizing the Court's "compartmentalization" as "artificial" and gathering
commentary reaching the same conclusion); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects:
Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 NYU L Rev 956, 961 (1999) (asserting that the Supreme
Court "took a wrong turn" in writing race out of the Fourth Amendment); Carol S. Steiker, Sec-
ond Thoughts about First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 820,844 (1994).
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the law enforcement interest. To be sure, race triggers strict scrutiny
rather than rational basis review under Fourteenth Amendment
analysis. But for purposes of thinking through the analysis, race is no
different from other crime prediction factors such as gender, age, edu-
cation, family history, and prior criminality. It functions in the same
way for purposes of criminological prediction and, thus, for purposes
of reasonable suspicion or fighting crime. Unless race predicts crimi-
nality, it clearly does not raise articulable or other suspicion and, at the
same time, does not promote the governmental interest in fighting
crime."'
Tracey Meares and I make a similar point outside the race con-
text with regard to the predictive factor of fleeing from the police in
our discussion of Illinois v Wardlow.' In that case, the Court decided
that flight from an identified police officer in an area known for heavy
narcotics trafficking constituted reasonable suspicion-and therefore
that the stop was constitutional-based on a common sense judgment
that fleeing from the police was inherently suspicious. Meares and I
argue that, rather than relying on common sense intuitions, the major-
ity should instead have explored empirical data on prediction:
If we knew that crime was indeed afoot in the vast majority of
cases in which police stopped individuals on the street after such
individuals had run away from them,.., then we would ... con-
clude that this category of information is a good reason ex ante
for police action, not only because the category of information
seems to reliably indicate guilt of crime, but also because the par-
ticular criterion satisfied by the category of information-how re-
liably the information indicates that crime is afoot-is a legiti-
mate explanation for police action.'32
In the Wardlow case, data from New York City suggested that this
particular factor-fleeing from the police-was not a good predictor
of criminality. A report issued by Eliot Spitzer, the Attorney General
of New York, collected information on a sample of stops based on
facts that, as reported by the police, clearly met the constitutional
standard of reasonable suspicion, as well as on stops based on facts
that courts have decided clearly would not constitute reasonable sus-
130 The use of race could promote other governmental interests-for instance, remedying
past discrimination or promoting diversity in the prison population by targeting white suspects.
131 528 US 119 (2000); Tracey L. Meares and Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword to Supreme
Court Review: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 90 J Crim L & Criminol 733 (2000).
132 Meares and Harcourt, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 780 (cited in note 131).
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picion."3 With respect to the Wardlow factor, the data suggested that
"[s]tops reported as undertaken because the suspect fled the scene"-
even in high crime areas-had similar stop-to-arrest ratios as "stops
based on factors generally understood to fail to satisfy the reasonable
suspicion test."'' These data, Meares and I argued, supported the dis-
senters' view in Wardlow that flight was an inadequate predictor of
criminal activity. Our point was not that data would resolve the legal
question-how predictive a factor must be to meet the constitutional
standard inevitably implicates normative judgments-but that data
would allow courts to compare this factor to others that have passed
constitutional review.
The same analysis should apply to race as a predictive factor. To
address the Fourth Amendment question, a court should determine
whether any evidence shows that race is a predictive factor, and, if so,
to what degree. Only if it passes this test might it be a reasonable
ground for suspicion, and therefore possibly promote a governmental
interest--so long as the use of race is narrowly tailored to that inter-
est. Both analyses-the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments-turn
on this initial question. It makes no sense to decouple them.
2. The Fourth Amendment: race as sole or partial factor.
The Supreme Court's decision in Whren -along with several ear-
lier border patrol cases from the mid-1970s' -also set the stage for
the second legal distinction, namely the distinction between using race
exclusively as the basis of suspicion and using race as one factor
among other factors that establish justifiable cause. The Court in
Whren essentially condoned using race under the Fourth Amendment
as long as there is independent justification for the search-in essence,
tucking the race issue under the rug, since few savvy police officers
confess to stopping a suspect based on race alone.
133 Civil Rights Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, The New York City Police Depart-
ment's "Stop & Frisk" Practice: A Report from the Office of the Attorney General xiii-xiv (Dec 1,
1999), online at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reportslstop-frisklstp-frsk.pdf (visited Aug 19,
2004). See generally Harcourt, Illusion of Order at 173-75 (cited in note 32) (discussing the re-
port's data and conclusions).
134 Meares and Harcourt, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 790 (cited in note 131).
135 See United States v Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543, 563-64 (1976) (permitting the referral
of motorists "selectively to [a] secondary [border] inspection area ... largely on the basis of ap-
parent Mexican ancestry"); United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873, 884-87 (1975) (holding
that the "apparent Mexican ancestry of the [car's] occupants," without further "specific articu-
lable facts," is not reasonable grounds to believe the occupants were aliens). See generally Gross
and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 732-38 (cited in note 2) (discussing whether the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibits all racial considerations in the decision to stop or search).
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Although the lower courts are split on this question, several im-
portant decisions accept Whren's invitation to ignore race. United
States v Weaver '3 is typical. In Weaver, a DEA agent, using a drug cou-
rier profile, stopped and frisked a passenger exiting a plane at the
131Kansas City airport . One of the factors that the agent relied on was
race: the suspect was an African-American man, and the DEA agent
was on the lookout especially for "young roughly dressed black males
from street gangs in Los Angeles."'3 Weaver challenged his seizure on
the grounds that the police lacked reasonable suspicion.
The Eighth Circuit rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge,
finding that the nonracial factors gave the police articulable suspi-
cion. ' In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Arnold raised the issue of
race, and argued that there was insufficient evidence that race is a
predictor of drug offenses to justify using race, which "simply rein-
forces the kind of stereotyping that lies behind drug-courier profiles.
When public officials begin to regard large groups of citizens as pre-
sumptively criminal, this country is in a perilous situation indeed."' In
a footnote, the majority responded:
We agree with the dissent that large groups of our citizens should
not be regarded by law enforcement officers as presumptively
criminal based upon their race. We would not hesitate to hold
that a solely race-based suspicion of drug courier status would
not pass constitutional muster. Accordingly, had [DEA agent]
Hicks relied solely upon the fact of Weaver's race as a basis for
his suspicions, we would have a different case before us. As it is,
however, facts are not to be ignored simply because they may be
unpleasant-and the unpleasant fact in this case is that Hicks had
knowledge, based upon his own experience and upon the intelli-
gence reports he had received from the Los Angeles authorities,
that young male members of black Los Angeles gangs were
flooding the Kansas City area with cocaine. To that extent, then,
race, when coupled with the other factors Hicks relied upon, was
a factor in the decision to approach and ultimately detain
136 966 F2d 391 (8th Cir 1992).
137 Id at 392-93.
138 Id.
139 See id at 396 (finding that Weaver's walking quickly toward a taxi, lacking a copy of his
plane ticket and identification, and appearing nervous constituted reasonable suspicion that
Weaver carried drugs).
140 Id at 397 (Arnold dissenting).
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Weaver. We wish it were otherwise, but we take the facts as they
are presented to us, not as we would like them to be.'
Many courts have similarly sidestepped the race issue by relying
on nonracial factors either to find or not to find reasonable suspi-
cion.' 2 Other federal courts have gone the other way and struck down
the use of race under circumstances where race was one among sev-
eral factors used to stop or search a suspect.' 3 State courts are also
split on this question." But the growing tendency is for courts to
wrangle over the question and to send a signal that they do not want
to deal with the race issue under the Fourth Amendment.'45
Nevertheless, at the end of the day, there remains a loose legal
distinction between using race exclusively and using race as one
among other factors. The first use of race is practically unanimously
condemned. In fact, if the police in Whren had argued that the legiti-
macy of the search rested entirely on the race of the two motorists,
there is little doubt that the Court would have struck down the search.
The second use of race is more controversial, but it can generally be
avoided by focusing on the other factors that raise suspicion.'"
Both of these conclusions, however, are wrong. The first-that the
exclusive use of race is impermissible- simply ignores or is willfully
blind to the possibility that, under some rare or unique circumstances,
141 Id at 394 n 2.
142 See generally Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 735 (cited in note 2), discussing Der-
ricott v State, 327 Md 582, 611 A2d 592 (Md Ct App 1992), and United States v Davis, 2001 US
App LEXIS 10997 (2d Cir). Some courts have also used the same logic-reliance on nonracial
traits justifies the stop and vitiates the constitutional claim-in the equal protection context. Al-
schuler, for example, has identified several cases from the Sixth Circuit that do just this: where
the police used other legitimate reasons to interview a suspect, the legitimacy of those other rea-
sons cancels out the equal protection violation of improperly relying on race. See Alschuler, 2002
U Chi Legal F at 178 (cited in note 2).
143 See United States v Nicholas, 448 F2d 622, 625 (8th Cir 1971) (holding impermissible a
search based on "a generalized suspicion that any black person driving an auto with out-of-state
license plates might be engaged in criminal activity"); United States v Laymon, 730 F Supp 332,
339 (D Colo 1990) (finding that a traffic stop based on the defendant's weaving was a pretext for
an impermissible stop based on the defendant's out-of-state license plates and race). Consider
also United States v Montero-Camargo, 208 F3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir 2000) (holding that Hispanic
appearance "is of little or no probative value" where the majority of people who pass through
checkpoints are Hispanic, but affirming the conviction because other grounds were sufficient).
144 See generally Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 734 & nn 253-54 (discussing state
court holdings).
145 See id at 737-38.
146 See R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection
Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L Rev 1075,1086-87 n 47 (2001) ("The consensus view seems
to be that race may be considered as one of many factors, but may not be the only factor in an
officer's decision to stop an individual."). See also Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 733
(suggesting that there is "a general view that race may not be the sole basis for deciding who to
stop or search, but that it may constitutionally be considered as one factor among others").
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race may be such a strong predictor of criminality that it raises justifi-
able suspicion. If race alone predicts a form of criminality to the
satisfaction of a Fourth Amendment level of suspicion, it should be
evaluated like any other predictive factor rather than being per se
impermissible.
Few, if any, commentators take this position even though it is
theoretically correct. As Rudovsky suggests, "Virtually everyone
agrees that it is impermissible to stop or search someone solely on the
basis of race.''.7 Moreover, Fourth Amendment law, as enshrined in
City of Indianapolis v Edmond,'4 requires individualized suspicion for
searches intended to advance a general interest in crime control.' 9 The
few commentators who advocate lifting the ban on group searches-
such as Stuntz for example-take pains to emphasize that "groups" do
not include "racial groups. ' -"
The unanimous commentary and the Edmond rule are, however,
incoherent. They rest on a false distinction between probabilistic
analysis by group trait versus probabilistic analysis by individual sus-
picion. But in both cases, the police are making an odds calculation.
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment-a constitutional provision
grounded on a reasonableness standard that depends on a probabilis-
tic analysis-the two are identical. The permissibility of a group
search-including a group search of a racial or ethnic group-should
depend on the predictive power of the group trait, in the same way
that the permissibility of individualized suspicion depends on the pre-
dictive power of the individualized traits. Race as a predictor of crimi-
nality should be no different. Constitutionality does not, of course,
mean that racial profiling is a wise policy choice, but that is another
matter.
The second conclusion-that partial use of race can be ignored if
other factors justify the search-is equally wrong."' If race is used as
147 Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const L at 306 (cited in note 8).
148 531 US 32 (2000).
149 Id at 44 (declaring that "we are particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily pursue their gen-
eral crime control ends").
150 See Stuntz, 111 Yale L J at 2164-65 (cited in note 15) (arguing that the Edmond norm
against group searches is "perverse"). As Stuntz emphasizes, "groups are defined by time and
place, not by demographic category": a group seizure includes "the temporary seizure of all cars
passing through a given intersection on a given afternoon," but not the "seizure of all young men
of Middle Eastern origin." Id at 2141 n 9.
151 Here, several legal commentators have criticized the outcome, but for different reasons.
See, for example, Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 175-79 (cited in noted 2) (noting that permit-
ting the police to use race as a factor "is insufficient under the Constitution," because racial clas-
sifications require a compelling governmental interest and a "'rational basis' will not do"); Ran-
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part of a profile, then a court adjudicating the Fourth Amendment
question should inquire into whether race contributed in any way to
the predictive capacity of the profile, regardless of whether the other
profiled traits satisfy constitutional standards."' If race does contribute
and the overall profile provides the quantum of suspicion that satisfies
the constitutional standard, then using race as part of the profile pre-
sents no Fourth Amendment problem. If it did not contribute, then us-
ing race as a part of the profile raises a Fourth Amendment problem
regardless of whether the overall profile satisfies the constitutional
standard. We could then debate whether to impose the remedy of
suppression or another remedy; and the fact that a Fourth Amend-
ment remedy may be appropriate in the case of race though not for
other traits that turn out to be irrelevant-such as, for instance,
height-would reflect the constitutional scrutiny given to race as a
protected category. Up until that point, though, race should be treated
like any other predictive trait in analyzing whether or not it contrib-
uted to the predictive power of the profile-in other words, whether
or not it raises suspicion.
3. Equal protection: excluding witness identifications.
The third legal technicality draws a distinction between using
race absent individualized suspicion about the particular suspect and
using race where there is an eyewitness identification based on race.
The first is generally associated with racial profiling: stopping a minor-
ity motorist because minority motorists are assumed to offend at
higher rates. The second is what we generally associate with detective
work: getting an identification from a witness and tracking down sus-
pects who match that description. Most courts hold that the latter is
not "using race." Often, the reason is that relying on an identification
dall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 148-49 (Pantheon 1997) (arguing that the courts are
wrongly permitting the realities of policing to "dictate the way in which the legal order should
respond," much in the same way some once believed that violent resistance to desegregation
should have dictated suspending desegregation). Randall Kennedy, for instance, has argued that
partial consideration of race should be deemed the same as exclusive consideration of race given
that race, even when claimed to be used partially, really overtakes all other considerations. As a
result, Kennedy objects to any reliance on race in the decision to stop or search suspects. See
Kennedy, New Republic at 33 (cited in note 121) ("Taking race into account at all means engag-
ing in racial discrimination.").
152 Anthony Thompson, one of the few commentators who advocates a similar position, sets
out how a reviewing court could do this: "[A] court would begin by providing guidelines regard-
ing the types of situations in which race could be a factor in suspicion. Then, the court would be
expected to scrutinize the officer's motivations to determine if the circumstances in a given case
warranted this reliance on race." Thompson, 74 NYU L Rev at 1005 (cited in note 129).
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is a race-neutral policy: the content may be race-specific, but the pol-
• • 153
icy itself is race neutral.
Curiously, many constitutional commentators endorse this dis-
tinction. In fact, as Richard Banks correctly observes, "Even the
harshest scholarly critics of racial profiling endorse police use of sus-
pect descriptions.'"" Gross and Livingston write, for instance:
It is not racial profiling for an officer to question, stop, search, ar-
rest, or otherwise investigate a person because his race or ethnic-
ity matches information about a perpetrator of a specific crime
that the officer is investigating. That use of race ... does not en-
tail a global judgment about a racial or ethnic group as a whole.'5
Rudovsky similarly defines racial profiling so as to exclude witness
identification cases -"except where police are acting on a racial de-
scription of the perpetrator of a crime."' And many commentators do
not place the same type of limits on eyewitness racial identifications.
So, for instance, Rudovsky observes: "Certainly police can consider
race where a physical description is provided, but absent that factor,
or other self-limiting factors, race cannot be considered in the decision
to stop, detain, or search."''. It is fair to say, with Banks, that the "con-
153 See, for example, Brown v City of Oneonta, 221 F3d 329, 337 (2d Cir 2000) (deeming
race-neutral the state policy of "investigat[ing] crimes by interviewing the victim, getting a de-
scription of the assailant, and seeking out persons who matched that description").
154 Banks, 48 UCLA L Rev at 1078 (cited in note 146). See also Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal
F at 265-66 (cited in note 2) ("Almost no one seeks to prevent the police from using race as a
partial description of physical appearance."). Consider U.S. Department of Justice, Guidance Re-
garding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies (June 2003), online at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance on-race.htm (visited Aug 20, 2004) (prohibit-
ing racial profiling in federal law enforcement activities "except that officers may rely on race
and ethnicity in a specific suspect description").
155 Gross and Livingston, 102 Colum L Rev at 1415 (cited in note 8). See also Gross and
Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 655 n 10 (cited in note 2) ("[lIt is not racial profiling for an officer to
stop, question, search, or arrest a person because his race matches the description of the perpe-
trator of a specific crime that has been reported."). Gross and Barnes note that "racial profiling
is impossible once the police are looking for a particular person-the victim's partner, the
woman in the surveillance video, Osama bin Laden." Id at 655.
156 Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const L at 299 n 27 (cited in note 8).
157 Id at 328. See also id at 308 n 79 ("Race is an appropriate factor in stops where the po-
lice have been provided with a description of a criminal suspect."). Rudovsky does give a more
refined analysis of Oneonta: where the race identification becomes the primary or predominant
factor, then Rudovsky suggests strict scrutiny should apply; however, the application seems to
turn on the form of the investigation, rather than on the probability analysis and three conditions
discussed in this Article. Id at 348. Sheri Lynn Johnson similarly writes:
The use of race to identify a particular perpetrator, for example, does not disadvantage any
racial group and thus does not require strict scrutiny. Although the suspect's race is noted
and weighed in the decision to detain, no generalizations about the characteristics, behavior,
or appropriate treatment of the racial group are employed.
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sensus view of legal scholars casts ... race-based suspect descriptions
as innocuous and unquestionably legitimate."'
The leading case discussed for this proposition is Brown v City of
Oneonta."9 In that case, a victim identified a burglar as a young Afri-
can-American male; according to the reported decision, the descrip-
tion included a knife wound to the hand, allegedly inflicted during a
struggle with the victim.) In response, the police interrogated every
African-American male student at the local college and conducted a
sweep of the town "stopping and questioning non-white persons on
the streets and inspecting their hands for cuts.' 6' The African-
American population in Oneonta was in the neighborhood of 300
people, with another 150 at the state university. Several such residents
sued the police for violating their civil rights. The court and the attor-
neys, naturally, addressed the Fourth Amendment and Equal Protec-
tion Clause arguments separately. 16 With regard to the equal protec-
tion claim, the Second Circuit ruled that the police had not purposely
classified by race or engaged in intentional discrimination based on
race when questioning African-American residents and students. In-
stead, the police had relied on a race-neutral technique, focusing at-
tention on persons who matched the eyewitness identification. The
policy itself-namely "to investigate crimes by interviewing the victim,
getting a description of the assailant, and seeking out persons who
matched that description"63-was race-neutral on its face, the court
declared. And even though the policy as applied here had a disparate
racial impact, without an additional showing of intent to discriminate,
"the disparate impact of an investigation such as the one in this case is
insufficient to sustain an equal protection claim."'6
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale L J 214,242-43 (1983).
158 Banks, 48 UCLA L Rev at 1083 (cited in note 146). See generally id at 1083-85 (compil-
ing a list of authoritative legal scholars who endorse the use of race-based suspect descriptions).
159 221 F3d 329 (2d Cir 2000).
160 Id at 334. Purportedly based on this information, the police accosted suspects to look at
their hands. According to some media accounts, however, the victim never made any statement
about the knife wound. See, for example, 60 Minutes H: The Black List (CBS television broadcast
Feb 13,2002) (reporting the contents of the original police investigative record).
161 Oneonta, 221 F3d at 334.
162 With regard to the Fourth Amendment claim, the Second Circuit held that "a descrip-
tion of race and gender alone will rarely provide reasonable suspicion justifying a police search
or seizure." Id. The court remanded the case to allow certain plaintiffs who had been seized to
pursue their claim under a Fourth Amendment theory. Id at 341-42. The court's treatment of the
Fourth Amendment claim is in accordance with my argument.
163 Id at 337.
164 Id at 338.
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This distinction also makes no sense. In this regard, the minority
position advocated by a few commentators-Banks '6 and Albert Al-
schuler 16 especially -gets it right. When the police work from an eye-
witness identification, they use probabilities in exactly the same way
as when they rely on racial correlations with crime. Ironically, they
may be working off less reliable information; eyewitness identification
is notoriously untrustworthy. 67 But whether race may be considered
depends on whether race functions sufficiently to narrow down the
suspect pool. In most cases, eyewitness racial identification will likely
satisfy this standard. That race-based suspect identification should be
subject to equal protection review does not mean that it should be
prohibited.'6 Nevertheless, courts should analyze the degree to which
eyewitness racial identifications are reliable under different circum-
stances, and, naturally, should distinguish between intra- and cross-
racial identifications given their distinct error rates. Courts could then
explore whether the racial category narrows down the pool of sus-
pects sufficiently in the particular case. Surely, sometimes race (either
in whole or in part) is a valid predictor and, if properly incorporated
in the criminal profile and used properly, can be expected to cull the
pool of suspects dramatically. Under these conditions, the state would
165 Banks argues that the categorical distinction is wrong: "Suspect description reliance is
not racially innocuous and, under equal protection doctrine, it should be treated as a racial classi-
fication." Banks, 48 UCLA L Rev at 1080 (cited in note 146). He relies in part on the "functional
similarities" between racial profiles and race-based suspect identifications, pointing out that both
categories feed into each other. Id at 1096. Yet Banks does not go so far as to argue, as I do here,
that the two are identical in the sense that they are both probabilistic determinations. The state-
ment "I think he was X" is a statement of probabilities of the same type as "X persons commit
crime statistically more often."
166 Alschuler also argues that the categorical distinction is wrong. He writes that the One-
onta police used an "express racial classification":
When an officer, relying on a witness description, restricts the liberty of black men in green
coats and not the liberty of white men in green coats, this officer differentiates by race. Of
course the officer's conduct may nevertheless be legitimate. Identifying a racial classifica-
tion begins, not ends, the inquiry.
Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 183 (cited in note 2). Moreover, as Alschuler suggests, all eye-
witness racial identifications turn into racial profiling: "[T]he victim's front-end particularity be-
comes the police officer's demographic generality at the point of arrest or detention." Id at 200.
Alschuler's argument, however, should be made in these slightly stronger terms.
167 See generally Elizabeth E Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Harvard 1979).
168 See Banks, 48 UCLA L Rev at 1081 ("I do not argue that suspect description reliance
should be prohibited, as a matter of either policy or constitutional doctrine."). Elsewhere in the
article, Banks suggests, based on probabilities, that subjecting race-based suspect identifications
to strict scrutiny would likely be fatal. See id at 1117. Under the analysis I propose, however, it
would all depend on the probabilistic analysis of the effect on the profiled crime and on the
ratchet effect, rather than on the probabilistic analysis of prior Supreme Court decisions.
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likely have a compelling governmental interest in using race as a fac-
tor in identifying suspects, but not otherwise.
4. Equal protection: inferring intent.
The Supreme Court's decisions in McCleskey v Kemp'69 and
United States v Armstrong'7"-which extend the Washington v Davis.'
requirement of intent to the criminal justice sphere-set up the final
major legal distinction in the racial profiling context. It is the require-
ment that a successful equal protection challenge rest on evidence of
intentional discrimination rather than on inference from unexplained
disparate treatment."
Many commentators have criticized the actual intent requirement
in the racial profiling context -as well as in other criminal justice con-
texts.'" Alschuler, for instance, suggests that courts should substitute
social meaning for intent: "Targeting only black street gangs or only
black drug dealers, for example, clearly conveys the message that
blacks are more to be feared than whites. The Equal Protection Clause
should require the government to justify its delivery of this mes-
sage.' 7. Though appealing in certain respects, the turn to social mean-
ing may not necessarily clarify or simplify this area of the law. The
social meaning of governmental action is often in the eye of the
beholder.
Gross and Barnes, in their discussion of the notorious New Jersey
case State v Soto,'7' suggest a more promising solution. In the Soto case,
the lower state court, relying in part on New Jersey precedent, carved
an exception to the McCleskey requirement on the grounds that the
decision to stop and search involves fewer variables than the decision
to sentence someone to death. The reduction in variables narrows and
simplifies the claim of racial discrimination and therefore, the court
169 481 US 279 (1987). In McCleskey, the Court rejected an equal protection claim for lack
of a showing of actual discriminatory intent, where the petitioner produced evidence that mur-
derers of white victims are 4.3 times more likely to be sentenced to death than murderers of Af-
rican-American victims. Id at 287,291-99.
170 517 US 456 (1996). In Armstrong, the Court required evidence of discriminatory pur-
pose in the context of a selective prosecution challenge. Id at 465.
171 426 US 229 (1976). In Davis, the Court articulated the principle that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause bars only intentional discrimination. Id at 239-41.
172 See generally Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const L at 322-29 (cited in note 8).
173 See, for example, id (providing critical commentary on both McCleskey and Armstrong);
Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 201-07 (cited in note 2) (critiquing Armstrong); Gross and
Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 741 (cited in note 2) (lamenting the "near impossibility" of meeting
the actual intent requirement).
174 Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 212.
175 324 NJ Super 66,734 A2d 350 (1996).
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suggested, statistical evidence may be sufficient to prove intentional
116discrimination in the racial profiling context. The decision to stop
and search involves not only fewer variables than the decision to sen-
tence to death, but also fewer decisionmakers. In the first case, the de-
cisionmakers are all police officers, generally from the same patrol
unit; in the second, they include prosecutors, grand jurors, petit jurors,
judges, and defense attorneys. Although, as Gross and Barnes observe,
the New Jersey court did not rely on this second distinction, it is im-
portant -perhaps even more important than the first.
Racial profiling on the highways as a potential form of discrimi-
nation is more analogous to the Batson v Kentucky" situation involv-
ing the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges than it is to the
McCleskey problem of racial discrimination in the death penalty or
the criminal justice system more generally. In both racial profiling and
the Batson context, the decisionmaker is one or more members of a
discrete law enforcement agency-whether a state patrol unit or a dis-
trict attorney's office. The decision to search and the decision to strike
a juror peremptorily are each based on a limited set of factors that
identify suspects or biased jurors-bumper stickers and car models on
the one hand, defense sympathies and orientations on the other.
Moreover, the decisionmakers have the ability -and should have the
opportunity-to explain exactly why they decided to search or strike
an African-American or Hispanic person.
For these reasons, the constitutional analysis of alleged racial pro-
filing under an equal protection challenge should follow the three-step
model of Batson. 8 This would not eliminate the intent requirement or
reverse Washington v Davis; instead, it would merely extend the Bat-
son method of inferring intent to the racial profiling context. Under a
Batson-type approach, statistical discrepancies in the race of persons
searched would satisfy the first prong of the analysis and set forth a
prima facie case. This accords with the economic model of racial pro-
filing, which essentially assumes that the disproportionate searches of
minority motorists are not accidental. Once the statistical burden has
been satisfied, the police unit would then be required either to offer
race-neutral reasons for the disparities (that is, to offer other factors
that, when held constant, eliminate the racial correlation with
searches) or to present evidence that race is a statistically significant
predictor of crime and that racial profiling satisfies the limited condi-
176 See id at 360. See also Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 723-26 (cited in note 2)
(discussing the Soto decision).
177 476 US 79 (1986).
178 Id at 96-98.
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tions that make it constitutionally acceptable-namely, that it maxi-
mizes search success without creating a ratchet effect and combats
long-term crime. '79 If the state satisfies its burden, then the
challenging party should have the opportunity to rebut the state's
evidence.
The McCleskey requirement of proof of actual intent fails to rec-
ognize-as most observers do, and as the economic model of racial
profiling correctly assumes-that the police are intentionally using
race if they knowingly dedicate 60 percent of their searches to Afri-
can-American motorists. The question should be whether the police
have a constitutionally satisfactory reason for using race that justifies
the disproportionality. Requiring proof of actual intentional discrimi-
nation by a police officer from the challenging party places the burden
on the wrong party. If the police are going to engage in discrimination
by searching a disproportionate number of minority motorists, then
they should have the burden of proving that this will promote a com-
pelling state interest. Barring that proof, the disproportionate searches
are intentionally discriminatory and should be held to violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
B. An Alternative Proposal
1. The Fourth Amendment.
If there is an offending differential between races, then member-
ship in a racial group increases the probability of being an offender.
Race would represent, therefore, an element of articulable suspicion.
Does it amount to "reasonable suspicion" for purposes of a Terry
stop' ° or "probable cause" for purposes of a full-blown seizure? In
most cases, race alone may not, and in this limited sense, the Second
Circuit in Oneonta is right. But it all depends on how predictive it is. It
would justify a stop or seizure if race alone is either (1) so predictive
that it reaches the level of prediction that satisfies the standard of rea-
sonable suspicion or probable cause, or (2) predictive and, along with
other factors, contributes to a level of prediction that satisfies the
standard of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The key is to cal-
culate any relevant offending differentials to measure how prediction
based on race compares to the predictive power of other factors that
pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Absent an offending differential,
179 Here the analysis diverges somewhat from Batson, given that no court has held that the
state could satisfy its burden of proof at the second stage by demonstrating that minority jurors
are statistically more defense-oriented.
180 Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968).
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membership in a racial group should not be included in reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, either as the sole reason or as one among
a set of factors. Under either circumstance, the Fourth Amendment
would be violated by the inclusion of race in the decision to search a
suspect.
Take the Oneonta example. Let us assume that the description of
the perpetrator in that case was that he was a young black male. The
African-American population in Oneonta, including the college, was
in the neighborhood of 450 people. If we assume that a quarter of the
residents and half of the college students are young African-American
men-about 150 total-then the odds of any one young black male
being the perpetrator are 1 in 150. Clearly those are not the type of
odds that a court should associate with reasonable suspicion."" As a
result, it would be improper from a Fourth Amendment perspective to
detain for questioning-or for that matter more intrusively to seize
and arrest-young African-American men based on the witness iden-
tification. The police simply lack enough narrowing identifying charac-
teristics to begin fingering individuals on the basis of race, and they
must continue to investigate in other ways."'
2. Equal Protection.
If race does not correlate with the specific crime under investiga-
tion and is therefore not a reliable predictor of crime that raises justi-
fiable cause for investigation-in other words, if the use of race fails
Fourth Amendment scrutiny-then the use of race by the police also
does not promote the traditional law enforcement interest of fighting
crime." ' If, on the other hand, race is a reliable predictor of the pro-
filed crime, then further constitutional analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment is in order.
Fighting crime-actually reducing crime-would qualify as a
compelling state interest.' The key question, for purposes of equal
181 See Meares and Harcourt, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 791 (cited in note 131) (reporting a
1999 study finding 7.3 stops-to-arrest ratio for reasonable suspicion stops).
182 See Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 184 (cited in note 2) (comparing the predictive
power of the Oneonta profile to that of one "found in a fortune cookie").
183 Note that the use of race could promote other governmental interests. See note 130 (of-
fering examples).
184 Though some question this conclusion, I have no doubt that post-Grutter v Bollinger,
539 US 306 (2003), which deemed promoting a diverse student body a compelling state interest,
see id at 332-33, fighting crime most probably would as well. Banks argues otherwise: "The rec-
ognition of ordinary law enforcement objectives as compelling would represent a departure from
settled doctrine." Banks, 48 UCLA L Rev at 1119 (cited in note 146). Banks argues, "The Court
has never described ordinary law enforcement objectives as compelling, having on at least one
occasion specifically declined to do so." Id, referring to Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US at 556-57, which
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protection, is whether the use of race is narrowly tailored to serve this
interest, given that the intentional use of race as a factor in policing
would trigger strict scrutiny. ' The requirement of narrow tailoring
would preclude policing techniques that have unacceptable collateral
consequences on the profiled population, such as a ratchet effect.
Under this proposal, the equal protection analysis would logisti-
cally follow the three-step Batson model. With regard to the first
prong, proof of statistically disproportionate searches of minority mo-
torists would constitute a prima facie case and shift the burden of
proof onto the government. At this second stage, the government
would be required either to offer a race-neutral reason for the dispari-
ties, such as, for instance, the existence of other factors that eliminate
the racial correlation, or to present evidence that race is a reliable
predictor of the crime at issue and that racial profiling has a long-term
negative effect on the profiled crime while increasing the efficient al-
location of police resources. If the government is able to sustain its
burden, then the challenging party may either attempt to rebut the
showing or demonstrate a ratchet effect on the profiled population
that indicates that the policy is not narrowly tailored to the compelling
governmental interest of fighting the profiled crime.
The premise of this approach, naturally, is that the consideration
of race in policing-whether it is used as the only factor or as part of a
profile-should trigger strict scrutiny."' This is how race differs from
other predictive factors: it receives heightened scrutiny in contrast to
nonprotected categories, but it is not treated differently from the per-
spective of prediction. The proposed analysis accepts the "compelling
state interest" framework, and therefore the inquiry turns on whether
the police strategy is narrowly tailored to the governmental interest of
fighting crime-which, in turn, depends on whether the three narrow
conditions of justified racial profiling are satisfied. This approach
conceded the "substantiality" of the public interest served by interdicting illegal immigration but
declined to deem it compelling. See also Johnson, 93 Yale L J at 247 (cited in note 157) ("The law
enforcement interests at stake in detention decisions cannot meet ... the 'compelling state inter-
est' requirement."). In contrast, Alschuler argues that "[f]inding and prosecuting burglars surely
qualifies as a compelling state interest, and although not everyone agrees that the interest in
prosecuting drug offenders is compelling, appropriate deference to the judgments of legislatures
and other respected authorities precludes courts from denying that it is." Alschuler, 2002 U Chi
Legal F at 183-84 (cited in note 2) (internal citation omitted), relying on United States v Salerno,
481 US 739,749 (1987), which stated in dicta that "the government's interest in preventing crime
by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling." Alschuler has the better of the argument.
185 See, for example, Gratz v Bollinger, 539 US 244, 268-75 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny
to a University of Michigan admissions policy favoring minority applicants).
186 In this respect, I agree with Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 176-92, and, like Alschuler,
disagree with Oneonta.
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draws a sharp distinction between what is constitutionally permitted
and what is, ultimately, the most optimal social policy. It may very well
be the case that racial profiling passes constitutional scrutiny and yet
is a terrible idea for society.
This proposed approach contrasts with much of the critical com-
mentary, which either implicitly rejects the "narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest" framework in the context of racial profiling
or argues that racial profiling could not possibly meet this standard-
in other words, that racial profiling is per se a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Gross and Barnes, for instance, argue that the
consideration of race-solely or in part-plainly violates the Equal
Protection Clause."O They analogize to the death penalty:
[N]o American court would ever uphold a death sentence under
the Equal Protection Clause if the prosecutor admits that she
asked for the death penalty in part because of the defendant's
race, regardless of any nonracial factors that entered into that de-
cision .... McCleskey, however troublesome, merely made it diffi-
cult to prove discrimination in capital charging; it did not reach
the absurd conclusion that equal protection is satisfied as long as
a black defendant is not plucked at random from the population
and executed solely because of his race. "'
Gross and Barnes suggest that the same is true in the racial pro-
filing context. Thus, they argue, "a government decision to take action
against a person because of her race is almost impossible to justify."''
Gross and Barnes also suggest that there is simply no compelling in-
terest, given that the drug interdiction programs on the highway are so
ineffectual.' Gross and Barnes are joined by other scholars who simi-
larly argue that using race in the decision to search is a per se viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause."'
Though appealing, these arguments are exaggerated. In the first
place, the analogy to sentencing someone to death or to greater actual
punishment does not hold. All considerations of race will injure some
members of a racial group. Affirmative action in higher education, for
example, will harm some white applicants who will not be afforded the
187 Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 744 (cited in note 2).
188 Id at 740-41.
189 Id at 740.
190 Id at 750-53.
191 See Rudovsky, 3 U Pa J Const L at 312-13 (cited in note 8) (likening racial profiling to
race-sensitive sentencing schemes and concluding that both deny equal protection of the laws);
Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 12 (cited in note 8) (urging a per se bar); Maclin, 3 Rutgers Race &
L Rev at 125-27 (cited in note 8) (same).
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opportunity to attend the university of their choice or receive the
benefits of the diversity at that university. This represents an injury
that is the byproduct of taking race into account. '92 It does not mean,
however, that there is no countervailing compelling interest or that a
policy will never be narrowly tailored to that interest. The nature of
the compelling interest and the analysis of narrow tailoring will de-
pend on the amount of harm produced: race-sensitive death sentences
would certainly violate the requirement that the policy be narrowly
tailored to the law enforcement interest; searching more minority mo-
torists may not violate the requirement, especially if there is no
ratchet effect.
Alschuler advances a more nuanced argument, but one that also
is ultimately unpersuasive. Alschuler argues that "the demand for a
'compelling governmental interest' in all cases of racial classification is
misguided. This standard requires too little justification for some ra-
cial classifications and too much for others.''93 As a result, Alschuler
proposes that courts strengthen the standard in some cases with addi-
tional considerations, and relax it in others. Courts should relax the
standard in cases of "unobtrusive investigations":
For example, following an anonymous threat to avenge Vicki
Weaver by bombing a specified federal building on the anniver-
sary of Ruby Ridge, law enforcement officers near the building
should be allowed to watch whites more closely than blacks.
Recognizing the legitimacy of taking race into account in some
investigations might indeed have a "spill-over" effect, but this ef-
fect would not be regrettable.".4
Courts should strengthen the standard in other cases. Here, Al-
schuler posits the example of the young African-American male in
Pothole, a hypothetical inner-city neighborhood, in which reliable so-
cial science evidence establishes that an absolute majority of the
young African-American men carry concealed knives, and that white
youths commit this crime at a considerably lower rate.'9 Alschuler
192 To be sure, the impact on the white students denied admission can be recast as no injury
at all if we question the concept of merit, desert, and entitlement. But these are semantic issues.
From the perspective of the denied white students, they have suffered an injury that they would
not have experienced without race-based admissions.
193 Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 187 (cited in note 2). See also id at 221 ("In the end,
the talismans 'compelling governmental interest' and 'narrowly tailored measure' may not nota-
bly constrain decision. If the constraint provided by these words is not illusory, however, it is
misguided.").
194 Id at 187 (internal citations omitted).
195 Id at 169.
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suggests in the Pothole hypothetical that the constitutional standard
should be strengthened. The stops of young African-American men,
Alschuler contends, would neither violate the Fourth Amendment
standard since the odds are better than 50 percent, nor the Equal Pro-
tection Clause since the stops are tightly fitted to the compelling in-
terest of removing weapons from the streets. Yet, Alschuler argues, we
should demand more: "[C]oncern for distributive justice should not
vanish altogether whenever an interest labeled 'compelling' and a
suitable means-end fit appear."'" So, Alschuler concludes, "Pro-
claiming the government's interest in fighting crime 'compelling'
should not validate every crime-fighting measure likely to prove
effective. '
The problem is deciding when to relax or strengthen the constitu-
tional scrutiny. Is it based on particular racial sensitivities? The Ruby
Ridge hypothetical, for example, is provocative because it selects on
whiteness in the context of a morally offensive crime, namely domestic
terrorist activities that likely will result in the death of innocent chil-
dren in federal day care centers. But it involves a tightness of fit be-
tween race and offense that makes it unique. Randy Weaver-Vicki
Weaver's husband and the target of the FBI operation-was a white
supremacist. Though there may be some, there is likely not an abun-
dance of African-American white supremacists. Accordingly, it is fair
to assume, the probability is high-very high-that an operation to
avenge Vicki Weaver would be carried out by white persons. This
Ruby Ridge hypothetical differs greatly from Oneonta. Whereas in
Oneonta, one might fear a possible eyewitness misidentification or,
possibly, racial fabrication (A la Charles Stuart and Susan Smith), the
Ruby Ridge hypothetical features a far greater tightness of fit with
race. In effect, these examples significantly vary the probabilities asso-
ciated with the racial classification. It is more certain that the potential
offender in the Ruby Ridge hypothetical will be white, and there is
every reason to believe that the use of race here is more likely to sat-
isfy the narrow conditions that make racial profiling acceptable.
As for the Pothole hypothetical, if it is indeed true that more than
50 percent of African-American male youths carry concealed knives
but that far fewer white male youths do so, then race is a significant
predictor of knife-carrying among young men, holding constant youth
and gender. If we, as a society, believe that knife-carrying is a serious
crime, and the three narrow conditions are satisfied, then using race
196 Id at 220.
197 Id at 221.
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may be narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest and
thus constitutional.
This is precisely the line that separates constitutional adjudication
from social theory. The use of race in Pothole, if it satisfies all three
conditions, may be constitutional, and yet, from a social and political
perspective, completely destructive. So long as the courts accept the
traditional law enforcement interest in fighting crime as a compelling
governmental interest, there is no constitutional problem with racial
profiling if the three narrow conditions obtain.
In sum, the use of race in policing may be a constitutionally ac-
ceptable-though not necessarily socially desirable -practice under
the three narrow conditions just discussed. If the police are dispropor-
tionately searching minority motorists, then the police must bear the
burden of establishing that racial profiling advances these interests.
The simple fact is that race is a protected category and using race re-
quires an evidentiary showing. It requires that the government shoul-
der a responsibility. To satisfy their burden, the police would need to
offer reliable measures of certain key quantities of interest-
comparative elasticity, offending, and selectivity-and reliable proof
concerning the three narrow conditions. Given that no state or federal
agency has yet attempted to explain or successfully explained the dis-
proportionate searches of African-American and Hispanic motorists
in the jurisdictions where the new data reveal disparities, a reviewing
court should find the statistical evidence of racial profiting on the
highways to be sufficient evidence of unconstitutional police practices.
IV. ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF RACIAL PROFILING
The key questions, then, for purposes of both the empirical and
constitutional analyses, revolve around the three narrow conditions.
They are, to repeat, (1) whether racial profiling likely reduces the
amount of profiled crime, (2) while maintaining or increasing the effi-
cient allocation of police resources, (3) without producing a ratchet ef-
fect on the profiled population. Clearly, the new data on police
searches from across the country do not provide reliable observations
on the key quantities of interest necessary to resolve whether the
three conditions obtain, specifically the comparative elasticities and
natural offending rates within different racial groups. As a result, the
new data need to be supplemented. Nevertheless, we can begin to
make reasonable conjectures based on the best available evidence and
conservative assumptions about elasticities and offending rates.
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A. The Elasticity of Offending to Policing
The elasticity of offending to policing is the product of at least
two major mechanisms: deterrence and incapacitation. Increased po-
licing may deter some motorists from carrying drugs on their person
or in their cars when they are on the road out of fear of being
searched. Incapacitation, in the case of highway searches, would most
likely be a function of cherry-picking. If the police select motorists
based on multiple factors (tinted windows, marijuana stickers, etc.),
the hit rate will be high. As the police search more motorists, however,
they must relax selectivity; thus the hit rate will fall precisely due to
the reduced selectivity. Here, the lower offending is not the product of
a rational response by motorists, but a cherry-picking effect.
The cherry-picking effect is likely to be negligible. The data from
the Indianapolis roadblock searches-which netted drug possession in
4.7 percent of the total number of stops"8-suggest that there is
unlikely to be much incapacitation. The police in Washington State, for
instance, searched only 3.5 percent of the cars stopped, for a total of
only 23,393 searches for the period March 2002 through October
20029-which is, one can only assume, infinitesimal as compared to
the number of motorists on the Washington state highways during the
period. As a result, most of the elasticity, if any, will relate to rational
choice deterrence.
The deterrence effect is difficult to measure. Most research on de-
terrence has been conducted in areas where there is likely an incapaci-
tation effect, and researchers as yet cannot properly distinguish deter-
rence from incapacitation. The National Academy of Sciences exam-
ined the problem of measuring deterrence in 1978, with inconclusive
results: "[B]ecause the potential sources of error in the estimates of
the deterrent effect of these sanctions are so basic and the results suf-
ficiently divergent, no sound, empirically based conclusions can be
drawn about the existence of the effect, and certainly not about its
magnitude."'' 9 Little progress has been made since then. As economist
198 See Edmond, 531 US at 34-35.
199 See Pickerill, et al, Search and Seizure at 20 (cited in note 27).
200 Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, Report of the Panel, in Al-
fred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, and Daniel Nagin, eds, Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimat-
ing the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates 1, 42 (National Academy of Sciences 1978).
See also Daniel Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, in Blumstein,
Cohen, and Nagin, eds, Deterrence and Incapacitation 95, 135 (deeming current empirical evi-
dence insufficient to confirm the existence of a deterrent effect and "woefully inadequate" for
estimating its magnitude). See generally William Spelman, The Limited Importance of Prison
Expansion, in Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman, eds, The Crime Drop in America 97 (Cam-
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Steven Levitt wrote in 1998, "few of the[] empirical studies [regarding
deterrence of adults] have any power to distinguish deterrence from
incapacitation and therefore provide only an indirect test of the eco-
nomic model of crime. ' 'n°
More specifically, few studies address the elasticity of drug con-
sumption to price or policing. Price elasticities have not been empiri-
cally estimated for marijuana, cocaine, or heroin.2 As a result, the lit-
erature is all over the place on elasticities. Stephen Schulhofer, for ex-
ample, writes that "[a]vailable estimates nearly all find modest to sub-
stantial inelasticity in the overall demand for heroin and cocaine, es-
pecially in the short run" ;203 yet the study that Schulhofer refers to, au-
thored by Peter Reuter and Mark Kleiman, assumes that "the aggre-
gate demand for heroin may have quite a high elasticity."' Reuter and
Kleiman argue that it is fair to assume that "the elasticity of demand is
moderately high for heroin, a little lower for cocaine, and quite low for
marijuana. '' 205 The inelasticity may partly explain, in their words, the
"apparent lack of response of cocaine and marijuana consumption to
the increased federal enforcement effort." According to a 1972 study,
the demand for marijuana among full-time college students at UCLA
is relatively elastic: a 1 percent price increase causes a decrease as
20great as 1.5 percent in consumption. Schulhofer suggests, however,
that "some estimates find that marijuana demand-largely derived
from non-addict, recreational users-is also inelastic, possibly because
marijuana expenditures, even at currently inflated prices, remain a
small part of the user's income."' ' Given the lack of research in this
area, it is difficult to come to firm conclusions.
Another problem is determining the relative or comparative elas-
ticities as between different racial groups. Do minority and white mo-
torists have similar or different elasticities of offending to policing?
bridge 2000) (reviewing the literature on the deterrence hypothesis and noting the studies' in-
ability to separate deterrence from incapacitation or rehabilitation).
201 Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J Polit Econ 1156,1158 n 2 (1998).
202 See Peter Reuter and Mark A.R. Kleiman, Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of
Drug Enforcement, in Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, eds, 7 Crime and Justice:An Annual Re-
view of Research 289,299 (1986).
203 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Solving the Drug Enforcement Dilemma: Lessons from Econom-
ics, 1994 U Chi Legal F 207,223.
204 Reuter and Kleiman, Risks and Prices at 300 (cited in note 202), cited in Schulhofer,
1994 U Chi Legal F at 223 n 51 (cited in note 203).
205 Reuter and Kleiman, Risks and Prices at 300.
206 Id at 290.
207 Schulhofer, 1994 U Chi Legal F at 223 n 50, citing Charles T. Nisbet and Firouz Vakil,
Some Estimates of Price and Expenditure Elasticities among UCLA Students, 54 Rev Econ & Stat
473,474-75 (1972).
208 Schulhofer, 1994 U Chi Legal F at 223.
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There are reasons to suspect that they may be different. As noted ear-
lier, elasticity will depend on the existence of legitimate work alterna-
tives and there may be cause to believe that minority motorists as a
group have lower job opportunities.
Another issue relates to the perception among minority motorists
of the police and the criminal justice system. As Tracey Meares ex-
plains, "legitimacy matters more to compliance [with the law] than
[do] instrumental factors, such as sanctions imposed by authorities on
individuals who fail to follow the law or private rules. 21. Tom Tyler's
research on legitimacy and obedience to the law suggests that dispro-
portionate searches of minority motorists may take a toll on minori-
ties' perception of the overall fairness of the system, which might in
turn lead to more rather than less offending. If minorities believe that
they are going to be harassed by the police or supervised regardless of
what they do, minority motorists may lose faith in the system and ul-
timately become less law abiding. "' This mechanism could produce dif-
ferent rates of elasticity as between racial groups, as well as an upward
sloping offending curve at the tail end for minority motorists.
The bottom line on the issue of comparative elasticities is that
there is a paucity of good evidence one way or the other. As Nicola
Persico observes, there is practically no literature on the relative elas-
212ticity of different groups. If forced to speculate, the most reasonable
and conservative assumption would be relatively low elasticity across
the board, with slightly lower elasticity for minority motorists. Given
that most of the successful searches for drug contraband on the high-
way involve quantities of marijuana that reflect at most personal use
-68 percent in Maryland, for example"' -and that the elasticity ofmarijuana is either low or average, it seems fair to assume conservatively
209 Persico, 92 Am Econ Rev at 1474-75 (cited in note 3).
210 Tracey L. Meares, Norm Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 Or L Rev 391,400 (2000).
211 See generally Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale 1990); Tom R. Tyler, Trust
and Democratic Governance, in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, eds, Trust and Govern-
ance 269 (Sage 1998) (explaining that legitimacy stems from trust relations, which turn on expec-
tations of reciprocity and perceived status as inferred from treatment by group authorities); Tom
R. Tyler and Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and
the Courts (Sage 2002) (exploring the empirical basis and explicating the conceptual structure of
the interplay between trust and authority); E. Allan Lind and Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychol-
ogy of Procedural Justice (Plenum 1988). See also Jim Leitzel, Race and Policing, 38 Society 38,
39-40 (Mar/Apr 2001) (attributing the parallel stereotyping of police as racists and minorities as
lawbreakers to race-based policing and arguing that the concomitant police/minority hostility
undermines efficacious crime control).
212 While no studies have been conducted domestically, Avner Bar-Ilan and Bruce Sacer-
dote found in 2001 that "as the fine is increased for running a red light in Israel, the total de-
crease in tickets is much larger for Jews than for non-Jews." Persico, 92 Am Econ Rev at 1476.
213 Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 697 (cited in note 2).
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that overall elasticities are relatively low. Furthermore, African-American
motorists probably have lower elasticity than white motorists due to
lower employment opportunities and other market alternatives.
B. The Offending Rate
The term "offending rate" can have several meanings. First, the of-
fending rate could refer to the rate of actual offending in the different
racial groups given the present distribution of police searches. This is
the "real offending rate." It is calculated by dividing the total number of
members of a racial group on the road who are carrying contraband by
the total number of persons of that racial group on the road. This is a
quantity of interest for which we do not have a good measure.
Second, the offending rate could refer to the actual rate of of-
fending in a racial group when the police are sampling randomly -that
is, engaged in color-blind policing. This is the "natural offending rate."
Now, it is not entirely natural, because if offending is elastic, it will de-
pend on the amount of policing. But it is natural in the sense that, as
between racial groups, racial profiling has no effect. This definition of
offending rate can be measured only under conditions of random po-
licing and random sampling. While hard to measure, it represents the
only proper way to obtain a metric that can be used to compare of-
fending among different racial groups.
Under assumptions of elasticity, the "real offending rate" will
fluctuate with policing. The "real offending rate," by definition, will be
the same as the "natural offending rate" when the police engage in
random searches. If the police stop and search more minority motor-
ists, then the "real offending rate" will be smaller than the "natural of-
fending rate" for minority motorists -again, assuming elasticity. Un-
der assumptions of low or no elasticity, policing causes little to no dif-
ference in the "real offending rate." It will equal the "natural offend-
ing rate" no matter how disproportionate the policing.
In all of this, naturally, the offending rate must be distinguished
from the "hit rate"-the rate of successful searches. The two are re-
lated since the offending rate feeds the search success rate. However,
the hit rate is generally going to be much higher than the offending
rate because the police search selectively.
Now, with these definitions in mind, when someone says that
"minority motorists have higher offending rates," it must be the case
that they are talking about higher natural offending rates. Certainly,
this is true of economists. The whole idea behind the economic models
is that disproportionate searches of minority motorists will, as a result
of elasticity, bring down their real offending rate to the same level as
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that of white motorists. When the hit rates are equal, the real offend-
ing rates should be equal as well. Yet even when the real rates of of-
fending are the same, the assumption is that minority motorists have
higher natural rates of offending.14 Nevertheless, might the offending
rates intersect at some point? Perhaps. When someone says, "minority
motorists have higher offending rates," it simply is not clear whether
they mean "at each and every comparative degree of searching" or
only "for the most part." In other words, the natural offending rates
could possibly intersect at higher rates of searches. In effect, the natu-
ral offending rates could look like either of the following two
graphs-or any permutation of these graphs.
GRAPH 7
Consistently Higher Offending among Minority Motorists
0
-o
U
X-Axis: Internal Group Search Rate
(Percent of Racial Group Searched)
214 This is what Borooah means when he writes that "[i]f the likelihood of being stopped
was the same for blacks and whites, then the likelihood of being arrested after a stop would be
substantially higher for blacks." Borooah, 17 Eur J Polit Econ at 35 (cited in note 3).
I I . . . . . .
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GRAPH 8
Mostly Higher Offending among Minority Motorists
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These two graphs depict different elasticities of offending to po-
licing as between members of different racial groups, and they affect
whether the natural offending rates are consistently or mostly greater
for minority motorists. This in turn will have important implications
for whether racial profiling reduces the amount of profiled crime and
whether it produces a ratchet effect on the profiled population.
To estimate natural offending rates, it is important to distinguish
between types of violators: persons carrying drugs for personal use
and drug traffickers. It may also be necessary to explore offending
rates by drug given that there may be significant racial differences de-
pending on the specific type of drug being seized on the roads. The
place to begin, then, is by estimating natural carrying rates for per-
sonal consumption by drug. Here, we can turn to data on personal
. . . . . I 4 I
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consumption rates, including various self-report surveys of students
and adults, such as the Monitoring the Future Project, the Youth Risk
Behavior Surveillance System, and the National Household Survey on
Drug Abuse, public health data on drug abuse hospitalizations, and,
very carefully, some criminal justice data.
One caveat deserves mention before interpreting the data. The
goal, of course, is to measure natural offending rates. But this will
prove impossible if racial profiling is prevalent, which many people
believe to be the case. In a Gallup Poll conducted in late 1999, 59 per-
cent of total respondents indicated that they believed that racial pro-
filing by police officers is "widespread. 2.' This perception is even more
pervasive among African-American respondents: 77 percent believe
the practice is widespread."6 Moreover, among African-American re-
spondents more generally, 42 percent have felt that they were
"stopped by the police just because of [their] race or ethnic back-
ground., ,..
If there is a generalized perception of racial profiling, then the ex-
isting data on drug use and other crimes would already reflect possible
elasticity, if any, resulting from racial profiling or the perception
thereof, and in this sense, would indicate real as opposed to natural of-
fending rates. It may be necessary, as a result, to discount existing
drug-use offending rates. How this survey data affects offending rates,
naturally, depends on whether and to what extent offending is elastic
to policing. Assuming elasticity, though, the survey data would suggest
that the existing offending rates for members of minority groups may
actually reflect slightly higher natural offending if the racial profiling
is deterring, or slightly lower natural offending if the profiling is dele-
gitimizing the criminal justice system.
1. Carrying drug contraband for personal use.
a) Self-report studies. The Monitoring the Future Project
(MFP) is a cohort self-report study of high school seniors that is con-
ducted by the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research.
The survey data has been collected since 1975 based on a sample of
215 Ann L. Pastore and Kathleen Maguire, eds, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 111
(DOJ 1999) (Table 2.33) (defining racial profiling as occurring when "some police officers stop
motorists of certain racial or ethnic groups because the officers believe that these groups are
more likely than others to commit certain types of crimes"), citing George Gallup, Jr. and Alec
Gallup, 411 Gallup Poll Monthly 23 (Dec 1999).
216 Pastore and Maguire, eds, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics at 111 (cited in note
215).
217 Id (Table 2.32), citing Gallup and Gallup, 411 Gallup Poll Monthly at 18-19 (cited in
note 215).
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120 to 146 public and private high schools intended to be representa-
tive of the entire United States high school population. Since 1991, the
survey has been extended to include eighth and tenth graders, and in-
cludes racial and ethnic comparisons. The MFP data reveal that, for
almost all drugs, African-American students report lower use than
their white and Hispanic cohorts at all grade levels, suggesting that the
effect is not due to different drop-out rates as between users and non-
users. By twelfth grade, white students have the highest lifetime, an-
nual, and thirty-day reported use of marijuana, inhalants, hallucino-
gens, heroin, amphetamines, methamphetamines, sedatives, tranquiliz-
ers, and steroids in relation to their African-American and Hispanic
counterparts. White twelfth graders also report higher lifetime, annual,
and thirty-day use of cocaine, including crack cocaine, than their Afri-
can-American counterparts. 18 The following table reflects the 2001 and
2002 cohort responses:
TABLE 7
MFP Data for 2001 and 2002: Any Illicit Drug
The Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) is a na-
tional survey of high school students (grades nine through twelve)
conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention which
tracks high-risk behavior for purposes of studying youth mortality
218 Lloyd D. Johnston, Patrick M. O'Malley, and Jerald G. Bachman, 1 Monitoring the Future
National Survey Results on Drug Use, 1975-2002 113-15 (National Institutes of Health 2003)
(Table 4-9) (Publication No 03-5375), online at http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/
monographs/voll 2002.pdf (visited Aug 19,2004).
Grade 8th 10th 12th
Lifetime
% White 24 45.1 55.2
% Black 24.7 41.5 45.1
% Hispanic 34.7 48.2 53
Annual
% White 18.3 37.6 43.6
% Black 15.1 28.5 30.4
% Hispanic 24.8 36.2 39
Past 30 Days
% White 10.6 22.9 27.2
% Black 9.1 16.2 18.2
% Hispanic 15.3 21.4 23.4
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rates. The study includes reported lifetime ("having ever tried") and
current ("used once or more in the last 30 days") use of several drugs,
including marijuana, cocaine, inhalants, heroin, methamphetamine,
and intravenous drug use. For 2001, white high school students, in con-
trast to African-American students, report higher use in all available
categories. Hispanic students report higher use than white or African-
American students of cocaine and lifetime intravenous drug use .2'The
following table reflects the 2001 YRBSS data, including the percent-
age of students reporting a given behavior and a 95 percent confi-
dence interval:
TABLE 8
YRBSS Data for 2001n
Lifetime Current Lifetime
Inhalant Inhalant Lifetime Metham- Lifetime IV
Use Use Heroin Use phetamine Use Drug Use
% wtte 16.3 4.9 3.3 11.4 2.4% White (±2.2) (±1.1) (±0.5) (±2.1) (±0.5)
% Black 5.8 2.6 1.7 2.1 1.6%_Black (±0.9) (±0.7) (0.6) (±0.6) (±0.7)
15.2 5.5 3.1 9.1 2.5Hispanic (±1.8) (±1.1) (±0.6) (±1.9) (±0.7)
The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA) is is-
sued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Sub-
stance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. The survey,
conducted since 1991, samples household residents and persons in
219 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 51 Surveillance Summaries 10-11 (No SS-
4) (June 28,2002), online at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/ss/ss5104.pdf (visited Aug 19,2004).
220 Id at 38, 40,42 (Tables 20,22,24).
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noninstitutionalized group quarters over the age of twelve (excluding
only homeless persons who do not use shelters, active military person-
nel, and residents of institutional group quarters, such as jails and hos-
pitals). The NHSDA data place drug use by minorities at approxi-
mately the same level or lower than by whites, although usage varies
by drug. For 2001, overall thirty-day drug use stood at 7.2, 7.4, and 6.4
percent for whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics, respectively.21
The following table summarizes yearly data regarding the major drugs
for the period 1997-2001:2
TABLE 9
Percentages Reporting Lifetime, Past Year,
and Past Month Use among Persons
Age 12 or Older by Demographics
Any Illicit Drug Marijuana
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Lifetime
% White 38.17 38.17 42 41.5 44.5 35.55 35.51 37.1 37 40.1
% Black 31.14 33.16 37.7 35.5 38.6 28.53 30.25 32.1 30.8 33.1
% Hispanic 25.9 26.56 31.2 29.9 31.9 22.33 23.16 25.3 24.2 25.6
Annual
% White 11.28 10.43 11.4 11.2 12.9 9.09 8.45 8.7 8.6 9.8
% Black 12.12 12.99 13.2 10.9 12.2 9.9 10.61 10 8.6 9.4
% Hispanic 9.87 10.51 11 10.1 11.9 7.46 8.19 7.7 6.6 7.3
Past 30 Days
% White 6.41 6.09 6.2 6.4 7.2 5.17 4.98 4.7 4.9 5.6
% Black 7.48 8.23 7.5 6.4 7.4 6.1 6.57 5.9 5.2 5.6
% Hispanic 5.86 6.12 6.1 5.3 6.4 4.04 4.47 4.2 3.6 4.2
221 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA), 3 Results from the 2001 National Household Survey on
Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables (2001) (Table 1.26B), online at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/
nhsda/2klnhsda/vol3/Sectlvl_PDFW26-30.pdf (visited Aug 19,2004).
222 Data compiled from SAMHSA surveys from 1997 to 2001, online at http://www.oas.
samhsa.gov/WebOnly.htm#NHSDAtabs (visited Aug 19,2004). No data on crack or heroin use is
available for 1999-2001.
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Cocaine Crack
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Lifetime
% White 11.84 11.44 12.5 12.4 13.5 1.87 1.77 - - -
% Black 6.48 8.45 9.5 7.4 8.5 3.11 4.2 - - -
% Hispanic 7.33 8.86 9.2 8.8 10.8 1.58 1.86 - - -
Annual
% White 1.89 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.9 0.56 0.29 - - -
% Black 2.43 1.87 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.41 1.31 - - -
% Hispanic 2.01 2.26 2.3 1.7 2.4 0.39 0.7 - - -
Past 30 days
% White 0.59 0.69 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.22 0.09 - - -
% Black 1.36 1.26 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.77 0.86 - - -
% Hispanic 0.82 1.31 0.8 0.8 1 0.17 0.25 - - -
Hallucinogens Heroin
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Lifetime
% White 11.33 11.49 13.1 13.7 14.7 0.88 1.01 - - -
% Black 2.78 4.84 4.9 5 5.1 1.01 1.91 - - -
% Hispanic 5.66 5.31 7.8 6.9 8.1 1.36 0.7 - - -
Annual
% White 2.08 1.82 1.6 1.8 2.3 0.2 0.1 - - -
% Black 0.74 0.44 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.55 0.24 - - -
% Hispanic 1.67 1.55 1.4 1.2 1.6 0.57 0.14 - - -
Past 30 days
% White 0.87 0.77 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.05 - - -
% Black 0.37 0.15 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.43 0.14 - - -
% Hispanic 0.48 0.72 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.21 0.08 - - -
Overall, these surveys consistently reflect lower or equal reported
drug use among African-Americans as compared to whites, and prac-
tically equal-though in the case of cocaine higher-use among His-
panics as compared to whites.m
223 These statistics concern only illegal drugs. If we were to include prescription mood-
altering drugs, such as Prozac or Valium, the disproportionality may be far greater. The use of le-
gal mood-altering drugs exploded in the 1990s. As Joseph Kennedy reports: "Between 1987 and
1997, the percentages of outpatient psychotherapy patients using prescribed antidepressant
medications, mood stabilizers, and stimulants tripled." Joseph E. Kennedy, Drug Wars in Black
and White, 66 L & Contemp Probs 153,173 (Summer 2003). The consumption of these types of
drugs tends to correlate with higher-income white consumers, which suggests that, in reality,
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Although these general survey studies are widely considered a
better measure of the nature and extent of drug use than arrest statis-
tics or ethnographies,' their reliability is open to question. Research-
ers have tested the validity of survey data by comparing self-reported
drug use habits with other, presumably more accurate, measures of
drug use. The three primary tests are internal validity tests,m external
validity tests, 6 and biological testing.n For our purposes here, the rele-
vant question is whether any evidence shows that self-reporting by
members of minority groups is less reliable than by whites.
On the racial comparison question, one recent study found that,
while self-reporting grossly underrepresents the prevalence of drug
use in a population, underreporting does not correlate with race. The
researchers used respondent demographics to create a logistic regres-
sion and mined the data for demographic factors correlated with con-
firmedly honest self-reporting. The researchers found that African-
American arrestee crack users were significantly more likely to make
whites may consume drugs at a far higher rate than minorities. I thank Richard Posner for this
insight.
224 Lana Harrison, The Validity of Self-Reported Drug Use in Survey Research:An Overview
and Critique of Research Methods, in Lana Harrison and Arthur Hughes, eds, The Validity of Self-
Reported Drug Use: Improving the Accuracy of Survey Estimates 17, 18 (National Institute on
Drug Abuse 1997).
225 Internal validity is determined by looking at a respondent's answers to related items on
a survey. For instance, a survey response would be internally inconsistent if the respondent
claimed to have smoked marijuana in the last thirty days in response to one question and in a
later question denied ever having used any illicit drugs over the course of his lifetime. On the
other hand, researchers interpret the high correlation between estimates of friends' drug use and
aggregate self-reported drug use as evidence of the MFP's high internal validity. Both the
NHSDA and the MFP demonstrate a high degree of internal consistency. See Harrison, The Va-
lidity of Self-Reported Drug Use in Survey Research at 19-20 (cited in note 224). See also Lloyd
D. Johnston and Patrick M. O'Malley, The Recanting of Earlier Reported Drug Use by Young
Adults, in Harrison and Hughes, eds, The Validity of Self-Reported Drug Use 59 (cited in note
224) (using rates of recanting of earlier reported drug use to estimate self-report validity).
226 External validity is demonstrated through consistency between self-reports and an offi-
cial record, polygraph test, or confirmation from interviews of friends or family. Researchers
have found that the external validity of self-reported drug use varies with the type of drug in-
volved, but not with the race of the respondents. See Adele V. Harrell, The Validity of Self-
Reported Drug Use Data: The Accuracy of Responses on Confidential Self-Administered Answer
Sheets, in Harrison and Hughes, eds, The Validity of Self-Reported Drug Use 37,46-48,53.
227 In biological testing, urine and hair samples are analyzed for evidence of drug metabo-
lites and used to impeach or confirm self-reports. Several of these studies suggest lower than
hoped for validity for self-reporting. Royer F. Cook, Alan D. Bernstein, and Christine M. An-
drews, Assessing Drug Use in the Workplace: A Comparison of Self-Report, Urinalysis, and Hair
Analysis, in Harrison and Hughes, eds, Validity of Self-Reported Drug Use 247 (estimating actual
prevalence to be 51 percent higher than self-reports). Validity varies for different population
groups (arrested offenders versus office workers) and also for different types of drugs. See gen-
erally Harrison, The Validity of Self-Reported Drug Use in Survey Research at 26-28,31-32 (cited
in note 224).
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a truthful self-report as to use than either white or Hispanic arrestee
crack users. On the other hand, Hispanic arrestee opiate users were
significantly more likely to make an accurate self-report about use
than African-American arrestee opiate users. No statistically signifi-
cant race effects were found in the validity of self-reporting on mari-juana and amphetamine use. Another study found no race effect when
comparing the reliability of self-reported drug use by a former drug
treatment sample with their charges upon admission to treatment9
Other research, however, has reached the opposite conclusion-
namely, that African-Americans are in fact less likely than whites to
make true and accurate self-reports about drug use."° One such study
found, for example, that although the total rate of recanting on previ-
ous self-reports of drug use is quite low, African-Americans recant at a
significantly higher rate than whites when reporting lifetime use of
marijuana and cocaine for the MFP.2' Clearly, this would be the kind
of empirical evidence that we need to explore further when dealing
with evidence of offending differentials.
b) Public health data. Given the difficulty of self-report data,
another approach is to look at public health data. The Drug Abuse
Warning Network (DAWN), for instance, is a government program
that collects data on drug-related visits to nonfederal hospital emer-
gency rooms across the nation. The assigned DAWN reporter, usually
an emergency room physician, reviews the medical charts of all
patients and reports drug-related hospitalizations by drug. The follow-
ing table represents 2001 DAWN data, with additional percentage
calculations:
228 Natalie T. Lu, Bruce G. Taylor, and K. Jack Riley, The Validity of Adult Arrestee Self-
reports of Crack Cocaine Use, 27 Am J Drug & Alcohol Abuse 399,414 (2001).
229 Harrell, The Validity of Self-Reported Drug Use Data at 53 (cited in note 226).
230 See, for example, Thomas A. Gray and Eric D. Wish, Correlates of Underreporting Recent
Drug Use by Female Arrestees, 29 J Drug Issues 91, 100-01 (1999) ("The odds of self-reporting
recent cocaine use by whites were almost twice the odds of nonwhites."); Michael Fendrich and
Yanchun Xu, The Validity of Drug Use Reports from Juvenile Arrestees, 29 Intl J Addictions 971,
977-82 (1994); Russel Falck, et al, The Validity of Injection Drug Users Self-Reported Use of Opi-
ates and Cocaine, 22 J Drug Issues 823 (1992); W.F Page, et al, Urinalysis Screened vs Verbally
Reported Drug Use: The Identification of Discrepant Groups, 12 Intl J Addictions 439, 445-49
(1977).
231 See Johnston and O'Malley, The Recanting of Earlier Reported Drug Use at 72-74 (cited
in note 225).
232 There is also the question of whether school and home survey data on drug consumption
are reliable given that they may overlook homeless drug users and school dropouts. However,
roadway searches probably target persons with cars and more than subsistence income. Thanks
to John Pfaff for this point.
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TABLE 10
2001 DAWN Emergency Department (ED) Data for Selected Drugs 3
2001 Percent
White 351,245 55.01%
Black 139,375 21.83%
ED drug episode Hispanic 79,517 12.45%
Other 5,209
Race unknown 63,138
White 57,836 52.33%
Black 29,455 26.65%
ED marijuana mention Hispanic 12,877 11.65%
Other 875
Race unknown 9,470
White 71,531 37.06%
Black 80,022 41.45%
ED cocaine mention Hispanic 25,117 13.01%
Other 720
Race unknown 15,644
White 40,104 48.39%
Black 28,706 34.63%
ED heroin mention Hispanic 14,075 16.98%
Other 381
Race unknown 9,798
White 11,720 63.17%
Black 1,271 6.85%
ED amphetamines mention Hispanic 2,495 13.45%
Other 194
Race unknown 2,874
These data suggest disproportionately higher offending among
African-Americans and Hispanics for most drugs. Here again, though,
there are important differences by drug, and so it would be important
to specify offending rate by drug type for the particular drugs that are
being interdicted on the highway in the specific geographic locations
where racial profiling is taking place. And here too, there are ques-
tions about the validity of any inferences concerning real drug use.
233 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration, Detailed Emergency Department Tables from the Drug Abuse Warning
Network 2001 (2002) (Table 3.4), online at http://dawninfo.samhsa.gov/pubs_94_02/edpubs/
2001detailed/files/DetEDtext.pdf (visited Aug 19,2004).
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Drug-related emergency room visits may correlate with socioeco-
nomic status more directly than race. African-American and Hispanic
users may have less access to private doctors and individualized health
care, and therefore may rely more on emergency room medical assis-
tance. Naturally, this correlation would skew the data.
c) Search data. There are significant questions about the reli-
ability of search, arrest, and other criminal justice data given that they
are the product of racially disproportionate policing and thus fail to
reflect natural offending rates. We must be very careful with any of
this data.
Despite the distortions in the data, the internal rate (within each
racial group) of persons carrying drugs can be compared. The Mary-
land data may be useful here. In the 1-95 corridor, the police con-
ducted 2,146 searches from 1995 to 2000. Of these searches, 33.3 per-
cent involved white motorists (about 715), 59.7 percent involved Afri-
can-American motorists (about 1,281), and 5.9 percent involved His-
panic motorists (about 127). In other words, setting aside the small
number of Hispanic motorists searched because the sample is too
small and underrepresentative, the police practices provide a sample
of about 715 white motorists and about 1,281 African-American mo-
torists. Gross and Barnes break down those searches by race. What
their tables reveal is that the searches netted a greater proportion of
persons carrying drugs for personal use among white motorists. While
African-American motorists had a lower internal rate of carrying for
personal use, they had a higher rate of carrying evincing drug traffick-
ing or dealing (which I discuss in greater length below). These data
tend to corroborate the self-report surveys in revealing evidence of
slightly lower personal drug use among African-Americans than
among white motorists. Their tables reveal the following internal rates
of offending:
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TABLE 11
Internal Rates of Offending from Maryland Search Data24
African-American
White Motorists Motorists All Searches
No Drugs 59.7% 62.2% 62.7%
Any Drugs 40.3% 37.8% 37.3%
Trace or Personal Use
Quantities of Drugs 36.2% 22.4% 26.1%
Small, Medium, or
Large Dealer
Quantities of Drugs 4.2% 15.4% 11.2%
2. Drug trafficking and drug couriers.
The racial breakdown of drug traffickers, drug sellers, and drug
couriers is harder to gauge. Practically all of the data stem from law
enforcement operations and are therefore potentially biased by the
disproportionate attention to minority trafficking. In addition, there is
every reason here to be even more skeptical of self-report data-the
little that there is.
Human Rights Watch reports that the NHSDA, discussed earlier,
contained questions about drug selling during the period 1991-1993.
According to Human Rights Watch: "On average over the three year
period, blacks were 16 percent of admitted sellers and whites were 82
percent.. ' . Given that African-Americans represented 11.5 percent of
the United States civilian, non-institutionalized population in 
1992, '
the NHSDA reflects higher drug selling among African-Americans.
Naturally, all the same questions about the reliability of self-report
studies apply, if anything even more saliently. The more serious the ac-
tivity surveyed, the less reliable the data;27 however, there is debate,
again, over the comparative unreliability by race.
234 Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 703 (Table 17) (cited in note 2).
235 Human Rights Watch, Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on Drugs
ch 7 (May 2000), online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa (visited Aug 19,2004).
236 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration, National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Main Findings 1992 17
(1995) (Table 1.3).
237 See Harrison, The Validity of Self-Reported Drug Use in Survey Research at 29 (cited in
note 224) (observing that self-report studies are more accurate for the least stigmatized drugs
and least accurate for the most stigmatized drugs).
[71:12751370
Rethinking Racial Profiling
One of the very few other data points, then, is the search data it-
self. As Table 11 suggests, the internal rate of drug trafficking is higher
within the sample of African-American motorist searches: 15.4 per-
cent of African-American motorists searched are transporting quanti-
ties of drugs that suggest dealing, in contrast to 4.2 percent of white
motorists. The difference is actually most pronounced among medium-
and large-dealer quantities, where 12.2 percent of African-American
versus 2.4 percent of white motorists are transporting contraband.z
As Gross and Barnes explain:
Black motorists who were searched on 1-95 north of Baltimore
were more than three-and-a-half times as likely as whites to be
dealers, and five times as likely to be medium or large dealers....
Of the whites who were found with any drugs on 1-95, 10% were
dealers and 6% were medium or large dealers; of the blacks with
drugs, 40% were dealers and 32% were medium and large
dealers. 9
Clearly, this is an area for more sustained research. We may
speculate, however, that African-Americans have a higher offending
rate than whites for drug selling and dealing-though how much
higher is not clear- but similar offending for personal use, resulting in
a slightly higher offending rate overall.
C. The Likely Implications of Racial Profiling
1. The long-term effect on the profiled crime.
Based on reasonably conservative assumptions -first, relatively
low elasticity of offending to policing; second, slightly lower elasticity
of offending to policing for minority motorists; and third, slightly
higher natural total offending rates among minority motorists-it is
fair to infer that racial profiling on the highways may increase the to-
tal number of persons transporting drug contraband on the roads.
From equation (6) in Part I.B.1, we know, assuming minority motorists
represent 20 percent of the motorist population and have lower elas-
ticity, that racial profiling will increase crime if the ratio of white elas-
ticity to minority elasticity is greater than the ratio of minority offend-
ing to white offending-in other words if the elasticity differential is
greater than the offending differential. Given the paucity of evidence
on both relative elasticities and offending, the conclusion is tentative,
but under these assumptions, racial profiling probably increases the
238 Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 703 (cited in note 2).
239 Id.
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profiled crime. This certainly seems to be the case in Maryland based
on the little data we have. M Naturally, it would be crucial to do a more
nuanced analysis with better data, exploring the different types of
drugs being transported in the particular geographic location. It would
also be important to develop better data on comparative elasticity and
offending.
2. The narrow efficiency of searches.
Given that the police in most jurisdictions are stopping and
searching minority motorists disproportionately in relation to their
representation in the general population, it is fair to suspect that the
police are more discriminating in their stops and searches of white
than minority motorists. They likely use additional factors to narrow
down which white motorists they stop or search. If so, and if the police
are successful in doing so, then the selectiveness differential probably
masks higher real offending rates among minorities. Thus, the consis-
tent findings of equal to lower hit rates for minority motorists may
mean equal to higher offending rates for comparably situated minor-
ity motorists. It is, as a result, impossible properly to interpret the hit
rates and reach any reliable conclusion as to the narrow efficiency of
highway searches. Again, this is an area for further research.
3. The ratchet effect.
Racial profiling on the highways likely has a significant ratchet
effect on the profiled population. From the earlier analysis of the basic
racial profiling models represented in Graphs 4, 5, and 6, it is clear
that the police may have to subject a disproportionate number of mi-
nority motorists to criminal justice supervision to equalize offending
rates. In all likelihood, this is exactly what is happening in Maryland. It
is hard to imagine, even if we assume that minority motorists are of-
fending at a higher natural rate than white motorists, that minority of-
fenders represent 60 percent of all offenders under natural conditions
of offending (that is, if the police are engaged in color-blind policing).
After all, 84 percent of motorists in Maryland found with drugs had
trace or personal-use amounts, and 68 percent had trace or personal-
use quantities of marijuana only; and the survey data seem to suggest
that personal consumption of drugs is relatively even across racial
lines. Even if we assume that the other 16 percent of seizures-those
seizures involving large hauls of drugs-consist entirely of minority
240 See note 61.
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motorists,"" then minority offenders would still represent only ap-
proximately 31 percent of offenders. 
2 "
The most likely explanation for the disjunction between this hy-
pothesized offending differential in Maryland (30/70) and the actual
apprehension differential under present conditions of racial profiling
(60/40) is that, continuing to assume elasticity, it takes a lot of profiling
to bring the hit rates down to the same level. The result is a significant
imbalance in negative contact with the police- whether the seizure of
drug contraband results in a fine, an arrest, probation, or imprison-
ment. This represents a ratchet effect that has a significant cost to mi-
nority families and communities.
V. RETHINKING CRIMINAL PROFILING
Racial profiling on the highways may increase the overall number
of persons transporting drugs on the highways and likely produces a
ratchet effect on the minority motorist population. The real problems
with racial profiling, then, are not so much problems about race, as
they are about criminal profiling. They are problems that may plague
profiling schemes in general, whether based on race or on gender,
wealth, class, status, or physical demeanor. In this sense, the fact that
racial profiling on the highway is "almost uniformly condemned"'' 3 is
probably the right result, but for the wrong reason. The idea that "it is
plainly unconstitutional to use race as a criterion for choosing who to
stop or search"" is an exaggeration. So too is the political rhetoric sur-
rounding the use of race in policing, whether from the right or from
the left. This includes President George W. Bush's statement denounc-
ing racial profiling on the grounds that "[a]ll of our citizens are cre-
ated equal and must be treated equally,"4' and FBI Director Robert
Mueller's statement that "[r]acial profiling is abhorrent to the Consti-
tution,"2 6 as well as Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall's
declaration: "That law in this country should tolerate use of one's an-
241 Note that this would be an unreasonably conservative assumption. A more reasonable
assumption from the Maryland data is that approximately 84 percent of the dealer population is
African-American. See Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 703 (cited in note 2).
242 Assuming that 18 percent of the motorists are minorities, if minorities and whites offend
at the same rate with regard to 84 percent of the offenses (personal use seizures) and minorities
comprise all of the other 16 percent of the offenders, then minority motorists represent 31.12
percent of all offenders. (The equation is (18/100 * 84/100) + (16/100 * 1) = .1512 + .16 = .3112).
243 Gross and Livingston, 102 Colum L Rev at 1431 (cited in note 8).
244 Gross and Barnes, 101 Mich L Rev at 744.
245 Quoted in Mosher, Miethe, and Phillips, Mismeasure of Crime at 183 (cited in note 1)
(Statement to Joint Session of Congress on February 27,2001).
246 Alschuler, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 163 n 3 (cited in note 2), citing 147 Cong Rec S 8683
(Aug 2,2001).
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cestry as probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant under
any circumstances......
Though noble, these rhetorical statements are simply wrong. If we
accept that the government has a compelling interest in combating
crime and that the legislature has properly set forth prohibited con-
duct in the penal code, there is no valid constitutional barrier to using
race in policing if the three narrow conditions are satisfied. Race in
the policing context should not be treated differently from race in
other constitutional contexts. Closing the door to racial profiling as a
per se constitutional matter would also prohibit using race to remedy
discrimination in criminal justice. Just as there may be a compelling
law enforcement reason to engage in racial profiling, there may also
be a compelling governmental interest in reducing the minority repre-
sentation in the carceral population. If so, the argument here too
should be framed in terms of affirmative action, not in terms of bar-
ring the consideration of race in the criminal justice context.
In the end, the overwhelming opposition to racial profiling is a
beacon that should shed light on the larger issue of criminal profiling
more generally. This is counterintuitive because most people in the
criminal justice system endorse criminal profiling as a law enforce-
ment tool. Practically no one questions the practice. In fact, even those
most adamantly opposed to racial profiling laud the larger practice of
criminal profiling.2
The trouble is, though, that criminal profiling tends to aggravate
the prejudices and biases that are built into the penal law. The criminal
law is by no means a neutral set of rules. It is a moral and political set
of rules that codifies social norms, ethical values, political preferences,
and class hierarchies. Criminal enforcement priorities exploit and ex-
aggerate these values and preferences. The decision to expend a lot of
law enforcement resources on gun-oriented policing, for instance, in-
volves a tradeoff. It may mean less police presence on university cam-
puses, which may result in higher incidences of sexual assault. It may
mean less investment in enforcement of securities regulations and
more insider trading. It may mean less attention to identity theft and
more cases of credit card fraud. Where the state allocates law en-
forcement resources reflects not only a moral evaluation of harm and
a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis, but also importantly an ideological
247 United States v Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543,571-72 n 1 (1976) (Brennan dissenting).
248 Harris, Profiles in Injustice at 16 (cited in note 8) ("Profiles enable the police to create
portraits of criminals using facts instead of gut instinct or wishful thinking. Profiles can system-
atically pool collective police experience into information that is comprehensive, solid, and accu-
rate-something much better than ... simple intuition.").
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dimension that has a lot to do with class, power, and politics. As Jack
Katz suggests, any group that is the target of criminal law enforcement
is, at that point in time, either no longer an elite or in battle with the
established powers-or is, as Katz writes more provocatively, "a class
engaged in civil war.' +9
Most of the time, our criminal law definitions and law enforce-
ment priorities emphasize the frailties of some and ignore the frailties
of others. But human frailty is pretty well distributed across race, class,
and social distinctions. If we look carefully, it is even well distributed
across gender lines. Domestic murders, for instance, are almost even
male-female.m Criminal profiling serves only to accentuate the ideo-
logical dimension of the criminal law. It hardens the purported race,
class, and power relations between certain offenses and certain groups.
In this sense, it serves to polarize social and political divisions rather
than defuse them. This is, perhaps, acceptable if we think that we focus
on pursuing child molesters, terrorists, and serial killers. But the crimi-
nal law is by no means limited to these heinous and egregious crimes.
Instead, the criminal law preoccupies itself with the gray area-drug
use, delinquency, quality-of-life offenses.
Criminal profiling is problematic precisely because it exacerbates
the correlation between the profiled crime and the profiled trait, rein-
forcing the public perception that certain groups are more prone to
crime than others. It may be efficient to target resources this way, but
it also makes matters seem worse than they really are. If law enforcers
profile for adultery among politicians, they are likely to give politi-
cians a bad reputation. If regulators profile for crimes of financial
greed among industry leaders, they are likely to aggravate perceptions
of capitalist profiteering. If administrators profile for plagiarism
among historians, they likely are going to ruin the reputation of his-
tory as a discipline. If these profiles are accurate, then there is every
reason to perceive politicians as adulterous, industrialists as greedy,
and historians as plagiarists. Yet profiling will accentuate these asso-
ciations. And this becomes particularly problematic when only certain
offenses are criminalized, targeted, and enforced.
Racial profiling is likely to boost significantly the general percep-
tion that minorities are drug users and drug couriers and to distribute
unevenly criminal records, corrections, and post-punitive collateral
consequences. In this sense, racial profiling is an excellent example of
249 Jack Katz, Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil 318-19 (Ba-
sic 1988).
250 Id at 47 (reporting a 1978 study showing that women committed about 40 percent of
family homicides).
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how criminal profiling accentuates embedded prejudices in the crimi-
nal law. But the same problem would attach to any other form of pro-
filing, whether of the wealthy for tax evasion or of single mothers for
welfare fraud. The goal of our law enforcement should not be to ag-
gravate our prejudices about human frailty by optimizing on specific
traits, but to respond evenly to incidences of crime and thereby dis-
tribute the coercive force of the law more evenly across society.
There is an idea shared by most in civil society that the criminal
law merely polices the civil boundaries between individuals and is, in
this sense, neutral. This is a liberal political theoretic idea attributable
to Hobbes and Locke. The idea is that the civil laws serve as "hedges"
that keep citizens from interfering with each other and that the crimi-
nal law merely polices these hedges. The liberal tradition in the nine-
teenth century expanded on this insight, helping to define the hedges
in terms of harm. The harm principle represented a sustained effort to
locate the hedges in a neutral way, acceptable to all. In the twentieth
century, conceptions such as the veil of ignorance or neutral principles
were introduced to shore up the tattered neutrality of those hedges.
The criminal law, however, does not merely police the civil
hedges. The criminal law locates them. It places the hedges, and in the
process, distributes wealth, power, and social status. The criminal law
and criminal law enforcement are, in this sense, instruments that are
deployed by some and experienced by others. It may be hard to avoid
this. What can more easily be avoided, though, is allowing a few of us
to use criminal profiling as a leveraging mechanism to magnify and
accentuate those distortions.
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APPENDIX
A. Under Conditions of Equal and Constant Elasticity of
Offending to Policing
Assuming resource constraint, racial profiling will decrease the
profiled crime under conditions of equal and constant elasticity of of-
fending to policing if the minority motorist offending rate is greater
than the white motorist offending rate. This can be derived from the
definition of elasticity.
For purposes of notation, let r c {M, W} denote the race of the
motorists, either minority or white. Let PoPr denote the representation
of each racial group in the total population. Let 0, denote the offend-
ing rate of each racial group. Let A 0, denote the absolute value of the
change in the offending rate of the racial group from Time 1 (no racial
profiling) to Time 2 (racial profiling). Let Ir denote the internal search
group rate for each racial group. Let A I denote the absolute value of
the change in the internal search rate for each racial group from Time
1 to Time 2. Let S denote the search rate for the total population.
From the definition of elasticity, if minority and white motorists
have the same and constant elasticity, then the following is true:
(AOm/Om) (AOw/Ow) (Al)(AIM I M )  -(Aiw /i w )  (1
Given that, at Time 1, the police are engaged in color-blind polic-
ing, the internal group search rates are going to be the same for both
racial groups. In other words, we know that:
S = I M -= I w  (A2)
We also know that the change in internal search rates as between
the different racial groups will offset each other since we are assuming
a resource constraint such that there are fixed law enforcement re-
sources. This implies that S is a constant: the total number of searches
does not vary and the police merely distribute their searches between
white and minority motorists. Hence the search rate of minority mo-
torists is related to the search rate of white motorists. We can deter-
mine the relationship between the change in the internal search rate
for each racial group as follows, given that the Time 1 total search rate
will be the same as the Time 2 total search rate:
S= PoPMIM +PopwI w = PopM(IM + AIM)+ Popw(I w -Aw) (A3)
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If we work this through the same way we worked through equa-
tion (1) in the text, this implies that:
AIM = AIPP w  (A4)Pop M
Given that we are assuming a minority motorist representation of
20 percent, equation (A4) is the same as:
AIM = 4AIw  (A5)
Using equations (A2) and (A5), we can substitute values for the
denominator in equation (Al). Since we know from equation (A2)
that IM equals I, and from equation (A5) that the change in IM is four
times the change in I, then we know that one denominator in equa-
tion (Al) is simply one fourth of the other. Thus, from the definition
of elasticity, if minority and white motorists have the same and con-
stant elasticity, then the following is true:
AOM = 4AOw (A6)OM OW
Equation (A6) may be rewritten as follows:
AOw = 0.25Ow (A7)
AOM 0 M
We know from equation (3) in text that racial profiling decreases
crime only if:
0.25 > (A8)
AOM
If we substitute from equation (A7), this holds true only if:
0.25 > 0.25 OW (A9)
OM
To simplify:
OM > OW
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In other words, racial profiling will decrease crime under these
conditions only if the offending rate of minority motorists exceeds
that of white motorists.
B. Under Conditions of Lower Elasticity of Offending to Policing
for Minority Motorists
Assuming resource constraint and lower elasticity of offending to
policing for minority motorists, racial profiling will decrease the pro-
filed crime only under very specific conditions concerning the rela-
tionship between elasticities and offending. This relationship can be
derived, again, from the definition of elasticity.
If minority motorists have lower elasticity than white motorists,
then the following is true:
X(AOM/OM) (AOw/Ow) where x > 1 (All)(AIM/Zm) (AIw/IW)
If we let E. denote the elasticity of offending to policing for each
racial group, this is equivalent to saying that:
x E (A12)E M
Using equations (A2) and (A5), we can substitute values for the
denominator in equation (All). Since we know from equation (A2)
that Im equals I, and from equation (A5) that the change in IM is four
times the change in I, then we know that one denominator in equa-
tion (All) is simply one fourth of the other. Thus, from the definition
of elasticity, the following is true:
x AOM = 4 AOw (A13)OM OW
If we work this through, equation (A13) is the same as the follow-
ing:
AOw = 0.25x OW (A14)
AOM 0 M
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We know from equation (3) in text that racial profiling decreases
crime only if:
0.25 > AOw (A15)
AOM
If we substitute from equation (A14), this holds true only if:
0.25 > 0.25x 0 w (A16)0OM
To simplify:
0 M > x O W  (A17)
In other words, racial profiling will decrease crime under these
conditions only if minority motorists' offending exceeds white motor-
ists' offending times their elasticity differential x, which from equation
(A12) we know is E w / EM.
C. Under Conditions of Lower Elasticity of Offending to Policing
for White Motorists
Assuming resource constraint and lower elasticity of offending to
policing for white motorists, racial profiling will decrease the profiled
crime if minority motorists' offending is higher than white motorists'
offending. This can be derived, again, from the definition of elasticity.
If white motorists have lower elasticity, then the following is true:
(AOM/OM) x (AOw/10) where x > 1 (A18)
(AIm IIM ) (AIw /Iw )
Using equations (A2) and (A5), we can substitute values for the
denominator in equation (A18). Since we know from equation (A2)
that IM equals I w, and from equation (A5) that the change in IM is four
times the change in I w, we also know that one denominator in equa-
tion (A18) is simply one fourth of the other. Thus, from the definition
of elasticity, the following is true:
AOM = 4x AOw (A19)
OM Ow
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To simplify:
AOW - (A20)
AOM 4x O M
We know from equation (3) in the text that racial profiling de-
creases crime only if:
0.25 > AOW (A21)
AOM
If we substitute from equation (A20), this holds true only if:
0.25 > (A22)
4x OM
To simplify:
0 M  > (A23)x
But since x is greater than 1, this is going to be true whenever mi-
nority motorists' offending exceeds white motorists' offending. In
other words, racial profiling will decrease crime under these condi-
tions if minority motorists' offending is greater than white motorists'
offending.
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